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This book charts out a new phase in the global struggles around gender equality and 
sexual democracy: the ultraconservative mobilization against “gender ideology” and 
feminist efforts to counteract it. It argues that anti- gender campaigns, which emerged 
around 2010 in Europe, are not a simple continuation of the anti- feminist back-
lash dating back to the 1970s, but part of a new political configuration. Opposition 
to “gender” has become a key element of the rise of right- wing populism, which 
successfully harnesses the anxiety, shame and anger caused by neoliberalism, and 
threatens to destroy liberal democracy.
Anti- Gender Politics in the Populist Moment offers a novel conceptualization 
of the relationship between the ultraconservative anti- gender movement and right- 
wing populist parties, examining the opportunistic synergy between these actors. The 
authors map the anti- gender campaigns as a global movement, putting the Polish 
case in a comparative perspective. They show that the anti- gender rhetoric is best 
understood as a reactionary critique of neoliberalism as a socio- cultural formation. 
The book also studies the recent wave of feminist mass mobilizations, viewing the 
transnational revolt of women as a left populist movement.
This is an important study for those doing research in politics, cultural studies, 
gender and sexuality studies and sociology. It will also be useful for activists and 
policy makers.
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The demonization of “gender” and the  
crisis of democracy
In the fall of 2013 we accepted an invitation to participate in what promised 
to be an interesting exchange: a discussion on “gender” organized at the 
Dominican Church in Warsaw, a place known for featuring Catholic 
progressives and fostering public debate. A few minutes into the discus-
sion a smoke bomb was deployed by a group of extremists gathered in 
the audience, several men holding up a sign which read: “Gender equals 
666.” Clearly, someone believed demonic forces were in play – a thought we 
found highly amusing at the time. The church was promptly evacuated; the 
Dominican priests were shocked and apologetic. They said we should meet 
again soon, but ultimately no such invitation was extended (Graff 2014a). 
At the time, what was happening in Poland around women’s rights, the 
rights of sexual minorities as well as the concept of “gender” itself appeared 
exceptional or aberrant. We thought so, too. Polish conservatism seemed 
somewhat extreme and slightly grotesque. Still, we believed that dialogue 
with ultraconservatives was possible and much needed. After the incident 
at the Dominican Church, however, we began to understand that such 
exchanges might no longer be safe or even possible. The very word “gender,” 
previously a neutral- sounding term used by social scientists and cultural 
studies scholars in academia, was becoming the center of a new phase of 
culture wars.
Several years later – in the spring of 2020 – continuous attacks on feminists, 
liberal proponents of gender quality policies and the LGBT community have 
led to street riots and direct violence. In July 2019 the Białystok Equality 
March was attacked by 4,000 neo- Nazis, football fans and representatives of 
Catholic groups, enjoying the full support of the local Catholic Church and 
the Law and Justice (PiS) party (Dehnel 2019). Although representatives of 
the ruling party distanced themselves from the violent acts, claiming that the 
perpetrators were just hooligans, the direct incentive for these attacks came 
from the party’s leader Jarosław Kaczyński. In April 2019 he went on record 
claiming that “the LGBT movement and gender are a danger to our iden-
tity, our nation and our state” (Chrzczonowicz 2019). As the Covid- 19 pan-
demic unfolded in March 2020, one of the Polish bishops likened the virus to 






to the nation (Steinhagen 2020). The view that the pandemic is a punishment 
for homosexuality was also expressed by other priests, echoing views on 
AIDS that had been promulgated by ultraconservatives in the United States 
back in the 1980s. Spring and summer of 2020 witnessed a pandemonium 
of politicized homophobia in Poland: the entire presidential campaign was 
dominated by the theme of “LGBT ideology” as a threat to the nation and 
Christianity, and soon thereafter the Minister of Justice officially announced 
the intention to terminate Poland’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention, 
the Council of Europe’s treaty to prevent violence against women (Szczęśniak 
2019). In August 2020 Poland was again present in the world media as a 
country where police violence was used against LGBT activists, the rainbow 
flag becoming the emblem of resistance against the populist- right government 
(Cain 2020; Human Rights Watch 2020). Another wave of mass protests 
emerged in the fall 2020 in response to yet another assault on reproductive 
rights: the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal that deemed abortion in case 
of fetal abnormalities unconstitutional. On 30 October, in the midst of the 
Covid- 19 pandemic, almost half a million people, mostly of the younger gen-
eration, took to the streets of over 600 Polish cities and villages in what 
appears to be the biggest street protests since the Solidarity upheaval. While 
the demonstrations were triggered by legislation concerning abortion, the 
real stakes were expressed in thousands of homemade banners and popular 
chants demanding that the Law and Justice party “Get the f…k out!” For 
the first time in Polish history, the Catholic Church became the target of 
protests: young women entered local churches demanding separation of 
church and state. These events showed that gender, religion and politics are 
inextricably linked in the current moment: the conflict around “gender” is 
also a struggle over the future of democracy.
Is the rise in politicized homophobia and misogyny a uniquely Polish 
phenomenon? Why has “gender” become such an important and controver-
sial term in recent years? And what is the relation between the anti- gender 
movement and right- wing populists? This book seeks to explain the growing 
visibility and power of anti- gender movements, discourses and campaigns, 
and to conceptualize the relationship between anti- gender actors and right- 
wing populist parties in Poland and beyond. For decades, liberal feminism 
has operated on an assumption of progress: human rights discourse was 
successfully expanded to include women’s rights, liberal democracy was 
spreading, and gender studies were getting more and more sophisticated, 
inclusive and self- aware. Many women in Eastern Europe shared in this 
optimism with particular eagerness; gender equality was part of what was 
called “democratization” in the region. Meanwhile, things have gotten 
worse. Around the world, people committed to gender equality, plur-
alism and democracy have begun to share a sense of danger, perhaps even 
doom. In recent years, abortion rights, sex education and gender studies, 
gay marriage, transnational treaties concerning gender- based violence have 





and coherent global anti- gender movement. At the same time, the populist 
right has not only taken over Poland, Hungary, the United States, Turkey 
and Brazil, but also won the hearts of millions of people in countries with 
strong democratic traditions and relatively weaker religious influences, 
such as Germany, the UK, France and Sweden. Parties such as Vox in Spain 
and Lega in Italy have included the anti- gender agenda in their political 
platforms. They have undertaken large- scale campaigns against women’s 
and transgender rights, often in unison with ultraconservative networks 
such as CitizenGo. In short, millions of people in Europe and beyond have 
been mobilized against “gender ideology” and in support of what they call 
“family values.” We explore this phenomenon, its historical roots, cultural 
and political dimensions and its far- reaching consequences for today’s world. 
The book expands from the Polish example to discuss similar dynamics in 
other locations, also looking at international cooperation between various 
players in the anti- gender movement and in politics. We show that Polish 
anti- gender campaigns are a part of a broader resurgence of right- wing 
extremism and religious fundamentalism, a coordinated transnational effort 
to undermine liberal values by democratic means.
Gender in the populist moment
We conceptualize the recent struggles over “gender” as part of a broader 
conflict, where what is truly at stake is the future of democracy. The con-
flict between ultraconservative and progressive forces over gender equality 
and sexual democracy exemplifies a key aspect of the political dynamic 
which several scholars have dubbed “the populist moment” and the “popu-
list Zeitgeist” (Krastev 2007; Mudde 2004; Mouffe 2018). Ivan Krastev 
warns against the dangers of the populist moment, interpreting it as a time 
of intense anti- elite resentment, irrationality and increasing anti- democratic 
tendencies. He states:
the defining feature of populism is the view that society falls into two 
homogenous and antagonistic groups: “the people as such” and “the 
corrupt elite.” It proceeds to argue that politics is the expression of the 
general will of the people and that the social change is possible only via 
the radical change of the elite.
(Krastev 2007)
While we share his anxiety over the possible outcomes of such trends, our 
understanding of this phenomenon is closer to Chantal Mouffe’s, who sees 
it as “a new conjuncture” in which neoliberal hegemony is “being called 
into question by a variety of anti- establishment movements both from the 
right and from the left” (2018: 5). A crucial aspect of this dynamic is that 
many movements and parties claim to be giving a voice back to “the people” 




in forging and mobilizing disparate definitions of “the people” and their 
interests: exclusionary in right- wing populism and pluralistic in left popu-
lism. To cite Mouffe:
We can speak of a “populist moment” when, under the pressure of pol-
itical or socioeconomic transformations, the dominant hegemony is 
being destabilized by the multiplication of unsatisfied demands. […] 
As a result […] the possibility arises of constructing a new subject of 
collective action – the people – capable of reconfiguring a social order 
experienced as unjust.
(Mouffe 2018: 11)
Gender is at the heart of this political realignment. We argue that analyzing 
conflicts revolving around gender equality and sexuality is a necessary step 
in order to properly grasp the logic behind the current crisis of democracy, 
the global rise of the populist right and also the prospects for progressive 
opposition. The good news for feminists is that it is no longer possible to 
think seriously about democracy and politics while ignoring gender issues. 
This is equally true for the new populist right and for those on the liberal left 
who want to effectively oppose de- democratization. The bad news is that the 
right has been remarkably successful in its efforts to reframe the debate: they 
have managed to capture the word “gender,” to redefine its meaning and 
demonize it, making gender equality appear like an enemy of the people. 
This book aims to make sense of these developments from a feminist per-
spective, as we analyze both ultraconservative anti- gender campaigns and 
the mass feminist mobilizations responding to them.
We examine the campaigns against “gender” or “gender ideology” 
that have been spreading around the world since the mid- 2000s (e.g. 
Aghdgomelashvili et al. 2014; Graff 2014a; Grzebalska 2016; Grzebalska, 
Kováts and Pető 2017; Hennig 2018; Korolczuk 2014; Kováts and Põim 
2015; Krizsán and Roggeband 2019; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Verloo 
2018a). Opposition to the term “gender” and to gender equality policies 
is not new: due to its focus on reproductive rights, anti- gender mobiliza-
tion has been interpreted as a continuation of resistance to feminism and 
as yet another stage in the culture wars –  a global clash of pro- modern and 
anti- modern sensibilities, a countermovement against the gains of second 
wave feminism (Bob 2012; Corredor 2019). In fact, anti- genderists use 
the term “culture war,” depicting themselves as peaceful yet besieged, and 
warning against the alleged violence of genderists. For example, right- wing 
German sociologist Gabriele Kuby repeatedly uses combat- related words 
such as “weapon,” “battle,” “fight” and “threat,” calling for resistance to 
“the 200- year cultural war to create autonomous, manipulable, controllable 
people” (2015: 17). This morally heightened militant rhetoric should not 
divert our attention from the actual goals of the struggle against “gender.” In 







for a wholesale elite change in the spheres of politics, culture, education and 
transnational institutions, ending the decades- long ideological and political 
dominance of progressive liberalism in the West.
For several decades, a key issue in the culture wars has been the politics 
of reproduction, as evidenced by the history of conservative resistance to 
UN population policies (see, e.g. Bob 2012; Buss 2004; Buss and Herman 
2003; Chappell 2006; Favier 2015; Omang 2013). The present wave of 
global ultraconservative activism – with its characteristic focus on the word 
gender – is rooted in the Vatican’s opposition to gender equality policies 
promoted on the transnational level after the 1995 Beijing World Conference 
on Women. At the time, a loose- knit cooperation of multi- denominational 
organizations and groups coalesced around “traditional family values.” It 
gradually evolved into what Bob (2012) calls a “Baptist- burqa” network, 
an interfaith alliance that cooperates internationally on different policy 
goals. Locally, specific aims have included defending conservative Christians 
persecuted for home- schooling their children in Germany, providing legal 
and ideological support for legislation outlawing abortion in Nicaragua and 
speaking against gay rights in Uganda (Bob 2012: 37– 38; Kaoma 2012).
In the last decade these struggles have grown considerably more complex, 
while alliances between different actors have changed. This is partly because 
of economic and political factors, such as the growth of Islamophobia 
following 9/ 11 and the 2015 “refugee crisis.” Due to the fact that the popu-
list right has embraced strong anti- Muslim sentiments the Baptist- burqa 
alliance has largely been dissolved on a transnational level, thus fundamen-
talist Muslim and Islamist groups are not a part of the global anti- gender 
movement. Nonetheless, some conservative Muslims and Christians con-
tinue to collaborate both locally, as in the case of the 2019 battles over sex 
education in Birmingham (BBC News 2019), and globally at the level of 
transnational institutions such as the United Nations (UN). As reported by 
the Catholics for Human Rights advocacy group:
The Holy See’s coalition building at the UN over the past two decades 
has revealed that disparate groups such as highly conservative Muslim 
governments (i.e. Egypt and Saudi Arabia) or religious traditions like 
Mormonism and Evangelical Christianity are united in a common desire 
to prevent women from having control over their bodies and their fer-
tility and to prevent gender non- conforming people and LGBT people 
from achieving protection under the law and freedom from violence and 
discrimination.
(Catholics… 2019: 15)
What has also changed during the last decade is the level of acceptance in 
most Western countries for new family configurations. This shift includes the 
legalization of gay marriage and growing acceptance for homosexual fam-





including IVF and surrogacy. These developments are perceived by con-
servative groups as a threat to the “natural order of things” and part of a 
global plan to dissolve the “traditional” heterosexual family. Anti- gender 
pundits consider biomedical intervention in the human body as an extension 
of Malthusianism and eugenics, both of which they see as the foundation 
of contemporary transnational gender policies.1 Ultraconservative actors 
frame these developments in terms of decline of Christian civilization: gender 
equality is presented as a path to degeneration and demographic decline, a 
theme that occasionally takes on explicit racist undertone. The falling fertility 
rates in Europe are juxtaposed against dynamic population growth among 
ethnic minorities and the influx of immigrants and refugees, both of which 
will allegedly result in the ultimate fall of the West (Gökarıksel et al. 2019).
Anti- gender mobilization comes in different shapes and forms, depending 
on the local cultural and political dynamics. In some cases, e.g. France, it 
includes strong opposition to assisted reproduction reflecting the ideological 
conflict about the nature/ culture frontier. In other locations, such as Poland 
and Russia, the focus of anti- gender campaigns is to demonize non- normative 
sexualities and family configurations, whereas in Spain the central target is 
anti- violence legislation, which is reframed by the anti- gender movement 
as an attack on the family. In one way or another politics of reproduction, 
kinship and hierarchy of power between genders are always at the center of 
anti- gender campaigns. One way to connect these diverse themes is through 
masculinity: what is really at stake here is the social status of men in general 
and the role of the father in the family (Golec de Zavala and Bierwiaczonek 
2020; Gökarıksel et al. 2019; Kimmel 2013). Birgit Sauer argues persua-
sively that right- wing populism can be interpreted as a masculinist identity 
politics, an effort to restore the authority of men, allegedly reduced to sub-
ordinate position by well- educated women and migrants:
In this discourse of drawing boundaries, of exclusion and “Othering,” 
right- wing populism contributes to the self- affirmation of masculinity 
by offering points of reference for the re- establishment of traditional 
gender constellations and thus for the abolishment of gender equality 
policies. The right- wing interpellation of the “little man in the streets” 
is part of a masculinist identity politics, which includes the promise that 
a charismatic leader might increase the self- confidence of subordinated 
masculinities.
(2020: 30)
The conflict is not merely one over the rights or prerogatives of men as a 
group, but also the ways in which democracy itself is gendered. Myra Marx 
Ferree (2020) claims that the current wave of masculinism is a reaction to 
an ongoing shift within liberal democracy, namely the transition from an 
understanding of democracy as “brotherhood” toward a truly inclusive 





are equal both in the family and in politics. This new model is being vio-
lently contested, various conservative movements coming to the defense of 
the ancien régime.
What sets present- day anti- gender campaigns apart from earlier forms of 
backlash is not just their focus on the term “gender,” but also their close rela-
tionship to right- wing populism. As we show throughout this book, contem-
porary anti- gender discourse is structured as a populist discourse, in that it 
persistently juxtaposes innocent, gender- conservative people, whom it claims 
to represent, against corrupt, immoral elites who are accused of spreading 
“gender ideology.” Anti- gender actors consistently position themselves as 
warriors for justice and defenders of ordinary people against the corporate 
greed of global capital. Thus, they list among their enemies not only trans-
national institutions such as the UN and World Health Organization, but 
also iconic figures of global capitalism such as George Soros and Bill Gates, 
pharmaceutical companies seeking to sell contraception and the medical 
establishment offering abortion and IVF.
Populist right- wing parties in many locations have allied themselves with 
ultraconservative religious actors and embraced anti- gender rhetoric in order 
to enhance their popular appeal as defenders of the common people against 
the depraved elites. We call this relationship an opportunistic synergy, a 
dynamic that includes political alliances, ideological affinities and organiza-
tional ties that enable wide- scale elite change in governmental bodies, aca-
demia, cultural institutions and civil society. Ultraconservative organizations 
provide the cadres that right- wing populists need in order to seize control 
over society: individuals who make their way into key institutions such as 
the Supreme Court and ministries as well as various bodies controlling civil 
society, culture and the media (e.g. Mierzyńska 2020a). The values promoted 
by these groups constitute the ideological basis of the new elites, and hence 
of society.
The vilification of “gender” serves to fuel polarization and to delegitimize 
political opponents, liberal pundits and civil society leaders as corrupt elites. 
In some contexts, this vilification is primarily moral and religious, in others– 
e.g. in Sweden – it is based on the argument that gender theory is unscientific 
and defies the rules of critical thinking. The alliance is part and parcel of a 
broader project of elite change in all spheres of political and social life.
While mutually beneficial, the ties between these two groups are by 
no means stable, nor do they lead to the same consequences in different 
contexts. Right- wing populists appear to strengthen their ultraconservative 
affiliations during electoral campaigns. Conversely, ultraconservatives gain 
visibility and political influence when right- wing populist parties ascend to 
power. While right- wing populists themselves may not be necessarily gender 
conservative, as the examples of the Scandinavian context aptly show, 
they appear to benefit from the vilification of “gender” initiated by their 
ultraconservative allies. Poland is a spectacular example of how opportun-
istic synergy works to the advantage of both sides: anti- gender activism has 
 
8 Introduction
helped populists into power, and once Law and Justice had won elections, 
anti- gender actors gained substantial access to money, political institutions 
and decision- making processes.
Positionality and methods
The insights presented in this book are the outcome of our engagements 
as feminist scholars and activists working at the intersection of academia 
and civil society in Poland and Sweden. The analysis results from partici-
pation in several collaborative projects, which emerged in response to anti- 
gender campaigns in the European context. We have participated in events 
organized as part of several international groups, including the networks 
“Anti- Gender Crusades in Europe: Mobilizations against Equality” initiated 
and coordinated by the Ebert Foundation in Budapest, and “Anti- Gender 
Movements on the Rise” organized by the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Berlin. 
As activists, we are affiliated with initiatives, bodies and organizations, some 
of which have been targeted by the anti- gender campaign.2 Since the out-
break of the “war on gender” in the Polish context around 2012 (Desperak 
2016; Graff 2014a; Graff and Korolczuk 2017; Morska 2014), we have 
participated in a number of public debates and confrontations concerning 
“gender ideology” in Polish media and public institutions, realizing over time 
that we are witnessing a coordinated effort aimed at delegitimizing gender 
research and ultimately gender equality policies and projects. Occasionally, 
the subject of our analysis became part of our embodied experience: when 
we participated as observers in a demonstration against sex education in 
schools in September 2015 in Warsaw, or when facing the smoke bomb 
deployed by radical right- wing activists during a public debate on gender. 
In short, we are what anti- genderists call “gender ideologues.” Our aim, 
however, is not to debunk and ridicule but to understand (cf. Avanza 2018). 
Committed to grasping the internal logic of our opponents’ worldview and 
the sources of its mass appeal, we examine anti- genderism as an ideology 
and moral sensibility deeply at odds with our own, but nonetheless one 
deserving of scholarly attention. At times we quote anti- genderists at length, 
giving them a chance to speak in their own voices.
This study builds on two sets of data. The first consists of anti- gender 
literature: official statements by, and interviews with, various popes and 
bishops, pastoral letters, articles and statements published on the webpages 
of specific groups and organizations, media reports, as well as interviews 
with some of the representatives of the anti- gender movement.3 We also 
examined the genre of anti- gender books, many of them written by women, 
striving to understand the ideological tenets of anti- genderism. For this pur-
pose, we conducted textual analyses of books and articles by key author-
ities in the European anti- gender circuit, including Gabriele Kuby (2015) 
and Marguerite Peeters (2007), as well as their Polish counterparts such as 










as Dyktatura gender (Chrostowski et al. 2014). We examined interviews 
with, and public statements by, key proponents of anti- genderism world-
wide, media coverage of anti- gender events, and various materials published 
on the websites of specific movements and organizations in Poland (Ordo 
Iuris Institute, Mother and Father Foundation, No to Gender!), as well 
as globally (the World Congress of Families, Agenda Europe, CitizenGo, 
Tradition, Family and Property). We followed Polish online initiatives, such 
as www.stopgender.pl as well as international platforms such as www.
lifesitenews.com.
Finally, we participated in anti- gender rallies in Warsaw in 2015 and 
studied media reports and research on related mobilizations in other coun-
tries, which included the anti- LGBT and antifeminist backlash in Putin’s 
Russia, Ukraine and Georgia; demonstrations against marriage equality 
in France (La Manif Pour Tous), the rise of anti- gay violence and legisla-
tion in other regions, including some African countries (e.g. Uganda’s Anti- 
Homosexuality Act of 2014), the role that controversies on gender equality 
played in the protests against Judith Butler’s visit to Brazil in 2017. Finally, 
in March 2019 we participated in the World Congress of Families in Verona, 
Italy and took part in a feminist counter- event organized under the banner 
“Verona, city of freedom!”
What interests us is not only the ideological framework linking these 
phenomena, but also the emotional dynamics and action repertoires. While 
our analysis focuses mostly on the Polish case, we strive to reconstruct the 
key tenets of anti- genderism as an ideology and strategy for social mobiliza-
tion far beyond our local context. Finally, we refer to events which we have 
experienced firsthand, as participant observers of numerous demonstrations 
and public debates. The most recent campaign examined in this book was 
initiated by the Law and Justice party in the summer of 2019 – at this stage, 
our sources include speeches by politicians and clergymen, who revived the 
anti- gender rhetoric in a massive attack on what was now called “LGBT 
ideology” as well as texts and images employed by the LGBT movement 
and its allies in response to this campaign. Our sources also include existing 
research on the anti- gender movements in Europe and the United States, 
including both academic analyses and institutional reports that we refer to 
throughout the book (e.g. Alonso and Lombardo 2018; Case 2016; Datta 
2018; Garbagnoli 2016; Grzebalska 2016; Grzebalska, Kováts and Pető 
2017; Hennig 2018; Kováts and Põim 2015; Krizsán and Roggeband 2019; 
Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Meyer and Sauer 2017; Rivera 2019; Verloo 
2018a; Villa 2017).
The second set of data includes documents from, and scholarly studies 
of, mass mobilization against the abortion ban in Poland in 2016 and 2017 
(Black Protests and Polish Women’s Strike). Our own analysis is based on 
examination of media coverage of women’s protests as well as texts and 
materials produced by the activists, e.g. speeches, essays, interviews, materials 







networking sites, blogs, websites of emerging or existing organizations, such 
as the Facebook groups of Gals4Gals (Dziewuchy Dziewuchom) and the 
Polish Women’s Strike (Ogólnopolski Strajk Kobiet, OSK) constituting a wide 
array of densely interconnected virtual communities. We also studied media 
reports on related mobilizations in other countries (including Argentina, 
Brazil, Croatia, Italy, Spain, South Korea). Our data consist also of notes made 
during participatory observations of the protests, both online and offline, as 
well as interviews conducted with activists. Since late March 2016, when plans 
to change the abortion law in Poland were announced, we have participated 
in a number of public debates and events concerning reproductive rights 
organized by activist groups, public institutions and Polish media. Finally, we 
engage in a dialogue with existing research on the protests, both academic 
and activist (e.g. Chmielewska et al. 2017; Murawska and Włodarczyk 2016; 
Gunnarsson Payne 2020a, 2020b; Kubisa and Rakowska 2018; Majewska 
2016, 2018; Ramme and Snochowska Gonzalez 2018; Suchanow 2020).
In the course of the events examined in this book, we repeatedly 
switched between the roles of observers (as in the case of the anti- gender 
demonstrations) and participant observers (during feminist protests, 
Equality Marches and at the World Congress of Families in Verona). As 
feminist scholars and activists we helped organize and took part in some 
protests against the abortion ban as invited speakers, e.g. during the rally 
in front of the parliament on 3 April 2016. We experienced directly what 
other participants were experiencing, we took detailed notes, made pictures 
and collected materials, e.g. leaflets. Unlike most participants of the Black 
Protests, we were also aware of some of the internal dynamics of discussions 
and communication inside the groups initiating and organizing the events. 
While some researchers strive for the position of a disengaged observer to 
ensure “objectivity” and “distance” toward the subjects of the study, we 
agree with Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln who claim that “there 
are no objective observations, only observations socially situated in the 
worlds of – and between – the observer and the observed” (2011: 12). This 
is why we deploy a range of interconnected interpretive methods to better 
understand the dynamic of the events in question.
The aims and contents of the book
This is not a book about feminism and anti- feminism. Rather, it aims to 
demonstrate the significance of struggles over gender issues to broader pol-
itical struggles. We write for those who want to understand the ongoing 
wave of right- wing populism and are not satisfied with the answers cur-
rently provided by political science and sociology. We believe that what is 
missing in the growing literature on populism is awareness of the centrality 
of gender issues within this new political culture.
We also hope to reach a feminist public: activists and scholars interested 






troubled by the scale and intensity of opposition to gender and sexual 
equality. We aim to move beyond the concept of backlash (Faludi 2006), 
which has framed these debates for three decades now. We invite readers to 
consider how anti- feminism feeds on and contributes to broader political 
developments. Our analysis of the anti- gender movement is embedded in 
important recent debates on the links between feminism and neoliberalism 
(Fraser 2009; Eisenstein 2012; Rottenberg 2018): we claim that the oppos-
ition to gender as a concept and political practice has become an important 
part of the resistance toward neoliberalism – a trend which feminists tend to 
ignore at their own hazard.
We show that anti- gender mobilization seeks to establish discursive and 
political hegemony of an ultraconservative agenda under the guise of defense 
of an oppressed majority against a corrupt elite. The grassroots feminist 
mass mobilization which emerged as a response to this trend – including 
Poland’s Black Protests, Ni Una Menos movements in Argentina, Women’s 
March in the United States, the Repeal the 8th Campaign in Ireland – can 
be viewed as a left-populist reaction to right- wing populism (Gunnarsson 
Payne 2019, 2020; Korolczuk et al. 2019). In other words, contemporary 
struggles over gender and specifically sexual and reproductive rights can 
only be properly understood as part of the populist shift in politics.
Chapter 1 provides theoretical grounding for the entire book. We present 
the core categories of this study: gender and gender ideology, populism, neo-
liberalism, and affect, explaining in what ways they relate to each other. We 
discuss how the term “gender” is used in anti- gender discourse, and why it has 
become so central for the collaboration between ultraconservative movements 
and right- wing populists. We also challenge the view that the current wave of 
anti- feminism is the result of a symbiosis between neoliberalism and conserva-
tism on the right. One of the core arguments of this book is that the anti-gender 
movement is so effective in attracting massive support because it is structured 
and legitimized as a conservative response to the excesses of neoliberalism.
In Chapter 2 we discuss the intellectual sources of anti- genderism and 
map out the transnational anti- gender movement, providing a basic sketch 
of our argument. We discuss the key role of the Vatican in developing the 
claims used in anti- gender campaigns and the subsequent development of a 
religious movement into a political one, stressing the importance of the East- 
West divide for the moral and political geography of this movement. We 
then explain how ultraconservative actors moralize the socio- economic crisis 
in their campaigns in order to mobilize large groups of citizens, including 
parents of young children. Finally, we discuss briefly the rise of the new wave 
of feminist activism as a countermovement to anti- gender campaigns.
Chapter 3 tells the story of Poland’s anti- gender campaigns and seeks 
to explain how they connect to both the rise of the populist right to power 
and their subsequent assaults on reproductive rights and LGBT people. We 
examine three stages of the campaign, showing how the focus changed over 





political uses and abuses of “gender” analyzing how anti- gender campaigns 
changed people’s views on specific issues, and which social groups turned to be 
most susceptible to these arguments. Differences between Poland and Western 
countries are addressed: whereas in the latter references to gender equality 
have been employed in a femonationalistic fashion by right- wing actors to 
vilify refugees as “barbarians,” in Poland anti- feminist ethno- nationalist rhet-
oric has been much more pronounced. Our main concern is to capture the 
dynamic of collaboration between right- wing populists and ultraconservatives 
which we call opportunistic synergy: to pinpoint the common discursive 
tropes and the interlocking (but by no means identical) interests and aims.
In Chapter 4 we look closely at anti- genderism as an ideological construct 
and a cohesive discourse, focusing on its affinity to right- wing populism, 
i.e. the way it constructs a division between “pure people” and “corrupt 
elites.” We examine closely the massive discursive appropriation at the heart 
of anti- gender discourse: the conservative version of anti- colonial rhetoric, 
which we claim is prominent especially in Eastern Europe and Global South. 
Through its use of the anti- colonial frame, anti- gender discourse manages to 
combine ultraconservatism with a critique of neoliberalism: it vilifies both 
global and local elites accusing them of “ideological colonization.” Feminism 
is thus presented as an integral part of neoliberalism, while “traditional 
family” becomes the last frontier of resistance, a source of hope and a reser-
voir of solidarity. We show how the use of the anti- colonial frame allowed 
the populist right to undermine the left- wing monopoly on voicing critique 
toward capitalism. Anti- colonialism is a populist meta- discourse that trumps 
many particularisms and conflicts by stressing the need to defend ordinary 
people, the poor, the helpless, the abused against a network of corrupt global 
elites. Today, anti- genderism has become the new language of anti- capitalist 
mobilization, which has profound consequences for the left.
Chapter 5 examines the cultural imaginary of anti- genderism and the ways 
it appeals to the emotions of parents: the stories it tells about identity, desire, 
family and sources of personal happiness. This chapter analyzes parental 
mobilizations against “gender” and examines specific images and arguments 
to show how emotions are triggered. We also show how these imageries are 
linked to material realities and social politics. At the heart of anti- genderism 
is the image of the child in danger: “genderism” is said to cause loneliness 
and unhappiness. Parents of young children are mobilized by anti- gender 
groups and networks through campaigns against the “sexualization” of chil-
dren allegedly caused by sex education. Men are promised the restoration 
of paternal authority, while women are addressed by presenting gender and 
feminism as antithetical to motherhood and the source of a demographic 
catastrophe. Anti- genderism conflates “gender” with those aspects of capit-
alism that are most distressing to members of the lower- middle class, espe-
cially to parents: the crisis of care, precarity and growing inequality.
In Chapter 6 we shift our attention to feminist efforts to counteract 
assaults on gender and sexual equality. We focus mostly on Poland’s Black 
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Protests: the mass movement of 2016– 2018 against the total ban on abortion 
proposed by the Ordo Iuris Institute, a leader of the anti- gender movement in 
the region. The chapter explains how mass resistance emerged and developed 
over time, successfully counteracting the plan to further restrict women’s 
reproductive rights in the country. We conceptualize the Black Protests as a 
movement responding to the triumphs of right- wing populism. Whereas the 
ruling Law and Justice party claims to represent the majority of the popu-
lation, allegedly oppressed by the liberal elites (including “genderists” and 
feminists), in reality it promotes a highly exclusionary and narrow definition 
of “the people.” This political construct has been challenged by the mass 
mobilization of the Polish women, who constituted a new political sub-
ject: angry women opposing patriarchy, state violence and social injustice. 
The rhetoric of righteous anger, resistance to cruelty, disrespect and injustice, 
is marked by high level of emotions, forging a new type of affective soli-
darity among previously unengaged women. Similar feminist mobilizations 
have emerged in Argentina, Spain, Ireland and the United States. Thus, we 
propose to interpret these developments as a part of a broader trend of 
women’s leadership in resistance against right- wing populism. The new fem-
inist articulation of “the people” – a populist feminism – is inclusive and 
pluralistic, effectively challenging the ethno- nationalistic and patriarchal 
imagery promulgated by the right (Arruzza et al. 2019; Gunnarsson Payne 
2020a; Snochowska- Gonzalez and Ramme 2019).
Finally, in our Conclusion we revisit the core findings of the book and 
our central conceptual proposition: the opportunistic synergy between 
the anti- gender campaigns and right- wing populism. We discuss the ways 
in which the collusion between these two trends in Central and Eastern 
Europe differs from the American contexts, where neoliberalism is deeply 
intertwined with neoconservative ideology, and highlight the consequences 
of these developments for feminist movements.
Notes
 1 This argument can perhaps best be illustrated by two different texts, both by influ-
ential anti- gender pundits: one by German sociologist Gabriele Kuby (2015: 18– 
20), the other by Polish journalist Marzena Nykiel (2014: 27– 50).
 2 These organizations include the Polish Women’s Congress, Political Critique, 
Polish Gender Society, Action Democracy, the informal Women’s 8 March Alliance 
as well as Warsaw Women’s Strike. We also collaborate with “For Our Children” 
[Dla Naszych Dzieci], a single- mothers’ association demanding child- support 
reform, and we have both written extensively on motherhood from a feminist 
perspective.
 3 We examined articles and reports published on websites which are key to anti- 
gender organizing (www.stop- seksualizacji.pl, www.stopgender.pl), Catholic and 
right- wing media outlets, such as PCh24 and Fronda (www.fronda.pl, www.
niedziela.pl, www.naszdziennik.pl, http:// gosc.pl, www.wsieci.pl,www.ekai.







ideology in mainstream media outlets, such as dailies such as Gazeta Wyborcza 
and Rzeczpospolita, popular weeklies, e.g. Polityka, Newsweek Polska, Wprost, 
wSieci, internet portals, including Onet and WP. Another set of sources included 
the main Polish TV stations, such as TVP, TVN and Polsat, and occasionally videos 
posted on YouTube. We focused on materials featuring “gender,” “genderism” and 
“gender ideology” as key words, aiming at comprehensive analysis of key actors, 
arguments and developments, as well as the frames of interpretation used.
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1  Gender, anti- gender and right- wing 
populism
Recasting the debate
Anti- gender mobilization plays a part in a broader cultural conflict over 
modernity: “gender” is a stretchy category that serves as a screen for col-
lective fears about change, loss of national identity, excessive influence of 
the West and its cultural hegemony. A crucial source of anxiety is the ram-
pant individualism of contemporary culture, the erosion of community 
and growing instability of everyday life. Opponents of “gender ideology” 
attribute these trends to the influence of feminism and the sexual revolution. 
Even though anti- genderist leaders often refer to community, family and 
motherhood only strategically, e.g. when mobilizing parents’ groups, many 
people engaged in the movement genuinely cherish these values as central to 
their worldview. The traditional family is often seen as the last bastion to be 
defended against the onslaught of modernity (Fábián and Korolczuk 2017; 
Höjdestrand 2017). The movement’s rhetoric is characterized by pathos, a 
Manichean vision of the world and a sense of urgency, exemplified by the 
speech made by Jacopo Coghe, vice- president of the Italian organization Pro 
Vita e Famiglia, at the World Congress of Families in Verona in 2019. Coghe 
proclaimed that the movement is engaged in a struggle against:
ideologies of death that destroy man and human reality. If the mother 
is no longer the one who gives birth and the father is no longer the one 
who begets, children can be bought and gender is decided within the 
mind, and if every desire becomes a right, this means that at stake is not 
only a new model of society but a new paradigm of humanity.1
Our aim is to understand how such rhetorical devices are linked to existing 
anxieties and claims shared by many people on the ground. Such an analysis 
helps to explain what makes an apocalyptic image of collapsing differences 
and impending doom – a vision that is religious and fundamentally anti- 
modern – capable of bringing thousands of people into the streets and what 
makes it so useful to right- wing populist parties.
In this chapter we develop a theoretical framework for our analysis by 
mapping out the core categories and explaining how they relate to each 
other. First, we elaborate on the meaning of the term “gender” as it is 
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used in anti- gender discourse, explaining why this particular concept has 
proved useful as a rallying cry in a broader cultural conflict about mod-
ernity. Next, we provide an overview of existing conceptualizations of 
populism, focusing on what they all share: a juxtaposition between inno-
cent people living ordinary lives and powerful, corrupt and cunning elites. 
We propose to define populism as a dynamic process, tracing how different 
actors frame their positions according to the populist structure, and how 
varying ideologies are employed to saturate this frame. This is followed by 
an overview of the scholarly literature on the role of affects and emotions in 
politics – a theoretical framework that is of crucial importance to our ana-
lysis in Chapters 5 and 6. Finally, we challenge the assumption, common to 
many feminist debates on anti- feminism, that a necessary symbiosis exists 
between neoliberalism and conservatism on the right. There is plenty of fac-
tual counterevidence to this assumption: right- wing populist welfare chau-
vinism informs policies that are already in place in many countries. More 
importantly, the unexamined view that the broadly defined right is always 
pro- market blinds us to how right- wing populists actually gain massive 
support today: by mobilizing resentment against neoliberalism, both as an 
economic paradigm and as a cultural project based on economization and 
individualism.
Gender, anti- genderism and anti- gender mobilization
What is the meaning of the term “gender” as it is used in anti- gender dis-
course? Some scholars have argued that it is an “empty signifier,” a flex-
ible synonym for individualism, abortion, non- normative sexuality and 
sex confusion (e.g. Mayer and Sauer 2017). Others challenge the notion of 
“gender” as an empty signifier; e.g. Anja Hennig argues that it obscures the 
ideological coherence of different strands of anti- genderism, which she calls 
genderphobia. She claims that:
Religious and political opponents of gender- sensitive reforms reject 
“gender” as social category because it clashes with a naturalist hier-
archical understanding of gender relations and with the anti- pluralist 
conception of a homogeneous society and/ or nation.
(Hennig 2018: 7)
We show that conservatives oppose “gender” on three levels: as a concept, 
as an ideology/ theory and as a social practice and political project (e.g. 
Case 2011; Favier 2015). In today’s ultraconservative discourses “gender” 
is enmeshed in a deeply pessimistic vision of recent history: it stands for the 
social and cultural evils brought about by the Sexual Revolution – here the 
term includes modern feminism and the struggles for the rights of sexual 
minorities. “Gender” is indeed an empty signifier in Laclau’s (2005) sense of 
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collective identification by linking issues concerning family, kinship, sexu-
ality and nation within a single chain of equivalence. Thus, “gender” is the 
right’s name for what the left calls sexual emancipation, modernization and 
equality, except that, of course, conservatives view the resulting freedom 
as a form of enslavement. In their version of the story, the 1960s brought 
about a dissolution of the “natural order.” “Gender,” as the core element of 
this tectonic shift as viewed by ultraconservatives, epitomizes the collapse 
of the fundamental God- given difference that makes society function prop-
erly: that between men and women. One could easily put together a list of 
components of “gender” and wonder at its internal diversity: divorce, gay 
marriage, social acceptance of promiscuity, abortion, the demise of the trad-
itional family. Yet, the multiplicity of evils should not lead us to the mistaken 
belief that the term is empty in a literal sense. Quite the opposite, “gender” 
is the general principle that makes descent into chaos possible; it is the dis-
solution of boundaries, the opposite of “natural order.”
We have identified three elements that constitute the core of anti- 
genderism as an ideological perspective. These include:
1 A set of convictions about the nature of man, “natural law” and human 
dignity that is consistent with Christian dogma and radically antithet-
ical to social constructionism. Although the base is theological, much 
care is taken to provide scientific grounding for anti- gender views on 
sex differences (neuropsychology, brain sex, etc.) and to argue that 
gender studies are a scientific hoax. The anti- gender movement claims 
to defend common sense against “the suicidal manias of the EU” – as 
Nicolas Bay, one of the leaders of Front National, put it in his speech at 
the World Congress of Families in Verona in 2019.
2 A deeply pessimistic and consistently anti- modernist narrative of 
Western intellectual, cultural and social history. The West is said to 
have degenerated under the influence of Marx, Engels, Freud, the 
Frankfurt School, feminism and postmodernism; specific thinkers 
and activists (especially Margaret Sanger, Margaret Mead and Alfred 
Kinsey) are presented as degenerates and semi- criminals, guilty of innu-
merable lies. In a speech delivered in September 2014 in Moscow, at the 
International Forum on Large Families and the Future of Humanity, 
Gabriele Kuby, one of the intellectual leaders of the movement, warned 
that genderism is:
fuelled by Marxist philosophers, particularly of the Frankfurt 
School in Germany. In their view, sexuality was to be liberated from 
restrictive morality – even from the taboo of incest. Sex between 
children, as well as sex with children, was to be allowed in order to 
create a “society without oppression.”
(Kuby 2014)
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A strong connection is traced between 1968 movements, the “ideology of 
gender” and Malthusianism. The core idea of anti- genderism, in the words 
of Kuby, is that “the deregulation of sexual norms leads to the destruction 
of culture” (Fantini 2013). Post- socialist countries and the Global South 
are said to be somewhat resistant to this cultural change. Today, anti- 
genderists claim, they can save the West from spiritual and demographic 
suicide by defending what are presented as the original, universal Western 
values, referred to as Christian values and Christian civilization.
3 An alarmist and conspiratorial vision of the current global distribu-
tion of power: Neo- Marxist globalists are said to have taken over the 
world by means of blackmail and manipulation masked by benevo-
lent talk about public health and human rights (Marchlewska et al. 
2019). As expressed by Ignatio Arsuaga, the founder of HazteOir and 
CitizenGo, in his Verona 2019 speech, the enemies of the family include 
“Gramscians, leftists, cultural Marxists, radical feminists [and] LGBT 
totalitarians who want to control our sons and daughters, who want 
to shut us up.” These sinister global forces, allegedly funded by trans-
national corporations such as Amazon and Google, are described as 
a new form of colonialism, whose most vulnerable targets are the 
developing nations of Africa. Eastern Europe is accorded a special place 
in this geography of gender, as a part of the world that was largely 
untouched by the sexual revolution.
Scholarly interest in anti- gender campaigns dates back to 2014; the academic 
literature on the topic has by now grown quite rich and diverse both in terms 
of theoretical approaches and the research questions asked. Some studies 
have stressed the breadth of the phenomenon, using terms such as “anti- 
gender mobilization” (Kováts and Pőim 2015) or “anti- gender campaigns” 
(Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). From the beginning, many scholars, especially 
those located in Eastern and Central Europe, have viewed anti- genderism pri-
marily as a political strategy, a way to oppose “laws and policies concerning 
sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Union” (Hodžic 
and Bijelic 2014). One concept that has enjoyed worldwide recognition is 
that of gender as a “symbolic glue” bringing together various actors and ideas 
on the right (Kováts and Pőim 2015; Grzebalska, Kováts and Pető 2017).
Anti- genderism has been viewed mainly as a religious trend within Roman 
Catholicism (e.g. Bracke and Paternotte 2016; Case 2011, 2016, 2019; 
Garbagnoli 2016). On the other hand, some scholars have downplayed the 
religious aspect, approaching resistance to gender as a transnational coun-
termovement to feminism (Corredor 2019), or – in the case of Eastern and 
Central Europe – a grassroots reaction to the undemocratic ways in which 
gender equality measures were introduced in the first place (Rawłuszko 
2019). A number of studies have focused on campaigns in specific countries 
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2015; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Alonso and Lombardo 2018; Darakchi 
2019; Hark and Villa 2015; Morán Faúndes 2019; Wierzcholska 2019). 
Focus on the specific targets of anti- gender campaigns in various contexts 
has resulted in scholarship that views anti- genderism as “anti- feminism” 
(e.g. Gilloz et al. 2017; Szelewa 2014), as an attack on gender studies and 
public education (Grabowska 2013; Kuhar and Zobec 2017; Paternotte 
2019; Redden 2018), or as an effort to oppose marriage equality and LGBT 
rights (Fassin 2014; Schmincke 2020). There are also those who propose 
to examine this trend as a form of conspiratorial thinking (Marchlewska 
et al. 2019), or propose that it should be interpreted as a new form of 
antisemitism (Chetcuti- Osorovitz and Teicher 2018). Finally, scholars in 
various locations have been tracing the complex links between anti- gender 
campaigns and the rise of the right (e.g. Dietze and Roth 2020b; Grzebalska 
and Pető 2018; Gunnarsson Payne 2019; Köttig, Bitzan and Pető 2016), and 
there is a growing agreement that anti- genderism can in fact be interpreted 
as a neoconservative response to neoliberal globalization (e.g. Grzebalska, 
Kováts and Pető 2017; Korolczuk and Graff 2018; Zacharenko 2019). As 
Weronika Grzebalska, Eszter Kováts and Andrea Pető observed in their 
2017 article published in Krytyka Polityczna, “gender” has become a sym-
bolic glue, binding together disparate actors and agendas:
“Gender ideology” has come to signify the failure of democratic 
representation, and opposition to this ideology has become a means of 
rejecting different facets of the current socioeconomic order, from the 
prioritization of identity politics over material issues, and the weakening 
of people’s social, cultural and political security, to the detachment of 
social and political elites and the influence of transnational institutions 
and the global economy on nation states.
(Grzebalska, Kováts and Pető 2017)
Throughout this book, we remain in dialogue with this growing body of 
scholarship, striving to shed more light on the relationship between anti- 
gender campaigns and right- wing populism, both of which we interpret as 
a reaction to the crisis of the neoliberal model. We focus on what we call 
the opportunistic synergy between the two trends and the role of the anti- 
colonial frame, as well as the affective dimension of anti- gender mobilization.
The conflict over gender has two dimensions, which we define as anti- 
genderism on the one hand and anti- gender mobilization/ campaigns on the 
other. It is useful to keep this distinction in mind in order to understand the 
sources of social mobilization as well as the commonalities and differences 
between mobilizations in various contexts.
First, anti- genderism is an ideology, a worldview, a body of knowledge 
whose proponents aspire to legitimacy in academia and transnational 
institutions. The set of ideas we call anti- genderism is marked by internal 
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these two features. Certain elements remain constant: the central claim 
that “gender” is about collapsing natural differences; the notion that it 
is a danger to children, family and reproduction; insistence that it is an 
imposition of global elites. This common core enables cooperation between 
ultraconservative groups and right- wing populist parties lending some 
ideological coherence to otherwise disparate political endeavors (Kováts 
and Põim 2015; Dietze and Roth 2020a). However, anti- genderism is also 
remarkably malleable and varied. Some versions are conspiracy theories 
(Byford 2011) featuring former communist secret agents, bloodthirsty 
capitalists and even the Illuminati; others steer clear of such claims, sticking 
to vague generalizations about forces behind the dissolution of values. More 
problematic and potentially incriminating elements of anti- gender discourse, 
such as antisemitism or open homophobia, appear from time to time in spe-
cific locations but are neither constant nor present everywhere. Anti- gender 
mobilization has its roots in the Vatican’s efforts to counter UN policies on 
population (Buss and Herman 2003; Butler 2004; Case 2011; Favier 2015), 
but some of the Holy See’s aims, such as banning abortion, are by no means 
explicit in every context. Thus, we agree with David Paternotte that the 
new wave of resistance displays “new discourses and forms of organization, 
attempts by established conservative actors to reach beyond their traditional 
circles and connect with a wider audience” (2014).
The actual campaigns against genderism, in turn – that is, the anti- gender 
mobilization – are not simply enactments of the core tenets of anti- gender 
ideology. Locally, anti- gender campaigns have pursued such aims as introdu-
cing a total ban on abortion in Poland, changing the core of the sex education 
curriculum in German schools, discrediting gender studies in Sweden and 
preventing the introduction of marriage equality in France. Transnationally, 
ultraconservative actors oppose the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, 
the use of the term “gender” in UN documents and demonize the WHO 
standards of sex education. The conflict around gender has been playing out 
in international institutions such as the UN and the EU since the 1990s, but 
today it engages people on the grassroots level, such as concerned parents 
taking to the streets of Paris or Warsaw (see Figure 1.1), often on a mass scale 
(Höjdestrand 2017; Fábián and Korolczuk 2017; Strelnyk 2017). While 
keeping track of the many specific campaigns and the actors involved, we 
should not lose sight of the overarching meaning of “gender” as a category 
used by these forces. To the right, “gender” signifies the chaos of modern 
life, the ultimate danger. The term collects various anxieties and frustrations 
about modernity, hence its usefulness to different actors. Right- wing popu-
list parties use anti- gender ideology selectively and instrumentally in order 
to moralize political conflict and demonize political opponents. In many 
parts of the world, the introduction of “gender” has led to the transforming 
of the political dispute into a struggle between good and evil. Anti- gender 
campaigns owe their success to the skillful mobilization of social affect and 
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Conceptualizing contemporary right- wing populism
Our analysis draws on and supplements contemporary discussions on popu-
lism (Gagnon et al. 2018; Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2018; 
Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Mueller 2016; Wodak 2015). 
Conceptualizations of this phenomenon follow two distinctive traditions, 
although both camps agree that anti- elitism is a distinctive feature of popu-
lism and that the division between the elite and the people is central for 
populist parties. One tradition of thought defines populism as a particular 
form rather than content of politics, stressing that it is mainly a counter- 
hegemonic logic of articulation: one based on a political divide between the 
elites and the people (e.g. Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2018). According to Laclau, 
“populism is quite simply a way of constructing the political” (2005: 6). 
“The people” achieve unity not through adhering to a coherent ideology, 
but rather though opposing a common enemy and producing what Laclau 
calls “empty signifiers” (a set of ideals and concepts embedded in language). 
Within this tradition, scholars tend to see populism as a corrective to repre-
sentative democracy and often focus on left populism, rather than the right- 
wing variety. This may explain why Laclau’s conceptualization is not widely 
Figure 1.1  Demonstration “Stop Depravation in Education,” Warsaw, Poland, 2015.
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used in Europe, where debates focus mostly on the threat that right- wing 
populism poses to liberal democracy (Mueller 2016). Laclau’s (2005) theory 
is particularly useful in explaining how political identities are forged, as he 
insists that “the people” is not an already existing constituency, but a con-
struct emerging in the political process. His definition of populism has, how-
ever, been critiqued as too broad, leading to an equation of populism with 
politics in general or to the dubious conclusion that all oppositional radical 
politics are necessarily populist in nature (Dean and Maiguashca 2020: 18).
The second, and today perhaps the most influential conceptualization, 
is the ideational one which defines populism as a “thin- centered ideology” 
dividing society into two antagonistic camps – “the pure people” and “the 
corrupt elite” – while drawing on other ideologies, such as nationalism 
(Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017: 8; Stanley 2008). This defin-
ition highlights the content of populism, which – while context dependent – 
is usually based on specific concepts of belonging, race, community and 
social order. Scholars working in this tradition tend to focus on right- wing 
populism, agreeing that it is an inherently anti- elitist and anti- pluralist polit-
ical position, one that is hostile to individualism and minority rights, which 
are seen as the core tenants of liberal democracy (Mueller 2016; Wodak 
2015). In the words of Ruth Wodak:
right- wing populism does not only relate to the form of rhetoric but 
to its specific contents: such parties successfully construct fear and – 
related to the various real or imagined dangers – propose scapegoats 
that are blamed for threatening or actually damaging our societies in 
Europe and beyond.
(Wodak 2015: 1)
Right- wing populism relies on the demonization of its enemies though fear- 
mongering and scapegoating, and simultaneous idealization of “the people” 
(e.g. Stanley 2008). In contrast to left- wing populism which – in the Laclauian 
tradition – is interpreted as a necessary correction to the crisis of democracy, 
the right- wing version is “characterized by emotionally- charged political 
appeals to addressing crises through neonationalism, masculinism, Othering, 
bordering, xenophobia, sexism, racism, phantasmatic ethnic golden- ageism 
[and] a disregard for liberal democratic norms” (Gagnon et al. 2018: v). 
This conceptualization has also been challenged, partly on the grounds 
that it is difficult to empirically distinguish the thin- centered ideology of 
right- wing populism from its accompanying thick- centered ideologies such 
as conservatism or racism. As Jonathan Dean and Bice Maiguashca argue, 
there are both conceptual and methodological problems with this approach 
because “in order to quantify and measure the depth and scope of populism, 
scholars have preferred to shift their gaze from ideology to the discursive 
content of a leader’s ‘political talk’ which can be more easily traced, coded 
and quantified” (2020: 18).
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Responding to what they see as gaps and internal contradictions in con-
temporary populist studies, Dean and Maiguashca (2020) call for a renewal 
and reorientation of the field. They propose to embrace an inductive 
approach to studying populism, one that recognizes the context- specificity 
of this trend and which starts on the ground, instead of departing from firm 
theoretical assumptions. This is a strategy that we have found useful in our 
own research, as our focus is on what the representatives of right- wing popu-
list parties and ultraconservative movements actually do and say.2 Theories 
of populism have served us as conceptual frameworks for understanding 
what we found on the ground, and – contrary to Dean and Maiguashca 
(2020) – we do not see Mudde’s and Laclau’s conceptualizations as mutu-
ally exclusive. Rather, they are helpful in analyzing different manifestations 
of the phenomenon known as populism: the former highlighting the ideo-
logical dimension of populism and the latter emphasizing the structure of 
populist logic. For our purposes we neither limit the understanding of popu-
lism to pure form nor see it is as a coherent ideological project. Instead, we 
analyze populism as “a series of collective enactments that, while mobilizing 
ideologies, discourses, and forms of rhetoric, cannot be reduced to them” 
(Dean and Maiguashca 2020: 18). In other words, we interpret populism 
as a dynamic process, tracing how different actors frame their positions 
according to the populist structure – one that polarizes society by juxta-
posing the elites and the people as two coherent and morally opposing 
camps – and how varying ideologies are employed to saturate this frame.
From our perspective, what is disappointing about both Mudde- and 
Laclau- inspired research is that both traditions have demonstrated very 
limited interest in the role that gender issues have played in the rise of right- 
wing populism. In many countries – and Poland is certainly one of them – 
patriarchal gender norms and ideologies are clearly an integral part of 
the exclusionary, nationalistic worldview that right- wing populist parties 
endorse, even though they may be manifested in various ways, depending 
on the context and time. Scholars are increasingly aware of this fact, and 
pioneering studies have begun to appear (e.g. Dietze and Roth 2020a, 
2020b; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015, 2017; Scrinzi 2017; Spierings and 
Zaslove 2015, 2017). Most studies on voting behaviors show a significant 
gender gap when it comes to voting for right- wing populist parties (Spierings 
and Zaslove 2017), but recent data suggest that in some countries this gap 
may be closing (Mayer 2015). When it comes to the content of populist 
politics, studies are also inconclusive. Research by Mudde and Kaltwasser 
(2015) shows that the specific goals and discourses of both left- and right- 
wing populist parties do not have much in common, depending mostly on 
the national context and the ways in which hegemonic norms and ideals 
of gender are constructed. More recent analyses, however, highlight a ten-
dency on the part of various right- wing populist parties in countries such 
as Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary or France to use strongly gender- 
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Julia Roth enumerates five “patterns of engendering” characteristic of right- 
wing populism: the gendering of scandals and of ethnic others, the appro-
priation of women’s politics (femonationalism), white re- masculinization, 
radical religious and femo- global alliances (gender as ideological coloniza-
tion), and the gendering of social inequalities (ethno- sexism) (2020: 253– 
256). While this systematization links various discursive patterns into a 
common logic, it does not explain the social and political dynamics that 
make these patterns effective. What is still lacking is a robust conceptual-
ization of the relation between populism and gender, one that would help 
us understand the rising wave of socially conservative right- wing popu-
lism worldwide. This book is an effort to lay the foundations for such an 
endeavor.
Scholars studying anti- gender mobilizations warn against conflating anti- 
gender movements and right- wing populism and call for a framework dis-
entangling the two (e.g. Paternotte and Kuhar 2018). While we agree that 
these are two distinct phenomena, we insist that the collusion between them 
is a powerful factor in today’s global political struggles. Thus, we propose 
to conceptualize this relationship as an opportunistic synergy: a dynamic 
cooperation between religious fundamentalists and right- wing populist 
parties, with both sides benefitting. While there is a clear ideational kinship 
between the two, their ideological investments and political interests are 
not necessary the same. Right- wing populists draw on anti- gender rhet-
oric to increase their moral legitimacy in the eyes of traditionalist voters, 
and to moralize the conflict between the elites and the people. Meanwhile, 
ultraconservative organizations seek openings in the political opportunity 
structure; they treat right- wing parties as powerful allies thanks to whom 
they can introduce legal changes, gain access to funding and participate in 
policy- making processes. Both forces join in an effort to foster elite change 
in all spheres of political, social and cultural life, replacing liberal actors and 
institutions with those who answer to the ruling party only. At the core of 
de- democratization lies a tendency for previously autonomous entities to be 
controlled by a small group of people, the new elite. Ideology often plays a 
merely instrumental role in this process.
For the mainstream populist right, the anti- gender discourse offers a frame 
with which to moralize the divide between innocent people living ordinary 
lives and corrupt elites. Representatives of the anti- gender movements tend 
to self- identify as victims of, and as forces of resistance against, various 
forms of global exploitation, both economic and cultural (Grzebalska, 
Kováts and Pető 2016; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). In effect, opponents 
of “gender” view themselves as both victims and heroes, protectors of the 
world’s colonized peoples, whose livelihoods and authentic local cultures 
and value systems are endangered by globalism. The alleged colonizers 
include not only feminists, liberal NGOs and international bodies such as 
the UN and EU, but also the power of global markets driven by what the 
Pope refers to as the “idolatry of money.” We view the populist claim that 
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gender is a form of “colonialism” as a core idea of anti- gender ideology and 
an important source of the movement’s success (see Chapter 4).
A question might arise at this juncture as to whether the political players 
involved in anti- gender campaigns are in fact extreme right parties, radical 
populists or right- wing populists. Existing scholarship on illiberal tenden-
cies in the contemporary world distinguishes carefully between the right, the 
extreme right, the populist radical right and the populist right (or right- wing 
populists) (e.g. Bustikova 2019; Mudde 2002; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; 
Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann 2012; Wodak 2015; Verloo 2018b). Our 
focus is on the broadly defined populist right, as this term best describes 
the phenomenon we study (e.g. Kaltwasser et al. 2017). To put it briefly, a 
collusion between the radical right and anti- gender movements does indeed 
exist, and we provide some evidence for it (especially when looking at spe-
cific anti- gender organizations such as the World Congress of Families). 
However, our primary aim is to show how anti- gender rhetoric is used by 
mainstream populist right parties, providing them with a mechanism of 
social polarization and in some cases helping them into power.
What exactly is the difference between the populist right and the extreme 
or radical right parties? Manuela Caiani, Donatella della Porta and Claudius 
Wagemann observe that “the term extreme (or radical) right has multiple 
facets, with the common ideological core being hierarchy and order; a state- 
centered economy; and the importance of authority,” but two elements are 
deemed central to the sociological concept of the extreme right: “ideologies 
of inequality” (such as racism, totalitarianism and ethnic chauvinism) and 
acceptance of violence toward any group defined as the Other (Caiani, della 
Porta and Wagemann 2012: 5). In short, radical or extreme parties openly 
engage in challenging democratic values or socio- political order more 
broadly. When analyzing contemporary Polish politics – which is marked by 
extreme polarization and radicalization on the right – it is often tempting 
to employ the category “populist radical right.” However, this terminology 
does not fully correspond to our case. For example, Mudde (2002) did not 
classify the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) as a popu-
list radical right party, but listed the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich 
Rodzin – LPR) – in this category instead. Although the two parties were in 
coalition between 2005 and 2007, the LPR was much more radical than its 
coalition partner when it came to gender equality, sex education and LGBT 
rights. More importantly, in recent years a major shift has occurred in many 
countries, one that calls for a re- assessment of existing conceptualizations: a 
realignment on the right as well as a marginalization of parties on the left 
(e.g. Stanley 2017). Despite its recent radicalization, PiS has maintained 
the position of a mainstream party – or as Ben Stanley put it “a border-
line populist party” (2017) – not an extremist one, which is a testament 
to the process of the entire political scene shifting massively to the right. 
A similar dynamic can be observed in other contexts, e.g. in Sweden where 
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of the population, or France, where Marine Le Pen advanced to the second 
round of the presidential elections in 2017, receiving 33.9% of the vote.
Right- wing populism is not a new phenomenon in Eastern Europe (Havlík 
and Pinková 2015; Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Stanley 2008). It is only in recent 
years, however, that we have witnessed the ascent to power of right- wing 
populist parties gradually incorporating radical right- wing ideologies into 
their programs in order to attract a hard- core electorate and to marginalize 
their rivals on the right. As of 2020, the Law and Justice party in Poland 
and Fidesz in Hungary are no longer “borderline populists” (Stanley 2017) 
but rather full- blown right- wing populist parties with strong inclinations 
toward authoritarianism. In Western Europe, on the other hand, the shift 
occurring on the right has consisted in radical right parties, such as the 
Front National and Lega, changing leadership and softening their political 
message with the aim of gaining more mainstream appeal: moving from a 
radical position to more mainstream populist one. To this end, they have 
sanitized their rhetoric and often included references to gender- equality in 
the process, strategically juxtaposing the gender- equal, civilized West against 
ultraconservative and barbaric Islam. One example is Marine Le Pen, who 
relaxed the Front National’s conservative position on such issues as same- 
sex unions or abortion, while calling for a French referendum on migration 
policy on the grounds that women’s rights are being compromised by an 
influx of refugees (Le Pen 2016).
While many of the parties included in earlier analyses of the populist 
radical right (e.g. Mudde 2002) are no longer in existence (as in the case of 
the League of Polish Families in Poland or MIÉP in Hungary) or remain on 
the fringes of mainstream politics (such as the National Revival of Poland 
or the Republicans in Germany), it is their powerful successors – the popu-
list right – that threaten to dismantle liberal democracy. Such parties include 
Poland’s Law and Justice, Italy’s Lega, the rebranded Front National in 
France, the Sweden Democrats and new political actors such as Alternative 
for Germany. Of course, these parties do not position themselves as radical, 
ultraconservative or anti- democratic, but as saviors and rejuvenators of 
democracy, the voice of the common people, allegedly underrepresented, 
marginalized and abandoned by socialists and liberals. In his widely 
discussed text “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Cas Mudde observed that “today 
populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western demo-
cracies” (2004), and a similar trend is also visible in Eastern Europe. It is 
precisely this mainstreaming of right- wing populist ideology that interests 
us, rather than the radicalism itself. Consequently, we employ the concept 
of right- wing populism rather than the extreme or radical right (Mudde 
2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Mueller 2016; Wodak 2015), focusing 
predominantly on the cooperation (what we call opportunistic synergy) 
between them and the ultraconservative organizations and networks.
Gender plays an important role in this new trend. For former right- wing 
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role: by focusing on the “natural family” and combining it with welfare- 
chauvinist positions, the extreme right attracts mainstream audiences, while 
side- stepping explicit racism and ethno- nationalism (Roth and Dietze 2020; 
Verloo 2018a). In former socialist countries, anti- genderism takes on a dis-
tinctly nationalist form: resistance to Western ideologies of gender equality is 
presented as a mark of national sovereignty and a chance to regain a rightful 
place in the moral geography of Europe. As Julia Roth and Gabriele Dietze 
observe, gender has become a “meta- language” and an “affective bridge” 
giving order to populist movements’ political objectives (2020: 14– 15). By 
invoking the concept of “gender,” right- wing populists can popularize their 
worldview, presenting themselves as defenders of the “freedom of speech,” 
the family and commonsense, a necessary corrective to the excesses of the 
cultural left and radical feminism.
The role of affects and emotions in right- wing politics
Our thinking owes much to the growing literature on the cultural politics of 
emotions, the affective roots and dynamics of political engagement (Ahmed 
2014; Gould 2013; Hochschild 2016; Salmela and Scheve 2017). For more 
than a decade, social- movement scholarship and political sociology have 
been re- examining the role of affects (understood as somatic reactions to 
a stimulus or object) and emotions (defined as more complex and cultur-
ally mediated structures of feeling) in political mobilization (e.g. Clarke, 
Hoggett and Thompson 2006; Flam and King 2005; Jasper 2018; Goodwin, 
Jasper and Polletta 2001; Protevi 2009). In the words of Deborah Gould, 
activist contexts are “sites where the world- making occurs,” which is why 
such contexts:
generate strong feelings among participants – for example, marvel at 
being part of a collectivity, euphoria and camaraderie from being in an 
action together, feelings of fulfillment that derive from taking part in 
something larger than oneself, a sense of freedom to become the self you 
want to be. Once experienced, the desire to feel those feelings again may 
be strong, helping to sustain participation.
(Gould 2013: 3)
Social movements are also spaces where meaning- production occurs in 
the realm of emotion. Thus, movements not only construct a language of 
emotions but also provide “an emotional pedagogy of sorts, a guide for 
what and how to feel and for what to do in light of those feelings” (Gould 
2013: 3). Anger and fear play an important part in politics, as do positive 
emotions such as hope, loyalty and desire for justice. In an important contri-
bution to the discussion on emotions in Polish politics, David Ost suggested 
that we adopt a “conflict theory of politics” and think about the way 
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Clearly it takes emotions – and not just ideas – to build collective political 
identity: “Creating and evoking moral empathy is part of what makes a 
movement. It is part of demarcating We and marking off Them” (Eyerman 
2001: 50).
What successful social movements appear to have in common, regardless 
of their ideologies and aims, is the capacity to convert shame into pride, to 
provide activists with a positive collective identity and a sense of agency, 
the ability to cause change. Feminist and queer theorists have long explored 
political uses of shame and anger by the political left, notably in the trans-
formative use of negative affects in mobilizing those marked as deviant. As 
Deborah Gould has documented, feelings were central to the provocative 
activist style of ACT UP – a movement that managed to convert shame and 
humiliation into pride and dignity under the banner of “gay pride” (Gould 
2009). More recently feminist history has been re- examined in terms of 
emotional attachments, rather than ideological affiliations, developments 
and conflicts (e.g. Chemaly 2018).
While most studies of emotions in social movements tend to focus on 
progressive movements (e.g. Civil Rights, anti- war, women’s and LGBT 
movements), there is a growing interest in the emotional appeal of con-
servative and right- wing groups (Busher, Giurlando and Sullivan 2018; 
Hochschild 2016). More recently, scholars have also been focusing on the 
uses of emotions or affects specifically in right- wing populism (e.g. Kinnvall 
2018; Salmela and von Scheve 2017). Social psychologists Agnieszka Golec 
de Zavala and Oliver Keenan (2020) highlight the importance of national 
collective narcissism – the belief in the exceptionality of one’s nation and a 
sense of resentment that the exceptionality is not sufficiently recognized by 
others – for understanding the motivations of people who support right- 
wing populists. Exploring the differences in affective politics between various 
strands of populism, Mikko Salmela and Christian von Scheve (2017) 
argue that left- and right- wing populism are driven by dissimilar emotional 
dynamics regarding shame; whereas the former relies on acknowledged 
shame, which may be easily mobilized in struggles for social justice, the latter 
is characterized by repressed shame and transforms fear and insecurity into 
anger and resentment. Polish cultural critic Janusz Czapliński has argued 
that today’s Poland is in the midst of a “war of shames” caused by excessive 
use of shaming in the process of modernization during the transition era 
(2017). During the 1990s, he claims, shaming was used against those unable 
to adapt to the new capitalist system; instead of devising paths of advance-
ment and inclusion, the elites dismissed such people as lazy, inflexible and 
routinely referred to them as Homo sovieticus. In the 2010s, shame was 
intercepted by the nationalist right, so that:
Polish culture is now involved in a war of two sanctioned forms of 
shame. The first – fragmented, internally inconsistent – emerges from 
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– narrow- minded and hostile towards differences of any kind – appeals 
to the ethics of majority rights; the former was unable to satisfy the 
popular need for respect, while the latter exclusively dispenses approval 
to “its own.” The former proposed the Christian principle “Be proud 
if you’re able to feel shame,” while the latter hypes the tribal dictum 
“Shame on you for not being proud!”
(Czapliński 2017: 90)
While we concur with scholars who emphasize the role of shame in right- 
wing affective political strategies, our own research suggests that positive 
emotions are equally important for ultraconservative mobilization. Anti- 
gender movements have been remarkably successful in converting cultur-
ally undervalued identities, such as the identity of a parent, into a source 
of righteous anger and collective pride (Fabian and Korolczuk 2017). 
Grassroots anti- gender groups function in the public sphere primarily as 
“concerned parents” who take pride in defending their children, while feeling 
abandoned or betrayed by the state. As we show in Chapter 5, the mobiliza-
tion of parental identities is an important source of the movement’s success 
in recruiting supporters, as well as earning credibility in public discourse.
Dean and Maiguashca (2020) suggest that focus on emotions might 
be the solution to the theoretical impasse in populism studies. They pro-
pose developing a new approach, one that pays particular attention to 
two distinctive features of populism: the affective investments (both hori-
zontal and vertical) of the people and political leaders and the epistemic 
dimension of populist politics – the affirmation of everyday knowledge of 
citizens. This is an analytical strategy we apply both in our chapters on 
anti- gender mobilizations and in our examination of feminist mass mobil-
ization. We show that anti- gender actors share a distinctive emotional rep-
ertoire: common tropes and narratives, focused mostly on dangers awaiting 
children and families, which trigger negative emotions such as shame, anx-
iety and fear, but also positive ones, such as pride and solidarity. In a some-
what similar fashion, feminist actors mobilize solidarity and righteous anger 
by evoking fear and anxiety in response to ultraconservative forces’ assault 
on women’s rights.
The way the anti- gender movement mobilizes emotions, we argue, is 
an important aspect of its affinity with right- wing populism. The victim- 
perpetrator reversal that anti- gender actors employ mirrors a broader trend 
of right- wing populists presenting themselves as victims of the liberal estab-
lishment and defenders of free speech stifled by political correctness (Wodak 
2015: 64– 66). “Proud victimhood” today serves as political legitimation 
on both the right and the left, but the right appears to have become more 
successful in using this currency in political play (Campbell and Manning 
2018; Lilla 2017; Wendling 2018). In his provocative book Dream (2007), 
Stephen Duncombe argued that, for several decades, U.S. conservatives 
have been able to tap into collective emotions far more effectively than 
 
 
30 Gender, anti-gender and right-wing populism
progressives. This, he claims, is thanks to their capacity to “create reality,” 
rather than merely present it and argue about it. The right speaks to passions, 
the left offers rational arguments that may be true but fail to result in pol-
itical mobilization. This pattern has been evident in the U.S. in the after-
math of Donald Trump’s electoral victory; it is also visible in Europe today, 
as illiberal forces grow in country after country. For progressives, reliance 
mostly on empiricism and rational argumentation appears to have been a 
costly miscalculation. Employing the sociology- of- emotions perspective can 
help us understand the appeal of anti- gender movements, to grasp how they 
manage to “mobilize anger,” tapping into people’s economic anxiety and 
growing sense of ontological insecurity, as well as the disillusionment with 
the political elite and existing civil society. Our analysis of recent feminist 
mobilizations suggests that politics of emotions are also possible on the left. 
In order to mobilize populations increasingly disenchanted with the political 
status quo, progressive forces need to tap into passions, desires and hopes.
Questioning the symbiosis between neoliberalism and  
right- wing politics
This book may be seen as a contribution to the rapidly developing body 
of work that examines the relationship between gender- conservatism and 
neoliberalism, one that offers an important corrective to the paradigm that 
links the right with pro- market views. We argue that anti- gender mobiliza-
tion is a reaction to, and partly a form of resistance against, neoliberalism. 
Following such scholars as Harvey (2007), Read (2009), Brown (2015, 
2019), Cabanas and Illouz (2019), Illouz (2007), Gregor and Grzebalska 
(2016), Jacyno (2007) and Ong (2006), we conceptualize neoliberalism not 
just as an economic doctrine and governance regime, but also as a cultural 
paradigm, a rationality permeating all realms of life and social strata. The 
core of neoliberalism is that economic rationality permeates all spheres of 
human activity, including cultural production, practices of citizenship and 
intimacy, identity and emotions. Profit- maximization and efficiency become 
unquestioned values overruling cooperation, democratic politics, social soli-
darity and the pursuit of justice.
As an economic practice, neoliberalism operates at the intersection of 
global and local trends, and entails privatization and erosion of welfare 
accompanied by austerity policies, an unregulated flow of money and goods 
as well as an imperial politics of economic domination. As a social and 
cultural trend, it includes extreme forms of commodification and individu-
alism. Thus, it entails “specific alignments of market rationality, sovereignty 
and citizenship” (Ong 2006) and deeply transforms social relations and 
value systems. In the words of Cabanas and Illouz (2019):
…neoliberalism should be understood not only in terms of its struc-
tural features and consequences, but also in terms of its infrastructural 
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to which all individuals are (and should be) free, strategic, responsible 
and autonomous beings who are able to govern their psychological 
states at will, fulfill their interest and pursue what is understood to be 
their inherent objective in life: the achievement of their own happiness.
(2019: 51)
This individualistic paradigm was developed in close alliance with neoconser-
vatism, whose emphasis on family responsibility and moralization of social 
inequalities made neoliberal policies appear inevitable and “natural.” In the 
U.S., as shown by Melinda Cooper (2017), the entire history of neoliberal 
transformation was made possible by the neoconservative ethos of self- 
sufficiency, responsibility and the return of carework to the home. The pri-
vate space of the family and women’s unpaid work within it served to absorb 
the social impact of cuts in health and child care, as well as other social 
programs addressed to marginalized populations and the working poor. While 
the re- traditionalization of gender roles was the goal of neoconservatives, 
in practice it happened almost by default as an effect of neoliberal policies 
in the Reagan era. “Traditional values” and the “traditional family” model 
were in fact a conscious reinvention of neoconservatives, a project of re- 
imagining the social world in a way that would fit the new form of capit-
alism. Cooper cites neoconservative sociologist Nathan Glazer, who stated 
that the “creation and building of new traditions, or new versions of old 
traditions, must be taken more seriously as a requirement of social policy 
itself” (2019: 313). Neoconservatives believed that “traditional values” are 
an essential supplement to free markets, a way to ensure social stability and 
moral meaning in a consumerist society. As Wendy Brown (2019) documents, 
key figures of the neoconservative movement, e.g. Irving Kristol and Friedrich 
Hayek, made this goal explicit in their writings. It was, they argued, the 
government’s role to promote “traditional values” in schools, families and 
civic spaces in order to counteract the intrinsic nihilism and moral degrad-
ation that comes with consumerism (Brown 2019: 90– 91).
The hegemony of “neoliberal political rationality” (McRobbie 2009) has 
made struggles for gender and social justice even more challenging, as it 
resulted in the rise of neoliberal feminism, which reduces feminist struggles 
to individual efforts to achieve work- life balance and personal success 
(Eisenstein 2012; Fraser 2009; Rottenberg 2019). Nancy Fraser (2009) claims 
that feminism was not simply “framed” or “co- opted” but rather succumbed 
to the general of neoliberalism as cultural formation. However, there was also 
something about the movement itself that made it possible for neoliberalism 
to “resignify” feminist ideals. Fraser locates the source of this problem in 
feminism’s cultural turn, its transformation into a critique of culture. The evo-
lution of academic feminism is, of course, central to this tendency:
In practice, the tendency was to subordinate social- economic struggles to 
struggles for recognition, while in the academy, feminist cultural theory 
began to eclipse feminist social theory. […] The timing, moreover, could 
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not have been worse. The turn to recognition dovetailed all too neatly 
with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress 
all memory of social egalitarianism. Thus, feminists absolutized the cri-
tique of culture at precisely the moment when circumstances required 
redoubled attention to the critique of political economy.
(Fraser 2009: 109)
It has become increasingly clear in recent years that Fraser’s diagnosis has 
serious consequences for feminist movements and not only for academic 
feminist theory. Mobilizations for women’s rights are most effective when 
they abandon the neoliberal framework and turn to radical egalitarianism 
(Arruzza et al. 2019; Gunnarsson Payne 2019; Korolczuk et al. 2019; Roth 
2020), thus challenging the right- wing monopoly on being the voice of the 
common people. In Chapter 6 we elaborate on this argument, conceptu-
alizing this phenomenon as populist feminism and claiming that it may 
become a serious counterforce to right- wing populism.
For such a change to become possible we need to reconsider the 
assumption that ultraconservative mobilizations are inevitably neoliberal 
in orientation (e.g. Brown 2006; Eisenstein 2012; Fraser 2009). We argue 
that this view is grounded in an unacknowledged U.S.- centric bias, i.e. the 
universalization of assumptions based on specifically American cultural 
and political patterns: the alliance between neoliberalism and neoconser-
vatism. Based on our research on anti- gender campaigns, we argue that 
this alleged symbiosis may not be quite as strong in contexts outside the 
U.S. In fact, ultraconservative actors’ position regarding neoliberalism 
has varied from country to country and over time. While the right in the 
U.S. has been neoliberal by default, the new right- wing populist parties in 
Western Europe often employ welfare chauvinist positions (Andersen and 
Bjørklund 1990; Finnsdottir and Hallgrimsdottir 2019; Eger and Valdez 
2015; Mudde 2002; Norocel 2016). As observed by Herbert Kitschelt and 
Anthony J. McGann (1995) right- wing parties in Western Europe have long 
built their popularity on promises of general safety- net programs available 
only to legal residents. These spending regimes would be both generous and 
highly restrictive, eliminating immigrants’ rights to state- sponsored health 
care, housing or child care. Such actors employed a “racist- authoritarian 
strategy” while
studiously stay[ing] away from an admiration of market- liberal capit-
alism. The main point is the mobilization of resentment on the authori-
tarian/ libertarian axis. The attack on foreigners, the vilification of 
feminist and environmentalist movements […] and the stress on national 
symbols and historical reminiscences are critical for racist- authoritarian 
strategy.
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This position evolved over the last two decades into the right- wing populist 
welfare chauvinism promulgated by parties such as the Front National in 
France, Law and Justice in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary. Recent scholar-
ship shows a similar dynamic at play in Scandinavian countries, including 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, pointing to the key role of gendered 
dynamics in the context of right- wing politics and claimsmaking. Parties 
such as the Sweden Democrats “position the Scandinavian welfare state as 
a zero- sum social good that cannot be shared with outsiders, while at the 
same time framing outsiders as risks to the social contract that has created 
the welfare state” (Finnsdottir and Hallgrimsdottir 2019: 2).
In Eastern and Central Europe the neoliberal revolution – the dismantling 
of the socialist welfare state with its generous universal health care system, 
job security and state support for families – took place as part of the systemic 
transformation in the 1990s and was accompanied by a re- traditionalization 
of gender roles (e.g. Desperak 2013; Dunn 2004). The important difference 
between the post- socialist and the American contexts is that whereas in 
the U.S. the return to “family values” was conceived of mostly in terms 
of strengthening individual responsibility and was thus fully compatible 
with the neoliberal ethos, in post- socialist countries the neoliberal revolu-
tion was experienced by many as a destruction of community and tradition. 
This dynamic was diagnosed by anthropologist Elizabeth Dunn (2004), 
who examined the effect of privatization on women workers’ self- concepts 
in a pioneering study of women employed at the Alima Gerber factory in 
Rzeszów, which was being privatized by an American company in the 1990s. 
Dunn’s respondents identified individualist discourses as oppressive: a force 
pushing them into a mold which they associated with the exploitative regime 
of the factory that employed them. Domesticity, motherhood and focus on 
childcare, which today are promoted by ultraconservatives as paramount 
to “traditional values,” were to these women a respite and refuge from the 
alienating world of capitalism. It is such sentiments and identifications that 
were eventually harnessed by the populist right. Dunn (2004) shows that 
resistance to feminism and neoliberalism were interconnected, reflecting not 
so much ideological choices but resistance to rapid socio- economic change.
The U.S.- centered paradigm fails to account for the central dynamic of 
right- wing populism in Europe and other parts of the world, namely its ability 
to mobilize resentment against neoliberalism, both as unbridled dominance 
of the market and a cultural project based on values and social patterns 
associated with modernity: individualism, self- sufficiency and effectiveness. 
In post- socialist states populists often challenge the collusion between liberal 
democracy and market liberalism, even though they may continue with neo-
liberal policies, combining them with generous state support for “our fam-
ilies” in order to attract voters. As we will discuss in the following chapters, 
such parties have not only promoted re- traditionalization but have also 
supported increased social spending on family- oriented policies, which can 
 
34 Gender, anti-gender and right-wing populism
explain, at least partly, wide public support for the populist right in recent 
years. Thus, the collaboration between ultraconservatives and right- wing 
populists in Europe should be carefully distinguished from “the American 
nightmare” discussed by Wendy Brown (2006).
Today’s anti- gender movement – a powerful ally of right- wing popu-
lism – can thus be viewed as reactionary opposition to neoliberalism, 
rather than a continuation of neoconservative movements of the 1980s and 
1990s (Grzebalska 2016; Kováts 2018; Zacharenko 2019). In the words of 
Weronika Grzebalska:
conservative protest movements create a space for [marginalized] 
people to vent their fears and insecurities, voice their anger and dissat-
isfaction with politics and claim a sense of agency and empowerment 
that European liberals and social democrats once promised – but failed 
to deliver.
(2016)
Similar insights can be found in the writings of Elena Zacharenko (2019), 
who urges liberals to break with neoliberalism in order to effectively oppose 
the ultraconservative movements. She points out that clashes over “gender” 
result from a broader trend clearly visible in European mainstream politics 
in recent decades: the tendency to employ the discourse of human rights and 
focus on minority issues, while simultaneously cutting social provisions and 
dismantling the welfare state in general. Zacharenko claims that the anti- 
gender movement is a reaction against this trend which equates gender pro-
gressivism with neoliberal governance, ignoring distinctions and divisions 
on the progressive side, especially the existence of left feminism.
The collusion between liberal democracy and neoliberalism has been 
especially pronounced in Eastern Europe, where market democracy and 
gender equality policies were introduced simultaneously and often by the 
same actors, under the pressure of Western institutions and later, as part of 
the EU integration process (see also Rawłuszko 2019). As a result, in Central 
and Eastern Europe “ ‘gender ideology’ has become a means of expressing 
a rejection of the European East- West hierarchy and the failed promises of 
capitalist transformation” (Zacharenko 2019). While we agree that raising 
inequalities and the politics of austerity have been an important factor in 
paving the way for right- wing populism, we view it as problematic to reduce 
conflicts around values to the effects of economic inequality. Our analysis 
acknowledges the importance of economic factors, but it also highlights the 
particularity of conflicts over values, identities, beliefs and lifestyles.
Gender traditionalism as a form of resistance against the onslaught 
of “Western individualism” is a staple of public debate in Eastern and 
Central Europe, feminism being presented as part and parcel of this new 
and dangerous regime. As documented by Joanna Regulska and Magdalena 
Grabowska (2013), this view had been typical of older religious women from 
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rural areas in Poland long before the beginning of anti- gender campaigns. 
These women were “rarely in favor of the free- market economy and equally 
rarely identify with feminist values. In Poland, some of these older, conserva-
tive women have been rising voices against neocapitalism and the European 
Union” (2013: 165). The women in question – conservative mothers’ groups 
which emerged in the Czech Republic in the 1990s, supporters of Radio 
Maryja or parental activists engaged in opposition to school reform in 2009 
in Poland – would eventually join the anti- gender movement, whose rhet-
oric corresponds to their own worldview: at once skeptical of capitalism and 
feminism, as well as inclined to view them as interconnected.
There is a tendency on the left and within feminism to assume that pro-
gressive movements own resistance to neoliberalism as a social project and 
cultural formation. In reality, however, there is significant opposition to neo-
liberalism on the other end of the political spectrum. While left- wing Western 
feminists were discussing the problem of feminism’s “elective affinity” to 
neoliberalism (Fraser 2009) or the rise of “neoliberal feminism” (Rottenberg 
2018), what took hold in the imagination of many women was a sweeping 
equation between feminism and individualism, a view which was promoted 
by traditionalist circles over the last decades. We claim that this equiva-
lence may have stronger resonance in Eastern Europe than in most Western 
contexts and that anti- genderism capitalizes on this fact.
Populist revolt or elite change?
In their important study Cultural Backlash Pippa Norris and Ronald 
Inglehart (2019) show that conflicts over values have in recent years 
become the decisive factor explaining popular support for right- wing popu-
list parties. While such parties tend to receive significantly greater support 
among low- income groups and people suffering from social deprivation, the 
support is often strongest among the petty bourgeoisie rather than unskilled 
manual workers, whereas it is significantly lower among welfare recipients 
(Norris and Inglehart 2019: 132– 169, for Poland see Gdula 2019). Cultural 
factors, such as anti- immigrant attitudes, mistrust of global and national 
governance, support for authoritarian values and left- right ideological self- 
placement are decisive for political choices.
We claim that the economic cleavages should be seen as intertwined with 
cultural ones in a complex pattern; they are mutually reinforcing, but nei-
ther can be reduced to the other. Economic grievances affect the demand 
for right- wing populism, but often in an indirect way, e.g. through exacer-
bating anxieties about migration, cultural marginalization and disruption 
of traditional values and moral hierarchies (Hochschild 2016; Norris and 
Inglehart 2019). Norris and Inglehart argue that in recent years traditional 
divisions between left and right have become obsolete; today political parties 
should be divided into liberal cosmopolitans and conservative populists. 
The former support pluralistic democracy, tolerance, multiculturalism and 
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progressive values, whereas the latter opt for traditional values and nation-
alism, using anti- establishment rhetoric to voice “the popular will.” David 
Goodhart (2017) describes the same division among voters as one between 
“Anywheres” vs “Somewheres;” that is those who are mobile, flexible and 
capable of adapting to new circumstances, and those whose identity is rooted 
in a particular place, and whose sense of security requires stable conditions. 
He describes the shift in global politics – a populist revolt – as the rise of the 
Somewheres against the decades- long hegemony of the Anywheres. These 
conceptualizations can be usefully combined with the concept of the popu-
list moment proposed by Mudde (2004), Krastev (2007) and Mouffe (2018), 
aiming to capture the profound shift in politics that we are witnessing today 
and the logic of the on- going struggles for hegemony.
One needs to be skeptical, however, of the populist leaders’ claim to be of 
the people. Politicians such as Orbán, Kaczyński or Le Pen are themselves 
members of their society’s elites, and many of their efforts are oriented toward 
gaining and monopolizing power, rather than redistributing resources and 
including marginalized populations. By successfully claiming the identity of 
those who speak for the poor and disempowered, right- wing populists have 
put in motion a process of elite change. While elites – small, well- connected 
groups with disproportionate economic, political and cultural power – are 
usually seen as stable, they are also subject to change (Putnam 1976; Best 
and Higley 2018). Existing scholarship focuses predominantly on political 
elites, which include
the familiar “power elite” triumvirate of top business, government 
executive, and military leaders (Mills 1956) along with persons and 
groups holding strategic positions in political parties and parliaments, 
major interest organizations and professional associations, important 
media enterprises and trade unions, and religious and other hierarchic-
ally structured institutions powerful enough to affect political decisions.
(Best and Higley 2018: 3)
However, a civil society elite also exists; it includes heads of most influ-
ential organizations and think- tanks, widely recognized social movement 
leaders or norm entrepreneurs and public intellectuals engaged in social 
campaigns. Interconnected with influential politicians and business leaders, 
the liberal civil society elite is often vilified in populist rhetoric as privileged 
and corrupt. In fact, the very word “elite” is used in such discourse as an 
insult. In its 2014 electoral program the Law and Justice party promised to 
re- organize state– civil society relations toward a more participatory model 
based on partnership, the strengthening of direct democracy and supporting 
the have- nots of the third sector, especially small organizations from rural 
areas. The reality proved different. Under the banner of anti- elitism, the 
populist right established itself as a new elite in politics, judiciary, culture 
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people” and giving them access to political and cultural power, right- wing 
populist actors aim to monopolize power for themselves and their allies, 
including representatives of the anti- gender movement. Over the last five 
years in Poland we have observed key positions of power and influence in all 
areas of life being taken over by people connected and loyal to the Law and 
Justice party (Bill 2020). Each time such a change occurred it was justified 
by a need to “give power back to the people” while in reality this process can 
be seen as a state- wide power grab. Andrea Pető and Weronika Grzebalska 
(2016) describe this process as the creation of a polypore state: a system in 
which all vital resources, concepts and institutions of the liberal democratic 
state are appropriated by the party in power and transformed into an illib-
eral state.
Neither the authors of Cultural Backlash nor Goodhart focus specific-
ally on gender as a key polarizing factor, delegating this role to conflicts 
involving national identity and migration. Our analysis, however, shows 
that broadly defined gender issues are of key importance for the processes 
of political polarization. Right- wing populists strategically accuse “cosmo-
politan elites” of blurring gender differences and hierarchies, and this charge 
is no less important than the one concerning open borders and multicultur-
alism. In fact, it is discourse around gender that allows today’s conservatives 
to bridge the two dimensions: economic and cultural. Anti- gender discourse 
persistently sets a culturally marginalized and economically disadvantaged 
majority (Goodhart’s Somewheres) against global liberal elites (cosmo-
politan Anywheres). This discursive pattern could be observed in post- 
communist countries long before the anti- gender campaigns began, but it 
was the combination of the anti- gender critique of liberal elites as morally 
corrupt and the right- wing discourse of regaining sovereignty that made it 
politically effective.
Notes
 1 This and other quotes from speeches given at WCF in Verona were transcribed 
and translated from Italian to English by Cecilia Santilli, a member of the research 
team “Civil Society Elites?”. We are grateful for her generous support.
 2 In our earlier article on this topic (Korolczuk and Graff 2018) we employed the 
term “illiberal populism” to underscore the fact that the right- wing actors openly 
challenge liberalism understood as individual freedoms, minority rights and plur-
alism. We now abandon this term, opting for the more precise concept of right- 
wing populism, recognizing the significance of the opposition between corrupt 








2  Mapping the anti- gender campaigns 
as a global movement
From religious trend to political 
struggle
In September 1995, an American Catholic journalist named Dale O’Leary 
traveled to Beijing to attend the United Nations Fourth World Conference 
on Women. She returned convinced that “the Gender Establishment firmly 
controls the UN” and made it her mission to reveal to the public the full 
scope of their plan to “remake the world” (1997: 26). The story she eventu-
ally told is that of a hostile takeover of international bodies such as the UN 
by International Planned Parenthood Federation and a group of aggressive 
U.S. feminists – a relentless effort to push a radical sexual agenda upon 
developing nations. In a rhetorical move we view as paradigmatic of the 
anti- gender imaginary, O’Leary presents herself as a champion of ordinary 
people’s right to lead traditional lives and to defend their families against 
the forces of the global Sexual Revolution. She also insists that the gender 
agenda is in fact a hoax, an outrage against common sense. Her 1997 book 
The Gender Agenda concludes with a vivid metaphor:
The Gender Agenda reminds me of a giant balloon in a small room. So 
long as everyone treats the balloon with respect, it continues to expand, 
and, eventually, it will suffocate the people in the room. But, all that is 
needed to stop the balloon is one sharp pin.
(O’Leary 1997: 213)
O’Leary is one of many conservative Catholics who prepared the ground 
for what would eventually become an international movement against 
“gender ideology.” This chapter maps out the intellectual sources and global 
connections of the anti- gender movement. We discuss (1) the origins of 
anti- gender campaigns and the key role of the Vatican; (2) the subsequent 
development of what started as a religious movement into a political one; 
(3) the importance of the East- West divide for moral and political geography 
of the movement; (4) the role played by the socio- economic crisis in these 
developments and (5) the rise of a new wave of feminist activism, which we 
view as a countermovement to anti- gender campaigns.
There is no doubt that the Vatican and Christian religious institutions 
played a key role in initiating resistance to “gender ideology” (Buss and 
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Herman 2003; Case 2011, 2016 and 2019; Garbagnoli 2016; Kuhar 2014). 
Yet, throughout this book we argue that anti- genderism is political at heart 
and cannot be reduced to a religious phenomenon. We agree with Paternotte 
and Kuhar, who claim that the invention of “gender ideology” is not only a 
religious issue. “These campaigns intersect with raising right- wing populism 
in Europe and, to a lesser extent, with political homophobia designed as a 
political project to increase state power” (2017a: 9).
Religious origins of anti- gender campaigns
The trend originates in the 1990s with the Vatican’s opposition to the 
inclusion of the term “gender” in documents produced during two UN 
conferences: the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development 
and the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women (Buss 2004; Case 2011, 2016; 
Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Corredor 2019). Interestingly, this was not 
simply a case of the center – the Vatican – influencing the peripheries. Morán 
Faúndes (2019: 410) has traced the genealogy of the “gender ideology” syn-
tagma to the works of several Argentinean neoconservatives produced in 
1995 and almost immediately picked up by U.S.- based Catholic journalist 
Dale O’Leary. According to many scholars, it was O’Leary who became a 
key early inspiration for the Holy See in introducing the phrase “gender 
ideology” into its discourse. Her pamphlet “Gender: the Deconstruction of 
Women” (1995) – later developed into The Gender Agenda – was widely 
read by Vatican officials, including Joseph Ratzinger, and conservative 
Catholics (Case 2016: 165; Paternotte and Kuhar 2017a: 9– 10). Since 
then, “gender” has gradually replaced “civilization of death,” as well as the 
opposition between “good” and “bad” feminisms within Catholic teaching, 
a shift that facilitated alliances that were both international and interfaith 
(Garbagnoli 2016).
To conservative Catholics, it was unacceptable that key transnational 
institutions, such as the WHO and UN, had opted for a conceptualiza-
tion of gender relations rooted in social constructionism and feminism, as 
opposed to complementarity and “natural law” promoted by the Church. In 
the words of O’Leary:
The Gender Agenda begins with a false premise – the differences between 
men and women are social constructs – and then goes on to demand that 
this premise be “mainstreamed” in every program and policy. According 
to the “gender perspective,” since all the differences between men’s and 
women’s activities and achievements are artificial, they can and should 
be eliminated.
(1997: 161)
Since O’Leary’s book, a whole library of anti- gender works has been 
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of the religious anti- gender agenda can be found in documents issued by 
the Vatican, most comprehensively the 1000- page long Lexicon: Ambiguous 
and Debatable Terms Regarding Family Life and Ethical Questions, 
published in 2003 by the Pontifical Council for the Family. Subsequently, 
Catholics around the world were informed about the dangers of “gender” 
by numerous exhortations and public documents produced by the Vatican 
as well as by national Catholic Churches (e.g. Congregation for Catholic 
Education 2019; Benedict XVI 2008, 2012; Bishops’ Conference of Poland 
2013; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2004).
The most influential figures of Catholic intellectual circles that have 
spoken against “genderism” include Michel Schooyans, a Belgian priest 
positioned in the Vatican, who authored one of the founding books of anti- 
genderism in 1997; the Guinean Cardinal Robert Sarah appointed a prefect 
of the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments 
by Pope Francis in 2014; the Colombian Cardinal Alfonso López Trujillo, 
the president of the Pontifical Council for the Family; as well as the French 
Lacanian psychoanalyst priest Tony Anatrella, who was eventually banned 
from exercising the priestly ministry in 2018 following an investigation into 
allegations of his having molested patients whom he claimed to have cured 
of homosexuality (Shine 2018). There are also several women among widely 
recognized authorities on the evils of gender, including activists and authors 
such as the German sociologist Gabriele Kuby (2015) and Belgian American 
theologian Marguerite Peeters (2007), whose work has been translated into 
many languages and circulated widely in Europe.
What role has the war on gender played within the Catholic Church? 
Demonization of gender is sometimes seen as a strategy of the Church 
to discipline liberal Catholics, whose calls for reform in the aftermath of 
the pedophile scandals are viewed as a threat to the Church as an insti-
tution (e.g. Radzik 2013). On this interpretation, genderism has become 
the new enemy of the anti- modern wing of the Church, a generalized evil 
that to some extent replaces Jews in their role of scapegoat associated with 
modernity and moral degeneracy. Indeed, the similarities between the two 
mindsets are striking. Like Jews in 19th century European antisemitism, 
gender is associated with cosmopolitanism and more generally with change, 
rootlessness and modernity (Volkov 1978) as well as perversion and the 
dissolution of boundaries (Mosse 1997, Gilman 1991). Like Jews in the con-
spiratorial antisemitism promoted by ultra- Catholic nationalists in 1930s 
France (Sanos 2013), gender is claimed to be a global power engaged in 
scheming against ordinary people, a tool of social engineering, part of a plot 
of global elites whose ultimate aim is the subjugation of local populations. 
Finally, like Jews in medieval Christian anti- Judaism, gender is occasion-
ally portrayed as a demonic force, in need of being exorcised (Trachtenberg 
1943). When confronting LGBT demonstrations, protesters often bear 
crosses and rosaries, as if facing a demonic force in need of being exorcised. 
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of the snail, associated in Christian iconography with sin and especially with 
lust. A closer look at the Sao Paolo Judith Butler incident reveals repeated 
references to “hell” (as in: “take your ideologies back to hell”), banners with 
Butler’s face adorned with horns, as well as references to witchcraft (Jaschik 
2017; Brazil 2017).
These are not isolated similarities but elements of a certain pattern, a cul-
tural continuity linking anti- gender discourse and traditions of religiously 
motivated conspiratorial antisemitism (Graff 2021). The belief that the Jews 
killed Christ and are enemies of Christianity allied with the devil played an 
important role in conservative Catholicism until the Second Vatican Council 
rejected these ideas in the 1960s. In 1988 another effort to purge Catholicism 
of antisemitism was made by John Paul II, who excommunicated Cardinal 
Joseph Lefebvre. While these decisions eradicated open antisemitism 
from Catholic doctrine, the ultraconservative anti- modernist strand of 
Catholicism survived in the form of Radical Traditionalism – a movement 
on the margins of the Church, active mostly in the U.S. (Weitzman 2015). 
The mainstreaming of a conspiratorial narrative about human sexuality can 
be interpreted as a symptom of a broad shift within the Church; gender has 
partly replaced Jews as the Church’s enemy and the embodiment of despised 
modernity. This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that anti- genderism’s 
birth during the papacy of Benedict XVI roughly coincides with this pope’s 
efforts to bring Radical Traditionalism back into the fold. In 2007 Benedict 
XVI re- introduced the Tridentine Mass and in 2009 he lifted the excom-
munication of the bishops of the Society of Pius X, a group that had been 
the center of controversies concerning Holocaust denial (Weitzman 2015). 
Two months before his abdication, the same pope also issued the Vatican’s 
first extended exhortation against “gender ideology” (Benedict XVI 2012). 
Thus, a compromise appears to have been reached between two wings of 
the Catholic Church: one conspiracy theory replaced another, a change 
both parties found beneficial. Many anti- gender texts fit the definition of 
a conspiracy theory as outlined by Jovan Byford (2011). Conspiracism 
as an explanatory style is centered on intentionality and collusion, while 
rejecting all official sources of knowledge. Such theories set out to explain 
complex social processes as sinister plots. The narrative is Manichean in 
nature; it involves an innocent misled majority that is manipulated by a 
powerful devious minority group. The conspiratorial imaginary demonizes 
the enemy, thus precluding any possibility of compromise. Its logic is irre-
futable as disconfirming evidence is transformed into further proof of con-
spiracy, while doubt is dismissed as distraction or worse – a sign of collusion 
with conspirators.
In short, the rise of anti- genderism appears as a reaction to tensions 
within contemporary Catholicism and works as the new source of cohesive-
ness among lay Catholics. As shown in a study conducted in Italy, this is a 
novel strategy “to combine religious coherence, political representation and 
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for the renewal and refocusing of Catholic political action” (Lavizzari 
and Prearo 2019: 424– 425). Thus, a conservative definition of the family 
becomes a new frontier and a cause to rally around, while dissenters are now 
positioned as those who have abandoned the faith. In the Polish context, the 
rise of anti- gender rhetoric within Catholic teaching is part of a broader 
process described by the theologian and philosopher Stanisław Obirek as 
a gradual drift of Polish Catholicism away from religion and toward pol-
itics (2015). Politicized religiosity in Poland is xenophobic, anti- intellectual, 
hostile toward the West and implicitly antisemitic, thus it easily enters 
into alliances with the extreme right forces and right- wing populists. One 
example of this trend is the rise and spectacular success of the Redemptorist 
priest Tadeusz Rydzyk, founder of Radio Maryja and TV Trwam, who has 
fueled nationalistic sentiments in Poland since the early 1990s and – as we 
will discuss later – become an important actor in anti- gender campaigns.
The Vatican’s opposition towards “genderism” is a continuation of the 
Church’s war against the “civilization of death” and the 1990s resistance 
to what was then called the “gender agenda” (Butler 2004; Omang 2013; 
Favier 2015), but it is worth noting what is new about the current phase of 
struggle, which dates back to around 2010. One key difference is that while 
representatives of the clergy and Catholic commentators oppose women’s 
reproductive rights and stress the connection between family planning and 
LGBT rights, they also link both to the flaws of global capitalism. Feminism, 
LGBT and global corporations are said to be part of the same agenda, which 
supposedly leads to the destruction of family and ultimately to the destruc-
tion of Christian civilization. Another new trend is “the inclusiveness of this 
axis, which is no longer divided along confessions, but rather along reac-
tionary and progressive Christians, be they Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical, 
or Orthodox” (Rivera 2018: 7). Unlike the Vatican’s earlier efforts to defend 
traditional “family values,” this is now part and parcel of a global struggle. 
The Catholic origins are undeniable, but examining them should not blind 
us to the importance of transnational and interfaith connections, or to the 
presence of fundamentalist Christians of various denominations at key 
anti- gender events such as World Congress of Families or Agenda Europe 
meetings, which we discuss below.
From the Vatican to Verona: how a religious movement became a 
political one
Tracing the Vatican’s influence and grasping the theological grounds of anti- 
genderism does not account for the movement’s current cultural and polit-
ical significance. The key question for us is how the religious trend spread 
beyond the Catholic circles and moved from the realm of religion into that of 
politics. In our view, three sets of factors contributed to this process: socio- 
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First, the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath strengthened the tendency 
toward the dismantling of welfare provisions in many states, resulting in 
increased precarity and a crisis of care (e.g. Piketty 2018; Theiss et al. 2017; 
Walby 2015). As Sylvia Walby argued in her 2015 book entitled Crisis, the 
global financial downturn had a powerful gender dimension: both the crisis 
itself (e.g. rising costs of living, stagnant or falling wages and growing job 
instability) and the austerity measures introduced in response to it, such as 
budget cuts and social services being turned over to the market, had a dis-
proportional impact on women. Ultraconservative actors redefined these col-
lective experiences in moral terms, as a “crisis of the family.” This was not a 
mere discursive strategy, but a full- fledged political one. Budget cuts and aus-
terity measures mobilized many citizens to demand better social policies, and 
some of these mobilizations were subsequently co- opted by ultraconservatives.
The contributing political factor is, of course, the crisis of the left and 
the rise of right- wing populism, the latter tightly related to the so- called 
“refugee crisis” and increased attention to Islam as a potential threat to 
Europeans (Dietze 2019, Norris and Inglehart 2019). These developments 
facilitated the rise to power of new actors such as Lega in Italy or Law and 
Justice in Poland and strengthened the position of radical parties such as 
AfD in Germany, which were willing to cooperate with ultraconservative 
groups and take on their ideological agenda as their own, merging fear 
toward “gender ideology” with Islamophobia.
Finally, technological advances, such as social media and online peti-
tion platforms, enabled unprecedented collaboration between groups and 
networks across national borders and provided the means for spreading the 
ultraconservative worldview in a modern or even hip format (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2013; Castells 2000). It is at the intersection of these trends that 
a rather marginal religious project – Dale O’Leary’s dream of destroying 
“the Gender Agenda” by means of “one sharp pin” – evolved into a vibrant 
transnational movement capable of influencing political developments and 
even reaching for political power.
Paternotte and Kuhar describe the various national anti- gender movements 
as “a complex constellation of global actors” (2017b: 271). Available 
research suggests that, indeed, there is quite a bit of cooperation, some of 
it institutionalized since the mid- 1990s (e.g. Bob 2012; Buss and Herman 
2001). For example, Polish activists cooperate closely both regionally and 
transnationally. During the September 2015 rally “Stop Depravation in 
Education,” which we attended as participant observers, many international 
guests were present. The list of speakers included renowned European anti- 
choice activists such as Antonia Tully (Society for the Protection of Unborn 
Children, Great Britain), Antoine Renard (La Manif Pour Tous, France and 
the head of the European Federation of Catholic Family Associations) and 
Christoph Scharnweber (Demo für alle, Germany).
There is growing evidence of ideational and organizational links between 
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mass protests of concerned parents such as La Manif Pour Tous in France, 
recent attacks on “the gender agenda” in the U.S. and the anti- LGBT and 
antifeminist backlash in Putin’s Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, as well as 
anti- gender mobilizations in other regions, including Africa (Datta 2018; 
Gradskova 2020; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Rivera 2019; Spallaccia 
2019; Suchanow 2018, 2020). However, some national movements are 
closer to each other than to others. The Ordo Iuris Institute in Poland and 
its funding body, the Father Piotr Skarga Association for Christian Culture, 
have been established by ultraconservative network named TFP – Tradition, 
Family and Property – which originated in Brazil in 1960 and eventually 
expanded in other parts of the world, including Eastern Europe. Neil Datta 
argues that the organization is not so much a Catholic movement as “an 
insurrection movement within Catholicism, with a distinct way of working 
by fusing social conservatism with economic hyper- liberalism and a legacy 
of complicity with far- right movements” (2020: 1). In some countries, 
including France, TFP was labeled a sect and was accused of indoctrin-
ating school children in its facilities (Suchanow 2020), but this did not stop 
the organization from expanding. In the beginning of the 21st century its 
main operation centers became France and Poland, and the main strategies 
include mobilizing people on the ground, entering decision- making spaces, 
such as European Union (EU) bodies and local governments, as well as 
promoting ultraconservative views on sexual and reproductive rights via 
traditional channels and social media (Datta 2020; Dauksza et al. 2020). 
TFP is behind some of the most dynamic anti- gender initiatives in Eastern 
Europe: Ordo Iuris is becoming a hub for the entire region. For example, 
it was behind the establishment of a “sister organization” – the Vigilare 
Foundation – in Croatia. According to Croatian journalist Ana Brakus, 
“the Father Piotr Skarga Association paid 5,400 Euros in founding cap-
ital, on top of 100 Euros from [original funder John Vice] Batarelo’s ori-
ginal Vigilare NGO” (2018). Representatives of Ordo Iuris have served 
as advisers to the Vigilare Foundation, which has followed some of the 
strategies employed in Poland, including collecting signatures in favor of 
banning abortion or sending donation slips to thousands of people in a 
fundraising and propaganda effort.
Close cooperation between Italian and French groups, in turn, has been 
documented in great detail by Sara Garbagnoli, who writes that:
The success of French anti- gender mobilizations encouraged [Italian] 
Catholic associations to fully adopt the anti- gender rhetoric. The Italian 
anti- gender movement, in other words, was created by copying and 
pasting the logos, the names, and the style of the main anti- gender 
French protests. New groups were created as the equivalent of French 
ones: La Manif Pour Tous – Italia (LMPT- I), the Sentinelle in Piedi 
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Cooperation takes place across the Atlantic, as well. In 2014 Ignacio 
Arsuaga and La Manif Pour Tous’s Ludovine de La Rochère publicly 
supported the March for Marriage in Washington DC (Brunet 2014; Feder 
2014). In 2019 at the World Congress of Families in Verona, Americans such 
as Brian Brown, CEO of International Organization for the Family, and 
ultraconservative evangelical pastor Jim Garlow, the chairman of Renewing 
American Leadership, shook hands with European political leaders including 
Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, Alexey Komov, who was a 
regional representative of WCF in Russia and Teresa Okafor, the Director 
of Foundation for African Cultural Heritage in Nigeria (Korolczuk 2019). 
These examples show that anti- gender ideas, strategies and images travel 
across borders, and while some remain the same, others are adapted to 
local needs.
When looking at different national cases of anti- gender mobilizations, 
common themes and preoccupations become obvious; it is also clear that the 
movements share common intellectual sources and authorities. Whereas the 
strategies include demonstrations, publications, workshops and conferences 
as well as political initiatives in parliaments, it is remarkable how well anti- 
gender activists have made use of the internet, building a sense of common 
identity among “defenders of the traditional family and values.” There are 
growing numbers of ultraconservative websites, social media outlets and 
open platforms disseminating information and mobilizing people to sign 
online petitions, take part in protests and engage on the local and national 
level. Sometimes these digital communities are linked to a specific local 
organization, such as stopgender.pl and stop- seksualizacji.pl in Poland, but 
there are also multi- language online platforms, such as CitizenGO founded 
in Spain in 2013, which mobilizes people through online petitions in 17 
countries. In spring 2020 the site boasted over 12,000,000 registered users, 
poised to defend “life, family, and liberty.” Campaigns have included an 
effort to stop the Netflix animated series Super Drags, mobilizing people in 
Ireland to keep abortion illegal, and opposing the depenalization of homo-
sexuality in Kenya. A recent mobilization in Warsaw has opposed the intro-
duction of sex education, based on claims that WHO standards include 
masturbation lessons for preschoolers (CitizenGo 2019).
The global dimension of the current wave of ultraconservative strat-
egizing consists not only in the building of transnational networks but also 
in these networks’ choice of targets, with an ear for the local culture but 
an eye for the larger goals ahead. Hence, on the one hand, focus on “con-
scientious objection” laws, as a way to limit access to abortion in even such 
liberal contexts as Sweden, and, on the other hand, the relentless vilification 
of the Istanbul Convention and other EU efforts to promote equality and 
non- discrimination (e.g. Niemi et al. 2020).
The global anti- gender movement believes itself to be the rightful heir to 
the values of Western civilization, and increasingly functions as a rival of the 





46 Anti-gender campaigns as a global movement
by both intervening at the level of transnational organizations and specific 
initiatives undertaken by ultraconservative organizations. For example, the 
Novae Terrae Foundation in Italy, closely linked to Agenda Europe and 
Lege party, has published a report titled Human Dignity Global Index. The 
title imitates a well- known UN report, the Universal Human Rights Index, 
which provides information on human rights violations in specific coun-
tries. Here, a “dignity rating” is introduced where dignity implies “the uni-
versal right to be born” (entailing limitations on access to contraception and 
abortion) (Rivera 2019: 18). Thus, efforts to ban abortion are strategically 
reframed as the pursuit of universal human rights. In the fall of 2020, a simi-
larly structured initiative was launched by Poland’s Ordo Iuris. Following 
the government’s call to reject the Istanbul Convention, ultraconservative 
organizations proposed to replace it with the Convention on the Rights 
of the Family, a document drafted by Ordo Iuris lawyers, which had been 
circulated in the region for two years and had been endorsed by activists 
from around Europe, including representatives of HazteOir and CitizenGo, 
as well as the European Center for Law and Justice (Ciobanu 2020b). 
Romanian journalist Claudia Ciobanu quotes an Ordo Iuris head lawyer 
Karolina Pawłowska, who explains this move in terms of the region’s self- 
defense against the imposition of Western norms:
That’s the whole reason why this initiative started, because we saw that 
the European Court of Human Rights is, step by step, trying to violate 
the definition of family and marriage in countries like Poland, Romania, 
Bulgaria […] We also have this new project of an EU LGBT strategy, 
in which the EU would like to impose the recognition of marriage 
contracted in countries that do recognise gay marriage, on other coun-
tries which don’t. […] The idea of our convention is to defend those 
countries which try to preserve the natural social order based on the 
“natural family” from this ideological dictate.
(Ciobanu 2020b)
Much of this ultraconservative strategy consists in repeating the steps by 
which feminism went international (and institutional) in the seventies, 
eighties and beyond, building transnational networks and introducing the 
movement’s vocabulary into the language of international institutions and 
treaties. What is at stake here is an uneasy balance between transnation-
alism and national embeddedness. What binds these actors together is 
ultraconservative universalism, the desire to build a world order that would 
displace what they perceive as the moral degradation and relativism of the 
contemporary “modern godless states” (Benedict XVI 2012). When anti- 
gender actors join forces with right- wing populists, this goal is framed in 
nationalistic discourse; the struggles for a new moral world seamlessly 
merge with goals related to national sovereignty and democracy, understood 
as the power of the people.
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Today, cooperation between ultraconservatives and political actors is 
facilitated by transnational networks and organizations, such as the World 
Congress of Families (WCF). A global network of pro- life – or rather anti- 
choice and anti- LGBT – groups, the Congress positions itself as a global 
pro- family movement. The WCF originated in the U.S. as a project of the 
Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society, founded in 1997 by conser-
vative historian Allan Carlson. Renamed as the International Organization 
for the Family (IOF) in 2016, it is now led by Brian Brown, who is also 
president of the National Organization for Marriage, formed in 2007 spe-
cifically to oppose the legalization of gay marriage in California. Today, 
the IOF has more than 40 official partner organizations around the world, 
including Russia. The IOF’s main goal, as stated in the mission section on 
their website, is “to unite and equip leaders, organizations, and families to 
affirm, celebrate, and defend the natural family as the only fundamental and 
sustainable unit of society” (IOF webpage). The efforts to protect what the 
leaders call “the natural family” include a range of activities described as 
“efforts to protect the unborn, encourage marriage, reduce poverty, improve 
the health of children and adults, help orphans find homes, and eliminate 
human trafficking and prostitution” (IOF webpage). In practice, the main 
activities of the organization overlap with the goals of the U.S. Christian 
Right; they include opposing marriage equality and reproductive rights. 
Due to its vicious rhetoric and vilification of sexual minorities, the Southern 
Poverty Law Center lists the IOF as a hate group.
The IOF and its flagship project, the World Congress of Families, have 
facilitated an ideological alliance between the U.S. Christian Right and 
European nationalists, right- wing populists and autocrats, perhaps most 
significantly also including Putin’s Russia along with the Russian Orthodox 
Church. Tracing the links between various figures and groups connected to 
the WCF may seem like a conspiracy theory, but the connections are well 
documented (e.g. Bob 2012: 42– 43; Datta 2018; Mierzyńska 2020a; Moss 
2017; Rivera 2018; Suchanow 2018, 2020). For over a decade, American 
founders have cooperated closely with local groups in other countries – 
for instance they took part in organizing the first and the second World 
Demographic Summits, both of which took place in Russia (at the Russian 
State Social University in 2011 and in Ulyanovsk in 2012). In 2012 the U.S.- 
based organization helped Russia launch FamilyPolicy.ru, a powerful advo-
cacy group whose objective is to influence key decision makers and opinion 
leaders in the field of family policy in Russia.
Not only do the American and Russian ultraconservative organizations 
cooperate, but Russian oligarchs, notably the ultra- Orthodox billionaire 
Konstantin Malofeev, are said to sponsor the activities and meetings of 
the network in an effort to advance Russian political interests in Europe 
(Barthélemy 2018; Rivera 2019; Suchanow 2020). Another notable figure 
facilitating transnational cooperation is Alexey Komov, a WCF board 
member and its representative in Russia, who allegedly worked for Malofeev. 
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Komov cooperated closely with Matteo Salvini, the leader of Italy’s popu-
list right party Lega. He was also on the board of CitizenGo, a petition 
platform started in Spain, as a daughter organization of ultraconservative 
advocacy group named HazteOir. Both Spanish organizations were initiated 
by Ignatio Arsuaga, who took part in the World Congress of Families in 
Verona in 2019, along with Brown, Komov, Salvini and others. It is figures 
like Komov that best epitomize the effective networking on the global right, 
which often occurs with the help of Russian money and Orthodox religious 
authorities (Moss 2017; Datta 2018).
The World Congress of Families is not the only global networking site 
facilitating cooperation among ultraconservatives and right- wing populists. 
Another platform for transatlantic cooperation, one that links civil society 
representatives with political actors, is the Political Network for Values. 
Established in 2014, it focuses on promoting the traditional family, marriage 
and religious freedom. According to its website, it is:
a global platform and a resource for legislators and political 
representatives rooted in a Trans- Atlantic dialogue on shared values 
and aimed at collaborating as a network on a local and global level by 
actively defending and promoting the values we share.
(Political Network for Values website)
What differentiates the Network from organizations such as the World 
Congress of Families is the prominent role of politicians, who are not guests 
but key figures in this group. The advisory board includes the Hungarian 
Minister of State for Family and Youth Affairs Katalin Novák as well as 
parliamentarians from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Kenya, 
Lithuania, Peru, Spain and Slovakia. Representatives of non- governmental 
organizations outnumber politicians on the Board of Directors, which 
includes Sharon Slater (president of Family Watch International), Benjamin 
Bull (Executive Director of Advocacy at First Liberty) and Brian Brown 
(listed here as President of the National Organization for Marriage). Three 
other members represent European countries: two politicians (Katalin 
Novák and Jaime Mayor Oreja, listed as Former Minister of Home Affairs 
in Spain) and Ignacio Arsuaga, President of CitizenGo.
The Network organizes annual meetings – Regional, Transatlantic and 
International – called Summits, as if to signal its ambition to become a rival 
to the United Nations. In recent years such Summits have taken place in 
Brussels, Washington, Madrid and Bogota, gathering together politicians and 
civil society representatives from various countries, including Poland and 
Sweden. An important initiative of the group is called the Values Observatory, 
whose website features maps of the world assigning various countries specific 
ratings (marked in green, red or yellow) depending on national legislation 
and policies concerning abortion, LGBT rights, access to assisted repro-
duction and euthanasia. Much like the Novae Terrae Foundation’s report, 
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this ranking both echoes and inverts the United Nations’ Universal Human 
Rights Index; countries which allow for homosexual marriage or abortion 
are marked in an alarming red, whereas contexts where access to termin-
ation of pregnancy or assisted reproduction is banned appear in a hopeful 
green. Poland and other East European countries are presented in yellow, as 
a frontier between the rival civilizations: the civilization of death prevailing 
on the West and the Global South together with most of Asia, which are 
seen as regions committed to “Human Dignity and the Common Good.” 
The very act of drawing such a map can be viewed as ultraconservatives’ 
claiming of moral authority in the international arena and sketching out the 
boundaries of conflict.
The moral geography of anti- genderism is vividly expressed by visual 
means in a poster announcing a conference entitled “Culture War in 
Europe: Does Poland Stand a Chance?”, held in Warsaw in October 2020 
(see Figure 2.1). The event’s main organizer was Patryk Jaki, a European 
MP associated with the right- wing party United Poland (Solidarna Polska). 
He is known for public statements about “gender ideology,” which he rou-
tinely equates with Marxism. The image is worth a closer look, due to the 
remarkable literalism with which it presents this claim. A contour map of 
Poland is split in two by a closed fist, a symbol of the revolutionary spirit. 
On the right are Marx, Lenin and a male gay couple in a close embrace. 
On the left, we see John Paul II, a heterosexual couple with two children 
(both boys) and Robert Schuman. The latter is perhaps the most interesting 
figure in this otherwise predictable scenario; Schuman has long been an 
icon of Europe’s liberal forces, a founding father of the EU associated with 
the ideals of pluralism, individual freedom and transnational cooperation. 
Recently, however, he is being recruited for the cause of pan- European con-
servatism and religiosity. While the Vatican initiated the process of his beati-
fication already in the nineties, in recent years Polish ultraconservatives have 
been presenting him as patron of a Christian Europe of sovereign nations, 
an antidote to neomarxism and “gender ideology.” In Poland, this effort 
is being carried out by the Institute of Schuman’s Thought (Instytut Myśli 
Schumana), formed in 2016, and working in close collaboration with Radio 
Maryja, TV Trwam and Ordo Iuris. The Institute’s website makes it clear 
that its ambitions are not limited to Poland; the aim is to “shape Europe 
under the banner of Schuman” building a counterforce to the liberal left 
secular forces. These ambitions are clearly shared by various groups in 
Europe. The conference announced in the poster is apparently sponsored by 
the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Party, which claims to 
be Europe’s leading Conservative movement united by “centre- right values,” 
but in fact brings together predominantly extreme- right and populist right 
parties including Vox (Spain), Fratelli di Italia (Italy), Sweden Democrats, 
Law and Justice (Poland), as well as a number of conservative and far- right 
parties in both North and South America.
50 Anti-gender campaigns as a global movement
Figure 2.1  Poster for the conference “Culture War in Europe: Does Poland Stand a 
Chance?” organized by Patryk Jaki, Warsaw, Poland, 2020.
 
Anti-gender campaigns as a global movement 51
Neil Datta’s 2018 report on “Restoring the Natural Order” helps one 
understand how coordination between different national organizations 
works globally. According to his findings, 20 U.S.- based and European 
ultraconservative campaigners met in 2013 and began pulling together an 
agenda of “achievable goals” (Datta 2018). Agenda Europe, as this group calls 
itself, has since grown to include over 100 organizations from 30 European 
countries. The network’s ideas, aims and ambitions are those of religious 
extremists, but explicitly religious language is strategically displaced by talk 
of “rights” and seemingly neutral Natural Law discourse (Datta 2018: 10). 
“Natural Law,” the anonymous authors of the group’s manifesto claim, 
has been undermined by the “Cultural Revolution” (equated by them with 
“sexual revolution”), which is destroying humanity. Western civilization is 
on the verge of collapse, and Agenda Europe’s urgent rescue plan includes 
not only overturning existing laws related to sexuality (LGBT rights) and 
reproduction (contraception, abortion, all assisted reproduction technolo-
gies), but also divorce, use of embryonic stem cells, euthanasia and organ 
transplantation. Their strategy is to reframe the conflict, using the strategies 
of their opponents. This involves positioning themselves as victims of the 
Cultural Revolution, “defenders of faith [struggling against] cultural revo-
lutionaries […] and intolerance against Christians, or ‘Christianophobia’ ” 
(Datta 2018: 15). Among its strategic recommendations, Agenda Europe’s 
manifesto explicitly mentions the “colonization of human rights” – that 
is, the reframing of ultraconservative religious positions on sex and repro-
duction to sound like human rights language. It is worth quoting Agenda 
Europe’s own description of how they intend to oppose what they see as 
“the contamination of language” by feminist and LGBT activists. The plan 
is to reclaim the terms used by progressive forces and “contaminate” them 
back to their own advantage:
It therefore seems to be a much better strategy to use all those words, 
including neologisms such as “reproductive rights”, but at the same 
time making clear what meaning those words have for us. If that is 
done consistently, we might even succeed in “contaminating” (or in, 
fact, rectifying) the vocabulary that our opponents have crafted, so that 
they cannot use them anymore. If, for example, a sufficient number of 
governments clearly state that “reproductive rights” means that any-
body has the right to reproduce, but that they do not imply any right 
to have access to abortion or artificial contraception, then all existing 
references to this term could be used in our favor.
(Agenda Europe 2019a: 127)
It is clear that the ultraconservatives aim to reframe the debate by taking 
over key terms introduced by the human rights discourse. Also recommended 
is infiltration of institutions and becoming “a respected interlocutor at the 
international level”; the aim is to get recognized as a UN player and be 
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included in Treaty Monitoring Bodies, as Special Rapporteurs and judges on 
the ECJ and ECHR as well as in the EU institutions (Datta 2018: 18).
Agenda Europe shares many supporters and participants with the World 
Congress of Families. For example, the 2017 WCF annual meeting organized 
in Budapest brought together, among others, Brian Brown, Alexey Komov 
and Ignacio Arsuaga, who are all listed as involved in Agenda Europe 
meetings and strategizing (Datta 2018: 39). Politicians representing popu-
list right- wing parties were also present at Budapest events, including the 
Polish Minister for Family, Work and Social Policy, Elżbieta Rafalska, and 
Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, who delivered the opening speech 
at the summit (Rivera 2018: 16; Suchanow 2019).
Two years later, the World Congress of Families was organized in Verona, 
an Italian city with a long history of fascist traditions, whose mayor had 
declared it “pro- life” already in October 2018. Verona proved to be the 
site of even closer cooperation between political actors and the religious 
fundamentalists; the summit was supported by both local and national Lega 
branches, and the then Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini was welcomed 
enthusiastically as the event’s star speaker. Salvini’s opening speech exempli-
fies how right- wing populism and anti- genderism converge in the vilification 
of feminism and Islam, linking the anti- gender struggle with anti- Muslim 
sentiments:
The feminists that speak of women’s rights are the first to pretend to 
not see what is the first, only and major, real danger in 2019 for rights, 
social achievements, freedom to work, study, speak, study, dress as you 
like – and it’s not the World Family Congress – it’s Islamic extremism, a 
culture where the woman’s value is less than zero […] The woman gets 
covered with a burka, the woman doesn’t have the right to leave the 
house, the woman shouldn’t wear a mini- skirt, and if she dresses too 
western, thinks too western or becomes too western, (they) beat her up. 
Not from the “dangerous extremists” of the Family Congress.
(Fox 2019)
Thus, an Italian right- wing populist leader positions himself as a champion 
of women’s rights and protector of individual freedoms, the core of Western 
civilization. Similar rhetoric was used by other speakers of the Congress, and, 
as we will show later, by many anti- gender actors in other locations. Gender- 
progressive forces are thus vilified as allies of radical Islam and positioned 
either as cynical enemies of the Western civilization or as naïve dupes, still 
believing in the peaceful coexistence of different religions and races.
Right- wing populists’ ascent to power in countries such as Italy and Poland 
opened up political opportunities for ultraconservative organizations. The 
ideological and organizational affinity between ultraconservatives and popu-
list right- wing parties has led to the institutionalization of the anti- gender 
movement within state structures (Donà and Bellè 2019; Mierzyńska 2020a). 
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and the emergence of new anti- gender initiatives. One drastic example is 
the anti- LGBT campaign in Poland; as of April 2020 more than 80 Polish 
local governments or municipalities (covering one- third of the country) 
have proclaimed themselves to be “LGBT- free zones” under the pretense 
that “LGBT- ideology” is a threat to children and families. This development 
triggered strong criticism from the European Parliament, which issued a 
statement linking Poland’s “zones” to a more general rise of homophobia in 
Europe, including Romania, Estonia, Spain, the UK and Hungary (European 
Parliament 2019).With the controversy over the “zones,” the struggle over 
“gender” has become an important cleavage in international relations. At 
the time of writing (spring 2020), the anti- gender campaigns are entering 
a new stage, one in which Poland’s very membership in the EU may be 
at stake.
The moral and political geography of the anti- gender 
movement: does the East- West divide matter?
Anti- gender alliances are part and parcel of global power struggles and are 
affected (and often disrupted) by tensions and realignments in international 
politics such as the changing relations between the U.S., Russia and EU. The 
key to understanding the present phase of the culture wars is the post- 1989 
geopolitical landscape; Eastern Europe and the Global South are seen as 
the key battlegrounds by the ultraconservative forces, whereas Russia plays 
the role of the poster child of retrotopic political imagination. As Zygmunt 
Bauman argued in his book Retrotopia (2017), utopian aspirations today 
tend to be directed toward an ideal past rather than a better future. This 
tendency, he claimed, is a reaction to late modernity experienced by many 
as a “Hobbesian” world of insecurity, fragmentation, individualism and vio-
lence. The anxiety produced by the complexity and liquidity of the modern 
world results in fantasies about the return of an ideal past. Within retrotopic 
imagination, both the return of tribal attitudes and indifference toward 
inequality are viewed not only as rational but also desirable. Not surprisingly, 
the country that is often idealized in ultraconservative discourse is Putin’s 
Russia. According to Kuby, “Russia is today the only country where there 
may be the possibility for church and state to rebuild the foundations of the 
family” (2014). While core documents of the movement include exhortations 
from the pope (e.g. Benedict XVI 2012), and while the key proponents of 
anti- genderism tend to be West Europeans (e.g. Anatrella, Kuby and Peeters), 
the present interests of the Vatican, Christian fundamentalists in the U.S. and 
European nationalists appear eerily convergent with those of Putin’s Russia, 
which is perceived as a moral rejuvenator of the West.
Some scholars posit that “the East- West divide does not offer a particu-
larly useful analytical lens” in the study of anti- gender campaigns (Paternotte 
and Kuhar 2018: 8). We challenge this view by showing how the East- West 
divide has been moralized by the anti- gender movement and elaborating 
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and coalitions. We argue that the key to understanding the present phase of 
contemporary culture wars is the post- Cold War geopolitical landscape, in 
which Eastern Europe and Russia are the key battlegrounds in the struggle 
against gender and increasingly also influential actors in global struggles.
Former socialist countries play a special role within the anti- gender 
declension narrative about the fall of Western civilization. Russia is an 
important source of anti- gender argumentation and resources (Bluhm and 
Varga 2019; Moss 2017; Suchanow 2020), while Poland and other post- 
socialist countries constitute a testing ground for the global right on how 
to implement their political agenda in a favorable political context. In the 
words of the German sociologist and anti- gender authority Gabriele Kuby:
A new totalitarianism is developing under the cloak of freedom […] 
now the East European countries are becoming aware of this trend, and 
my book seems to be helping awaken people. The destruction has not 
gone as far here and people are motivated to resist it. My great hope is 
that these East European countries will become a stronghold of resist-
ance in the European Union.
(as cited in Vail 2014: 1)
In contrast to the 1990s, when the West was aiding the East to estab-
lish liberal democracy, today the anti- gender actors claim that it is time for 
the East to save the West from rampant individualism and secularization. 
It is increasingly evident that the operation is not just spiritual in nature – 
huge amounts of money are involved and Eastern European organizations 
are not just recipients of Western know- how and financial support but 
also newly emerged leaders. These developments are connected to geopol-
itical shifts and the role of the Kremlin as a patron of ultraconservative 
groups worldwide (Bluhm 2016, Datta 2018, Moss 2015, 2017). A recent 
investigative report tracing how money travels within the TFP network 
reveals that Poland has become not only a space where the aims of global 
ultraconservative organizations can be effectively implemented but also a 
player in its own right and a source of funding for transnational operations. 
A group of journalists from Poland, France and Brasil revealed that between 
2009 and 2019 the Piotr Skarga Association – the Polish organization that 
founded Ordo Iuris – transferred 6.8 million euro to ultraconservative groups 
associated with TFP around the world (Dauksza et al. 2020). The Polish 
group perfected a business model originally developed by TFP in conjunc-
tion with the American Leadership Institute: mass mailings asking people 
for donations for religious purposes and offering devotional items such as 
rosaries in return. The reported income of the Piotr Skarga Association from 
such a scheme amounted to 6.3 million euro in 2019 alone. What explains 
the spectacular success of this strategy in Poland is that the donors believe 
that the money is transferred to the Catholic Church, which is why many 
Catholic institutions in France and in Poland have dissociated themselves 
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from the financial dealings of TFP network, even though they often support 
their political agenda. Clearly, the East has become not only just an imagined 
center of Christian civilization but also an important hub for the global anti- 
gender movement.
Another vivid example of how anti- genderism is contingent on global pol-
itics is the development of the World Congress of Families. On their website 
the American founders take pride in the accomplishments of their Russian 
partners; in the eyes of the WCF leaders Russia epitomizes the last frontier 
of true “family values” because “at a time when Western governments are 
moving backward to a pagan worldview, Russia has taken a leadership role 
to advance the natural family” (WCF 2014). However, close collaboration 
between neoconservatives from Russia and the U.S. in 2012 was put to 
the test by changes in the global geo- political landscape: tensions between 
Russia and the U.S./ EU due to the crisis in Crimea in 2014 (Moss 2017) and 
then the developments in Syria. Consequently, American leaders decided to 
officially withdraw from organizing the biennial conference, which was to 
take place in 2014 in Moscow. Similarly, Poland was repeatedly mentioned 
by speakers at the World Congress of Families conference in Verona in 
2019 as a great example of pro- family policy making and resistance to 
gender ideology, but no Polish representatives were present, most probably 
because the Russian influence in WCF would not go down well with Polish 
voters. Asked directly by one of the authors why there were no Poles at 
the Verona conference, Brian Brown stated evasively that they had all been 
invited but “chose not to come.” Polish investigative journalists and activists 
working on the issue suggested that open collaboration with Russian- 
sponsored groups would be potentially incriminating for groups such as 
Ordo Iuris that work closely with the ruling party (Mierzyńska 2020a; 
Suchanow 2020).
Like the Vatican, the WCF strives to become a counterweight to the UN 
at least regarding population policies, but in the context of serious political 
tensions it has difficulty maintaining its identity as a global institution. The 
crisis in Eastern Ukraine significantly reduced the political opportunities 
of some local anti- EU, pro- Russian groups such as the Parents’ Committee 
of Ukraine (Strelnyk 2017). At the same time, new possibilities for trans-
national cooperation opened up with the rise of right- wing populist leaders 
such as Donald Trump or Javier Bolsonaro, whose positions on Russia’s 
autocratic regime are highly ambiguous.
We interpret anti- genderism as a political movement whose agenda is 
obfuscated by appeals to human dignity, references to Natural Law and 
endless talk of moral values. Examined from a political perspective, the 
anti- gender campaigns reflect the nature of global civil society, which is 
ideologically diverse and conflict- oriented, with differences cutting across 
institutions and borders, and specific battles resulting in policy outcomes 
(Bob 2012; Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017). This conceptual framework 
allows us to see transnational and local ideological and institutional 
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connections. Locally, the movement often has a grassroots character and 
builds on context- specific concerns; the key themes, however, such as the 
recurrent image of the child in danger and the critique of cosmopolitan elites, 
are commonly used by anti- genderists around the globe. The movement’s 
activists and ideologues portray politics as evil and corrupt, while local 
populations are seen as innocent, authentic and oppressed. By appealing to 
nostalgia for “natural” modes of living, anti- gender campaigns tap into the 
anti- political resentment observed on both sides of the Atlantic (Bennett 
et al. 2013), which in turn fuels electoral victories of right- wing populist 
actors and political successes of extreme right- wing parties (Köttig, Bitzan 
and Petö 2016; Krizsán and Roggeband 2019). Thus, as we will show in 
the following chapters, anti- genderism is best seen as a brand of populist 
discourse.
While ultraconservative organizations seek respectability and legit-
imacy through the use of the language of human rights and engagement in 
transnational institutions, they sometimes struggle to manage their public 
image as legitimate actors within liberal democracy. A vivid example of 
such a public relations crisis can be found in the publication of Agenda 
Europe’s secret documents by the secretary of the European Parliamentary 
Forum on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, Neil Datta, in 2018 (Datta 
2018; Agenda Europe 2019a). While Agenda is focused on Europe and 
many of its leaders have direct links to the Vatican, its Summits have 
hosted Americans luminaries from groups such as the (Rivera 2019). 
These special guests were there to share experiences gained in many 
decades of activism in the U.S., which many European activists seems to 
view as far ahead of Western Europe. An important guest speaker was 
Alexey Komov, a well- known Russian ultraconservative representing the 
Russian Orthodox Church and, no doubt, Russia itself, as a beacon of 
the new ultraconservative civilization. Donors to the program include a 
Mexican billionaire, members of the European aristocracy, a UK climate- 
change denier, a far- right Russian oligarch and a corrupt Italian politician 
(Datta 2018: 24; Rivera 2019). While these connections are clearly profit-
able to the network, they are also less than attractive to the general public 
in Europe. As Datta comments:
Vatican surrogates catalysed the Christian, anti- SRR community in 
Europe and leveraged Catholic institutions to create a space where 
Agenda Europe members could discreetly convene and strategize, away 
from public scrutiny, but under the helpful gaze of the Holy See.
(2018: 19)
Thus, a problem arose when the strategic document produced at an 
Agenda Europe meeting was leaked to the public and publicized. Agenda 
representatives responded with a venomously sarcastic post on their blog 
dated 6 May 2018. The post is worth quoting at length as it shows, perhaps 
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unintentionally, a profound ambivalence and anxiety regarding the issue of 
transparency:
Neil Datta, the chief lobbyist of the international baby- slaughtering 
industry on the Brussels scene, has made a sensational discovery that 
is making headlines all over Europe: he has found out that defenders 
of the Right to Life from all over Europe know each other, connect to 
each other, support each other, and … actually … meet each other!!!! 
Now, this comes as a total surprise. A really shocking revelation. Until 
just some weeks ago, Datta must have thought that meeting each other, 
discussing strategies, or influencing politics was the exclusive privilege 
of the baby- killing industry (which, thanks to its enormous profits, can 
afford a host of well- paid professional lobbyists like himself), and per-
haps of some other protagonists of the Culture of Death (such as the 
sodomy- promoting fake- NGO ILGA Europe, which, thanks to lavish 
donations from George Soros and the European Commission, is equally 
able to afford a highly efficient lobbying activity all over Europe), but he 
never expected that his opponents – the defenders of the Human Rights 
and Human Dignity he so viscerally rejects – were doing the same.
(Agenda Europe 2019b)
Despite the fact that Agenda Europe representatives vehemently denied the 
secret status of the network and claimed full transparency, in fact it took 
them over a year to fulfill the promise and publish the document itself. They 
did so in a blog entry dated 21 May 2019, explaining that the document had 
needed “a bit of proof- reading before [they] put it online” and adding that 
in the process they “somehow forgot about” it. Interestingly, the published 
document bears no signatures or names, thus belying claims to full transpar-
ency, while in the blog post the anonymous authors ironically dismiss any 
transnational connections between their network and Russian oligarchs, 
European aristocrats or Steve Bannon.
The authors call Datta “a gangster- lobbyist” and a representative of “a 
multi- billion industry that kills babies and sells their body parts,” which 
makes the text an example of hate speech, a discourse that dehumanizes 
its opponents, thus implicitly justifying potential violence. It is a rhetorical 
structure commonly used by anti- gender groups: another example we dis-
cuss further on is the Polish “documentary” entitled “Invasion” aired in 
2019 (see Chapter 4). What caused this outburst of anger and hatred? In our 
view, the network aims to mainstream its radical ultraconservative agenda 
in what is a largely liberal Europe. Hence, it tends to highlight its iden-
tity as the voice of the people (e.g. by including links to many conservative 
NGOs), while concealing its alliances with radical political parties such as 
Vox, and perhaps even more importantly, its affiliations with Russian actors 
such as Komov. By publishing what the network calls an “entirely private 
document destined to animate a private discussion in a private meeting” 
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(Agenda Europe 2019b), Datta upset this strategy, revealing the ways in 
which Agenda Europe really functions: as a network of elite groups allied 
with radical and populist right- wing parties and the Kremlin, and supported 
by shadowy business moguls whose ultimate aim is to reach for power.
Protecting children and families: moralizing the  
socio- economic crisis
In many countries, anti- gender campaigns erupted in response to specific 
legislative initiatives seen as a danger to families and children. The triggers 
have included reproductive rights, gay marriage and the prevention of 
gender- based violence, but also sex education in schools and gender studies 
in general. The campaigns’ central motif – both rhetorical and visual – has 
almost invariably been the child in danger and the traditional family in need 
of protection: the logos of various campaigns featuring silhouettes of “trad-
itional” families are strikingly similar (Paternotte and Kuhar 2017b: 269). 
As early as 2004, “gender” was demonized during the conservative mobil-
ization against Zapatero’s government same- sex marriage bill in Spain 
(Cornejo and Galan 2017). The peak of European mass mobilization against 
“gender ideology” occurred in France in the fall of 2012 when hundreds of 
thousands of people took to the streets of Paris and Lyon to oppose marriage 
equality for non- heterosexual couples under the banner of La Manif Pour 
Tous (Chetcuti- Osorovitz and Teichner 2018; Fassin 2016). In Italy, a pol-
itical party named The People of the Family (Il Popolo della Famiglia) was 
formed in 2016 by one of the leaders of anti- LGBT networks, with the slogan 
“No gender in schools,” and the anti- gender agenda was eventually taken 
over by mainstream parties such as Lega, as part of the effort to build their 
political image as defenders of the family and tradition (Garbagnoli 2017; 
Lavizzari and Prearo 2019). Anti- gender campaigns focused on “protecting” 
children have also spread beyond the European context; in August 2017 the 
Supreme Court of Justice in Peru ruled that including “gender ideology” in 
school curricula is illegal as it violates parents’ rights to decide about their 
children’s upbringing; in Brazil opposition to gender studies and equality 
policies became one of the core political goals of the newly elected President 
Bolsonaro (Correa, Paternotte and Kuhar 2018; Redden 2018). In roughly 
the same period (2017– 2018) thousands of Polish schools submitted them-
selves for certification as “Family Friendly,” a program led by a Catholic 
anti- choice foundation determined to protect children from “gender 
indoctrination.”
While the focus on children has been a staple of many conservative 
campaigns in the past, the current attack on “gender” would not be such a 
success if right- wing populism did not address the real needs and grievances 
of many families in Europe and beyond. Ultraconservative actors – both 
religious and secular – have skillfully harnessed people’s anxieties, resent-
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corrupt and wealthy elite. This claim alone may sound somewhat vague; 
what makes it robust and convincing is the accompanying promise of more 
generous social policies focused on parents and children. Such proposals are 
often purely strategic, but they should not be dismissed. Promises of gen-
erous welfare provisions are an effective way to recruit supporters who do 
not necessarily share an ultraconservative worldview.
In many countries, “defending the family” and promoting public policies 
with a family perspective became an important platform of cooperation 
between anti- gender organizations and right- wing populist parties. The latter 
often combine conservative positions on gender equality with promoting 
generous state support for “our children” and “our families.” Already in the 
1990s, radical right parties began to shift their economic orientation from 
pro- market to welfare chauvinism (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Eger and 
Valdez 2015; Mudde 2002; Norocel 2016). Maureen A. Eger and Sarah 
Valdez (2015), who analyzed the political ideology of European radical right 
parties and their voters’ attitudes, conclude that this shift can help explain 
the rise of popular support for such parties. They conclude that while radical 
right politicians increasingly invest in nationalist ideology, including a pref-
erence for anti- immigrant and anti- multicultural policies, they also tend to 
embrace welfare chauvinism, supporting the increase in social spending for 
in- groups, while cutting benefits to out- groups:
During the 1970s and early 1980s, parties articulated support for free 
enterprise and economic orthodoxy; yet, in the most recent period, 
platforms indicate a decline in support for liberal economics. Instead, 
these parties increasingly favour social expenditure and welfare state 
redistribution. Results from our voting analysis confirm that wel-
fare chauvinism – not rightist economic preferences – affects voting 
behaviour.
(Eger and Valedez 2015: 124– 125)
Poland and Hungary are vivid examples of how contemporary right- 
wing populist parties employ a similar strategy, positioning themselves as 
champions of generous social policies. They claim to support hard- working 
families with children – families that liberals allegedly never cared for. In 
Chapter 5 we show in detail that they have also introduced a number of pol-
icies aimed at boosting fertility rates, and that the issue of welfare and the 
mobilization of parents have been of paramount importance for the popular 
appeal of the anti- gender movement. The 2019 World Congress of Families 
in Verona was emblematic in this regard: even the American leaders pub-
licly agreed that state support in the form of cash transfers, cheap credit 
and affordable child care is an important element of defending “the natural 
family” (Korolczuk 2019).
We claim that anti- genderism is the contemporary populist right’s 
response to the failures of the neoliberal paradigm, on both the ideological 
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and economic levels. The obvious effects of neoliberalism include the pri-
vatization of social services, the dismantling of welfare provisions and the 
precarization of the working and living conditions of both women and 
men (Brown 2015; Charkiewicz and Zachorowska- Mazurkiewicz 2009; 
Zacharenko 2019, Walby 2015). But there are also social and cultural 
effects: neoliberalism economizes all spheres of life and introduces extreme 
forms of individualism, deeply transforming gender relations and value 
systems (Brown 2015 and 2019; Cabanas and Illouz 2019; Fraser 2009; 
Gregor and Grzebalska 2016; Ong 2006). While in reality right- wing popu-
list governments have continued neoliberal policies in some areas, e.g. for-
ging close alliances with the business elite and continuing the process of 
privatizing the state’s assets (e.g. Pawłowski 2020), simultaneously, they 
have introduced some pro- welfare changes and stressed the importance 
of state support for families. Thus, they have been successful in presenting 
themselves as guardians of social cohesion and as generous supporters of the 
common people. Anti- gender rhetoric has helped them to link the economic, 
the social and the cultural dimensions, and to promulgate the view that only 
traditional forms of community – the family and the nation – offer protec-
tion against the evils of late capitalism.
In contemporary ultraconservative discourse “gender” is strongly linked 
to “individualism” and antithetical to “natural family.” “Gender” stands for 
confusion, instability, erosion of community, in short, the chaos of modern 
life. This is why the anti- gender rhetoric is so readily adopted by right- wing 
populists. As Ruth Wodak elaborates in her seminal book The Politics of 
Fear (2015), right- wing populism thrives on collective anxieties related to 
both real and imagined threats such as economic hardships, the refugee 
crisis and moral panics. “Gender” – a word that sounds ominous and alien 
in most cultural contexts – has replaced feminism in ultraconservative rhet-
oric, epitomizing both the erosion of family and social bonds, as well as 
economic exploitation of the people by the corrupt global elites.
Knowledge production and expertise: academia as a  
site of struggle
Anti- genderists do not just undermine the scholarly legitimacy of gender 
studies scholars, whom they portray as ideology- driven activists blinded by 
“cultural Marxism” (Jamin 2018; Busbridge et al. 2020); they also aim to 
build academic credentials for their own claims. Gender is deemed ideo-
logical and unscientific, whereas a commonsense view of sex differences as 
being self- evident and biologically grounded is said to be scientific. This 
tendency is shared by the contemporary populist right, which is profoundly 
suspicious of experts, academic institutions and intellectual authorities in 
general. This trend is not limited to gender issues; history is also an important 
battleground, especially the history of migration, antisemitism, slavery, 
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that academia is dominated by liberals and leftists, thus must be purged 
of “ideology”: this view has been an important theme of the culture wars 
at least since the 1970s (e.g. Engeli 2019; Hartman 2015). Attacks against 
gender studies have evolved into an emblematic element of this process, 
which consists of attacking gender scholars as well as building up alternative 
sources of legitimacy, a body of knowledge and a new pantheon of intel-
lectual celebrities with academic titles (Korolczuk 2020). A close reading 
of texts by exponents of transnational anti- genderism, including Gabriele 
Kuby and Marguerite Peeters – or their local versions such as Polish anti- 
genderists Father Oko or Marzena Nykiel – reveals  an ambitious intellec-
tual project, one that strives to present itself as rational and rooted in science 
(Kuhar 2014). Books are published and translated, lectures are given and 
academic conferences are organized at institutions of higher learning, online 
courses and workshops are offered.
Anti- genderism is thus a vast project of knowledge production and edu-
cation, which employs various channels, both religious and secular. Just like 
second wave feminism established itself in the academic world in the form of 
gender studies, the present wave of anti- feminist activism seeks to legitimize 
itself by establishing anti- gender studies (Korolczuk 2020). The scale of this 
educational effort is remarkable. For example, in Poland during 2015 alone 
the Association of Catholic Families organized over 120 meetings for parents 
concerned about the “sexualization of children” through gender education in 
parishes all over Poland (Duda 2016: 37). In 2017 Polish gender scholars were 
targeted by the Ordo Iuris Institute, demanding that rectors of public univer-
sities provide a list – it seems appropriate to call it a “blacklist” – of gender 
studies scholars, whom they accused of promoting pedophilia. Interestingly, 
by 2020 the Ordo Iuris strategy had changed; the foundation proposed 
to amend the law of higher education as to “strengthen the freedom of 
opinion.” In practice, this proposal would have opened the doors of academic 
institutions to religious fundamentalists of no academic standing, including 
“experts” promoted by Ordo Iuris, such as Mark Regnerus, whose research 
on children brought up in homosexual families has been discredited by the 
American Sociological Association. The future of this legislative change 
remains uncertain, but the ultraconservatives’ efforts have in the meantime 
focused on silencing students at Silesian University, following a complaint 
against one of the professors, who had expressed ultraconservative views 
during lectures (Morgan 2020; Śmieja and Borysławski 2020).
Anti- genderism, as a body of knowledge and worldview, claims to be 
scientific, even though the movement’s proclaimed aims are moral and 
its highest authorities tend to be religious figures. It reflects an ambitious 
plan to establish a new paradigm in social sciences, based on a religiously 
grounded set of fundamental truths about human nature, sexuality, family 
and society. In their texts and lectures, the key experts featured by the 
movement – some local, some international, often endowed with academic 
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as is characteristic of conspiracy theories (Byford 2011). Anti- genderists 
have established an intellectual circuit alternative not just to gender studies 
or feminism but to contemporary social sciences and cultural studies. As 
Kuhar has observed, “the Church’s discourse (and its public appearance) 
seems to be ‘secularizing’: the Bible is substituted by science and the Church 
itself by civil society proxies” (2014: 7).
Sometimes this struggle turns violent. An emblematic event took place in 
October 2017 when an effigy of Judith Butler was burnt by protesters opposed 
to her visiting Brazil (Brazil 2017; Jashik 2017). Over 370,000 people signed 
a petition calling for the cancellation of her lecture and the conference she co- 
organized in Sao Paulo, and claiming that gender equals pedophilia. In 2018 
a fake bomb was left on the doorstep of the National Secretariat for Gender 
Research in Gothenburg, and even though no one was hurt, the message was 
clear: opponents of gender studies and gender mainstreaming mean business. 
Media reports and recent studies have shown that even in gender- egalitarian 
Sweden many scholars interested in gender and queer theory are trolled online 
and receive hateful emails, as well as rape and death threats (e.g. Ericson 2020; 
Lilja and Johansson 2018, de los Reyes et al. 2017). While some of those 
attacks have been waged by alt- right trolls, Sweden being a hotbed of alt- right 
activity in Europe, more mainstream critiques of gender studies significantly 
add to the hostile atmosphere. Even before the bomb threat, gender studies 
scholars in Sweden were concerned for their safety enough to publish an open 
letter in the popular Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet, where they claimed that 
such attacks “often lead academics to change their research focus. They do 
not have the strength to live with the threats directed at them. A milieu that 
wants to limit the space for open and critical research is expanding” (de los 
Reyes et al. 2017, our translation).
In many countries attacks on gender studies have been justified as being 
in defense of true science, objectivity and freedom of speech, but references 
to insufficient academic productivity are also sometimes made. In August 
2018, the right- wing populist government in Hungary announced its plan 
to ban gender studies in both public and private universities, claiming that 
it no longer wishes to finance such educational programs, as their graduates 
have no jobs anyway. Apparently, the neoliberal logic of today’s academia 
seamlessly coexists with ultraconservative bias against gender studies. In 
June 2020 the Romanian parliament voted to pass a law that makes it illegal 
to use the concept of “gender” in higher education and to question the diffe-
rence between sex and gender, thus effectively outlawing gender studies as a 
discipline (Bucur 2020; Tidey 2020). Subsequently, the proposal was rejected, 
thanks to an appeal to the country’s Constitutional Court made by Romanian 
president, but this initiative attests to the broader tendency in the region.
Sweden is an interesting example, where gender studies are delegitimized 
through their comparison to religion (Korolczuk and Gunnarsson Payne 2018). 
One of the most vocal critics of gender studies and gender mainstreaming in 
the Swedish media is the freelance journalist and conservative pundit Ivar 
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Svenska Dagbladet (SD). In four long articles published in SD in Autumn 
2017, Arpi described the alleged hegemony of gender studies at Swedish 
universities. He claimed that gender studies have become a “higher church” 
(upper kyrkan) in today’s academia: a set of scientifically unfounded claims 
is used to indoctrinate young people at institutions of higher learning, while 
ideological radicalism of feminist and queer scholars leads to stifling public 
debate and freedom of speech (Arpi 2017a). Arpi has not postulated the 
banning of gender studies in the Swedish educational system; in fact, he 
positions himself as a defender of academic freedom, which is allegedly under 
threat from an overzealous and radical elite group (2017b, 2017c).
Despite its secular framing, Arpi’s critique of gender studies and gender 
mainstreaming is strikingly similar to attacks waged by religious anti- 
gender pundits such as Kuby or Peeters. Arpi’s 2020 book Genusdoktrinen 
(Gender Doctrine), written together with Anna- Karin Wyndham, who holds 
a doctorate in pedagogy from the University of Gothenburg, presents a 
world where a silent revolution is underway, the pursuit of knowledge is 
endangered, and truth is distorted. Ironically enough, the book is listed in 
the Gender Studies section on the website of Bokus, one of the biggest online 
booksellers in the country. It is advertised by an alarmist passage telling the 
prospective buyer to brace for an upcoming catastrophe:
A revolution is sweeping through our universities. It is called gender 
mainstreaming and it is used as a cover for a radical and in- depth pro-
cess. Quotas for women are established behind closed doors. Researchers 
fall silent for fear of reprisal. Knowledge is distorted when research 
funding is conditional on the need to create a gender perspective, even 
if it is glaciers, Moomin trolls or bridge supports that are being studied. 
What is now happening at the universities will soon affect the whole of 
society.
(Bokus 2020, our translation)
Arpi is not the only Swedish journalist critiquing gender studies as an unscien-
tific, ideology- driven and dangerous. A similar vision of a gender apocalypse 
has appeared in opinion pieces published by various authors in Christian 
media, local newspapers and right- wing extremist online magazines, such as 
Samtiden (e.g. Hyltén- Cavallius 2017).
The anti- gender activists focus on educational institutions and uni-
versities not only because they see them as a breeding ground of “gender 
ideologues” and sex educators, but also because they attempt to delegitimize 
and eventually replace current intellectual elites. The movement’s promise 
to its constituency is a world in which ordinary people thrive supported 
by the state, free from the pressures and demoralizing influence of liberal 
elites. As in the case of Hungary and Sweden, the critique of gender studies 
and anti- discriminatory education does not have to be rooted in religious 
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Anti- gender campaigns and feminist mobilization: the dynamics 
of political struggle
We believe it is necessary to examine anti- gender campaigns in dialectic with 
the emergence of a new wave of feminist activism. Too often are the two phe-
nomena analyzed separately: the former as a new stage in the decades- old 
opposition to gender and sexual equality among religious fundamentalists, 
the latter as a response to the rise of misogyny epitomized by the alt- right 
in the U.S. and masculinist movements around the world. Rather, we view 
anti- genderism and the new feminism as rival responses to the challenges of 
the populist moment. While most actors on the right have always viewed 
gender issues as central to their cultural and political project, the liberal 
mainstream and parts of the left seemed for a long time to be oblivious of 
the significance of women’s and LGBT rights. In Chapter 3 we will show 
how gender- related battles were central to the victory of the populist right in 
Poland, and how the defense of women’s rights became an important nexus 
of resistance against the Kaczyński regime.
On 3 October 2016, many commentators were astonished to see tens of 
thousands of angry women in the streets of 140 Polish cities and villages. 
That same year, mass- scale protests erupted in Argentina under the slogan 
#NiUnaMenos as women revolted against femicide and sexual violence. The 
movement grew and radicalized quickly, “expanding the ambit of ‘violence’ 
as an analytical category to include the multifarious assaults of capitalism on 
the lives of poor and working women and gender non- conforming people” 
(Arruzza and Bhattacharya 2018). A few months later, the Women’s March on 
Washington took place, in response to the inauguration of Donald Trump as 
U.S. president, turning into one of the biggest grassroots mobilizations in the 
country’s history. Perhaps the most vivid example of the new wave of women’s 
activism is the International Women’s Strike – also known under the Spanish 
name Paro International de Mujeres – a global mobilization coordinated 
across different countries, bringing women into the streets on 8 March 2017 
and 2018. Initiated by activists from the Polish Women’s Strike, the network 
operated under the banner “Solidarity is our weapon” in countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the U.S. In late 
October 2016, the IWS made a call to strike translated into several languages:
We, the women of the world, had enough of physical, economic, verbal 
or moral violence directed against us. We will not tolerate it passively. 
[…] As conscious citizens, us women know that the world is going 
through a phase of crisis but we do not accept being victims of it. [...] 
We, the women of the world, announce that if we do not take effective 
measures to stop this violence urgently and immediately, we will make a 
strike, caring and united, all over the world to defend our human rights. 
We constitute more than half of the world’s population and we know 
that power is in our hands.
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Women’s rights – a set of issues that had been dismissed for decades as 
mere distractions from real political struggle, as “cultural” or “identity” 
politics – proved to be the biggest mobilizing factors at a time of political 
crisis. In terms of sheer attendance, feminist protests attracted incomparably 
more people than “pro- family” marches ever had. For example, the March 
for the Family organized by the World Congress of Families in Verona in 
March 2019 (Figure 2.2) was attended by a thousand participants at most, 
whereas a feminist protest against the WCF (Figure 2.3) gathered at least 
Figure 2.2  March for the Family in Verona, Italy, 2019, organized by the World 
Congress of Families.
Photo by Elżbieta Korolczuk
Figure 2.3  Feminist March in Verona, Italy, 2019, held under the banner “Verona 
Transfeminist Parade.”
Photo by Elżbieta Korolczuk
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30,000 people from all over Italy and abroad. The political dynamic, how-
ever, makes it much more difficult for the progressive groups to influence 
politics. In countries where the populist right is in power, such as Poland, 
Brazil or Italy under Salvini, the structure of political opportunities is more 
or less closed to feminist actors.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003133520-4
3  “Worse than communism and 
Nazism put together”
Poland’s anti- gender campaigns in a 
comparative perspective
In March 2019, a Law and Justice politician notorious for her rhetorical 
bravado, Krystyna Pawłowicz, announced on Twitter:
This is war! On Polish children and families. On Polish villages and 
cities. ON POLAND AND EUROPE, which AWAITS our HELP! On 
Polish identity and culture. […] We HAVE to win this culture WAR! 
Proponents of Soros and leftist pathological ways – HANDS OFF 
POLAND AND EU!
(Gersz 2019, our translation, upper case used as in original)
The tweet was a reaction to the Warsaw mayor’s signing of the so- called 
LGBT+ Charter. Thus, most commentators viewed it as an outburst of hate 
speech and scapegoating of sexual minorities. At the time, hardly anyone 
noticed connections between the ruling party’s opposition against the LGBT+ 
Charter and the “war on gender,” which had unfolded in Poland a few years 
prior. The link was not immediately visible, because the word “gender” was 
not used. However, many of the core elements of the earlier phase of the 
anti- gender campaign were present: the children and family in danger, the 
liberal political elite as a source of threat, Europe awaiting Poland’s help and 
references to George Soros as a sinister figure behind it all. Pawłowicz’s reac-
tion was illustrative of this moral panic. Opponents of the LGBT+ Charter 
insisted that the defense of gay rights reflects cultural Marxism and is part 
of global scheme of manipulation (see also Jamin 2018, Busbridge et al. 
2020). The visual materials used by Law and Justice politicians – the image 
of an umbrella with PiS logo shielding a family with two children against 
a dripping rainbow – were a recycled and only slightly altered version of 
the logo used in a 2017 Ordo Iuris campaign “Let us Protect the Children” 
inciting parents of school children to report any anti- discriminatory classes 
to this organization (see Figure 3.1). A slightly different version of the same 
image was also used by radical nationalist Jacek Międlar in the fall of 2017; 
this time the black umbrella signified nationalism, while the six colors of the 
dripping rainbow were marked as the European Union (EU), Islam, fem-
inism, the Open Society Foundation, LGBT and communism. One element 
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is always there: a heterosexual heteronormative family with children that 
needs to be sheltered against the threat signified by the rainbow.
This chapter tells the story of the anti- gender campaign as it unfolded 
in Poland and its interconnectedness with the rise to power of the populist 
right. The broader context of these developments has been described by 
Marta Kotwas and Jan Kubik (2019) as a process of “symbolic thickening” 
occurring in Poland’s public culture. This trend had begun around 2006 
with the Polish right- wing actors promoting an ethno- nationalist vision of 
Poland as a Catholic country, the last frontier of Christianity in Europe: “A 
gradual symbolic thickening of the Polish public culture through the intensi-
fication of Catholic and nationalist discourses resulted in the expansion of 
the discursive opportunity structure” for right- wing actors (Kotwas and 
Kubik 2019: 435). The anti- gender campaigns can be viewed as feeding on 
this dynamic and contributing to it.
We show that the collaboration between ultraconservatives and right- 
wing populists helped the latter ascend to power in 2015 and then win 
the presidency in 2020, following the logic of what we call opportunistic 
synergy. The Law and Justice party and its coalition partners have repeat-
edly employed specific arguments forged by ultraconservative forces, such 
as the claim that all gay men are pedophiles or that sex education is a 
form of child abuse. The function of this rhetoric is to strengthen social 
polarization, scapegoat minority groups and malign political opponents, 
branding them as supporters of demoralization. Hence, the intensification 
of anti- gender rhetoric on the part of the ruling party has been more or less 
synchronized with the political calendar. “Gender” or “LGBT ideology” 
keeps reappearing as a danger to children and families before the elections, 
while the face of the enemy continues to change: in 2012 it was an image 
of proponents of the Istanbul Convention accused of imposing foreign 
norms and values, in 2015 it was the face of a lustful Syrian refugee, a 
single man whose arrival was a danger to Polish women, while in 2019 
and 2020 it was the face of a gay man wearing make- up as a clear sign 
Figure 3.1  Poster from Ordo Iuris campaign “Let’s Protect Our Children,” 2018.
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of gender transgression. The collaboration continues in cycles framed by 
elections: each time ultraconservative forces make demands on the polit-
ical camp they helped into power, albeit with mixed results due to growing 
resistance, which we document in Chapter 6.
Saving the children and the nation: actors and goals of  
anti- gender campaigns in Poland
The main social actors involved in the anti- gender campaign have included 
priests, ultraconservative activists, journalists and bloggers, quickly joined 
by conservative politicians from parties such as Law and Justice as well as 
Poland Together (Polska Razem) and the far- right Kukiz15 and its successor 
Confederation (Konfederacja). Self- appointed opponents of “gender 
ideology” have included Father Dariusz Oko, Archbishops Henryk Hozer 
and Marek Jędraszewski, right- wing politicians such as Jarosław Gowin, 
Patryk Jaki, Krystyna Pawłowicz, Zbigniew Ziobro and Michał Woś, as 
well as representatives of non- governmental organizations, including Jerzy 
Kwaśniewski from Ordo Iuris and Kaja Godek from the Life and Family 
Foundation (Fundacja Życie i Rodzina). Again and again they have claimed 
that it is necessary to protect children, the family, and Polish cultural and 
religious values from feminists, LGBT and human rights activists, allegedly 
supported by liberal politicians and the West.
A key actor within the Church has been the Redemptorist priest Father 
Tadeusz Rydzyk, whose media empire includes the Radio Maryja radio 
station, as well as television station (TV Trwam), a daily newspaper (Nasz 
Dziennik), a university complex, and a foundation (Lux Veritatis) involved 
in research, education, cultural production, as well as a number of various 
large- scale investments. More than just a broadcaster with two million 
listeners, Radio Maryja is in fact a powerful social movement that enjoys 
the support of the Polish Episcopate and a popularity estimated at 9% of 
Poland’s population (Pacewicz 2018; Pobłocki 2020). Anti- genderism is a 
perfect fit with Radio Maryja’s politics which are nationalistic, anti- EU and 
anti- establishment – a combination of the radical traditionalist strand of con-
temporary Roman Catholicism with a peculiarly Polish brand of politicized 
religiosity, wherein Catholicism is equated with national belonging, while 
non- Catholics and liberals are portrayed as enemies of the nation (Stanley 
2016). As shown by Ireneusz Krzemiński (2017), the station’s national- 
Catholic ideology is in fact an updated version of the pre- war, National 
Democracy ideology (known in Poland as “endecja”). However, as Kacper 
Pobłocki convincingly argues, Radio Maryja’s brand of radical conserva-
tism should be viewed not necessarily as a “return of the repressed,” but a 
phenomenon that is “very twenty- first century in its post- secular embrace 
of politics” and its ways of generating a sense of community among other-
wise isolated individuals, who are scattered throughout the world and often 
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Since 1991, when the station was founded, Radio Maryja’s has given rise 
to a specific, cultural, social and political identity: “the Radio Maryja lis-
tener.” Marked by wounded national pride, a strong attachment to “family 
values,” and resentment against Western liberalism, this identity was suc-
cessfully courted as an electoral base for Law and Justice in 2015 and has 
remained Kaczyński’s most important ally ever since. Rydzyk’s loyalty has 
been generously rewarded by the state. By July 2019 his various initiatives 
(his “deeds” as he calls them) had been subsidized by the state with the sum 
of 214 million PLN (approx. 50 million euro), and since then money has 
continued to flow his way (Mikołajewska 2019, 2020). If Kaczyński’s project 
of “raising Poland from its knees” is fully compatible with Radio Maryja’s 
brand of religious nationalism, the struggle against “gender ideology” has 
offered an ideal site for collaboration – apparently free of antisemitism, of 
which Radio Maryja is often accused, and yet fulfilling the same need of vili-
fication of the political enemy. Since 2012 both Radio Maryja and Rydzyk’s 
newspaper Nasz Dziennik have been disseminating anti- gender discourse 
almost on a daily basis, collaborating with key anti- gender pundits (such 
as Father Dariusz Oko and the Ordo Iuris Foundation). Genderism, an 
enemy of “the natural family,” is framed, depending on the need, either as 
an enemy of Poland or an enemy of the Catholic Church. For listeners of 
Radio Maryja, the two are all but synonymous.
An influential player in the Polish context – one focused exclusively on com-
bating gender equality and sexual minority rights – is the ultraconservative 
foundation Ordo Iuris Institute for Legal Culture (Instytut Kultury Prawnej 
Ordo Iuris), established in 2013, which today employs over 30 persons (not 
counting external experts and volunteers). The organization produces data 
and core arguments used by the populist right, as well as engaging in stra-
tegic litigation, writing law proposals and publicly attacking progressive 
NGOs (Ciobanu 2020b; Mierzyńska 2020a; Provost and Milburn 2017; 
Wielka Koalicja 2020). Several organizations involved in the anti- gender 
campaign were established well before the anti- gender mobilization began, 
e.g. the Mother and Father Foundation (Fundacja Mamy i Taty), which 
had been promoting “traditional family values” and opposing gay rights 
and divorce since 2010.1 Other groups such as the Stop Sexualizing Our 
Children Initiative (Inicjatywa Stop Seksualizacji Naszych Dzieci) and the 
Stop Gender network came into being in 2013 and 2014, respectively, with 
the sole purpose of resisting what they saw as the spread of genderism. Their 
specific targets were sex and anti- discriminatory education, as well as access 
to contraception and IVF treatment.
Some of the groups that have joined anti- genderists were grassroots 
mobilizations, such as the parents’ movement Save the Little Ones! 
(Ratujmy Maluchy!), which emerged around 2009 to oppose educational 
reform, but joined the fight against the Istanbul Convention in 2012 on the 
grounds that the measures designed to counteract domestic violence posed 
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and networks helped mobilize large numbers of people, especially concerned 
parents, worried about the supposed threat to their children posed by “the 
homosexual lobby” and sex educators. Occasionally mass rallies were also 
held, e.g. in August 2015 in Warsaw around 2000 people, mostly families 
with children, gathered under the banner “Stop Depravation in Education.” 
A joint effort of 26 organizations and networks, the event was aimed against 
the sex education curriculum in Polish schools. The annual Marches for 
Life and the Family organized in Warsaw by the Center for Life and Family 
(Centrum Życia i Rodziny) gather even larger crowds. According to the 
organizers, the march in 2019 held under the banner “Stop Sex Education 
in Schools!” attracted almost 10,000 participants. Compared to the massive 
scale of France’s La Manif Pour Tous these numbers may seem negligible, 
but they show that anti- gender organizations are able to mobilize street 
protests even without any threat of specific legislative changes in the pipe-
line. Over time the strategies have evolved, leaning toward strategic litiga-
tion, lobbying, online mobilization and publishing reports and pamphlets 
about the alleged outrages of the LGBT community.
Our chronology of the campaign in Poland includes three major phases. 
The early one, 2012– 2015, was focused on sex education and opposition 
to the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, both accused of deceitfully 
introducing “gender ideology” into Polish culture. Those early attacks 
on “gender” peaked in 2013 when it was chosen as the word of the year 
by committee of linguists and cultural studies experts (Newsweek Polska 
2014). The second phase unfolded in 2016– 2018, around the time when 
Law and Justice came to power. It was focused first on vilifying refugees 
as rapists and – after PiS won the elections – on abortion rights, although 
this particular campaign was not a success because of the massive oppos-
ition it triggered. The third phase has consisted mainly of attacks on LGBT 
minorities; it began in the spring of 2019 and is still in progress at the time 
of writing. In the context of the COVID- 19 pandemic some right- wing 
outlets suggested that the virus is a sign of God’s wrath, a punishment for 
homosexuality and gender transgression, while others expressed hope that 
the pandemic would at last liberate the world from the excesses of gender 
and political correctness (Steinhagen 2020; Gadowski 2020). As we finish 
working on this manuscript in September 2020, Poland’s withdrawal from 
the Istanbul Convention seems more and more likely and the government is 
offering generous compensations to municipalities that have declared them-
selves free from “LGBT ideology” and lost EU funding. The ultimate results 
of these activities are yet to be seen: many commentators suggest that this 
is just a prelude to Polexit. In any case, the end of Poland’s anti- gender 
campaigns is nowhere in sight.
It is clear to us that a strong link exists between the first wave of anti- 
gender activism and the 2015 electoral victory of the right- wing populist 
Law and Justice party. Its electoral campaign – a classic example of the pol-
itics of fear as discussed by Ruth Wodak (2015) – relied on building moral 
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panic around two interconnected issues: the threat of “genderism” and the 
danger of mass immigration, the latter often dubbed an “invasion,” a word 
that would eventually also be applied to LGBT people. In many countries, 
including Poland, Italy and Hungary, right- wing populists resort to the claim 
that “genderism” makes nation states vulnerable to the “barbarian inva-
sion,” as refugees are portrayed by the radical right. Both themes – LGBT 
rights and migration – were overwhelmingly present in the conservative 
media and religious discourse spreading into social media and mainstream 
public debate. Usually viewed in separation from each other, the two themes 
are indeed strongly linked, as observers in several contexts have noted (e.g. 
Meret and Siim 2013; Szczygielska 2019; Zaviršek and Rajgelj 2019).
Setting the stage: the first phase of anti- gender campaigns 
in Poland
While it is difficult to locate the precise starting point of anti- gender mobil-
ization in Poland, one date often mentioned is April 2012, when the then- 
Minister of Justice, Jarosław Gowin, publicly opposed ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention, calling it a “carrier of gender ideology” (Graff 2014a; 
Grzebalska 2016). His statements, puzzling to many people at the time, seem 
to have initiated Poland’s anti- gender campaign.2 The rationale offered by 
Gowin was that the Convention is an ideological Trojan Horse; its hidden 
agenda, he claimed, was undermining the traditional family. The fact that the 
text of the Convention includes the word “gender” was viewed as proof of its 
social- constructionist underpinnings.3 Polish feminists and sex educators as 
well as the then- ruling party, the liberal- conservative pro- EU Civic Platform, 
were portrayed as traitors, mere puppets in the hands of an international, or 
even global conspiracy against the existing traditional gender order. A similar 
isolationist note could be heard in other related public statements. Bishop 
Stanisław Stefanek, representative of the Council for Family of the Polish 
Episcopate, commented on the government’s efforts to initiate discussion on 
civil unions as evidence that the ruling party “implements global directives, 
dressing them up in trendy words, claiming that this is what progress and 
freedom are about” (Kowalczyk 2012).While the immediate goal was not 
achieved – despite the opposition Poland ratified the Istanbul Convention – 
the campaign shifted the public debate.
Soon, another theme became prominent in anti- gender debates: sex 
education, which was demonized as the “sexualization of children.” The 
overarching theme of “child in danger” is not a Polish invention, as it has 
been used also in other countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Germany and 
France (e.g. Höjdestrand 2017; Kováts and Põim 2015; Strelnyk 2016). 
However, in Poland the focus on children may be stronger than elsewhere 
because the initial stage of the anti- gender campaign coincided with the sur-
facing of the public accusations against pedophile priests (Diduszko 2019; 
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as an effort of the Polish Episcopate to divert media attention away from 
the Church pedophilia scandals. A vivid example of such argumentation is 
the article published in January 2014 in The New York Times by the well- 
known Polish intellectual and founder of a left- liberal think- thank Political 
Critique (Krytyka Polityczna), Sławomir Sierakowski:
The reasons behind such an orchestrated action might be found in 
the Church’s recent problems. Poles have been outraged by the large- 
scale financial fraud carried out by the commission tasked with 
the reprivatisation of church property that had been seized by the 
Communist government. Poles also continue to be disturbed by increas-
ingly frequent disclosures of paedophilia within the Church.
(Sierakowski 2014)
Sierakowski was not alone in attributing the anti- gender campaign to 
local trends (Kuisz and Wigura 2014). Public statements by some Polish 
bishops corroborate this interpretation: on 8 October 2013 Archbishop 
Józef Michalik made a public statement depicting child victims of pedo-
phile clergymen as “clinging to priests,” seeking out the love they do not 
receive at home, due to rising divorce rates and the impact of gender 
ideology (Kim 2013). With this widely discussed statement he attempted 
to shift responsibility for child abuse from perpetrators to “broken fam-
ilies” and international institutions that “sexualize children” through sex 
education. While Michalik later retracted his expressions as “unfortu-
nate,” the question of sex education remained a key theme of anti- gender 
mobilization.
In the Polish context, as well as globally, it is the Catholic Church that 
was the main force behind the anti- gender campaign (Case 2011), even 
though different religious authorities are active as well. Official religious 
sanction for this effort was given in the Pastoral Letter of the Bishops’ 
Conference of Poland, which was made public and read in churches on 29 
December 2013. This document provides a useful sample of how anti- gender 
crusaders explain the origins of “gender ideology,” showing how in the post- 
communist context of Poland gender equality is disqualified through a crude 
parallel with Marxism and communist propaganda. In the view of the Polish 
Episcopate:
Gender ideology is the product of many decades of ideological and cul-
tural changes that are deeply rooted in the Marxism and neo- Marxism 
endorsed by some feminist movements, and also the sexual revolution. 
[...] It maintains that biological sex is not socially significant and that 
cultural sex, which humans can freely develop and determine irre-
spective of biological conditions, is most important. [...] The danger of 
gender ideology lies in its very destructive character both for mankind, 
personal contact and social life as a whole. Humans unsure of their 
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sexual identity are not capable of discovering and fulfilling tasks that 
they face in their marital, family, social and professional lives.
(Bishops’ Conference of Poland 2013)
Polish bishops stress the danger posed by this alleged “ideology” claiming 
that, by negating sexual difference and gender complementarity, it erases the 
existing gender order and constitutes a major threat to mankind. According 
to this view, “gender ideology” is being implemented worldwide by inter-
national institutions (especially the United Nations and the EU) and nation 
states, inspired by feminists and proponents of gay rights in order to fight 
religion and the “natural family” (Buss 2004; Paternotte 2014).
Though gay rights were not explicitly mentioned in the Pastoral Letter, it 
was soon clear that the key danger to Polish children is, indeed, homosexu-
ality, often dubbed as “homosexual propaganda” and in 2019 re- named as 
“LGBT ideology.” Father Oko, the charismatic priest and the most famous 
representative of the early phases of Poland’s anti- gender campaign, was 
disseminating homophobic hate speech in the public sphere; his public 
utterances were jeremiads warning against the slippery slope of excessive 
tolerance. In a typical statement broadcast on Radio Maryja he exposed the 
alleged homosexual conspiracy:
Anyone who allows himself to be brainwashed by homosexual ideology 
will find himself the following day forced to accept incest, polygamy, 
polyamory – these are the consequences. The homosexual lobby always 
acts in this way. Such are the stages. They will never stop; they want a 
total revolution.
(wobroniewiary 2015, our translation)
During the early stage of anti- gender campaigns, progressive actors – both 
observers and targets of the attacks – reacted with confusion and disorien-
tation. One misconception was that the whole thing is based on an unfor-
tunate misunderstanding. Hence the well- meant effort to explain gender to 
the misinformed undertaken by Minister Agnieszka Kozłowska- Rajewicz, 
at the time the government’s Plenipotentiary for Gender Equality. Assuming 
(or perhaps pretending to assume) that the Bishops’ Letter was the result 
of ignorance, Rajewicz offered calm explanations and posted a primer 
in gender studies on the Ministry’s website. She explained that gender 
is not a threat, but a staple category of social sciences and that gender 
mainstreaming is an EU policy and not an international plot against the 
family. The Ministry’s website also featured a glossary of gender- related 
terminology aimed to enlighten the misinformed. Yet another example of 
actions based on the assumption of Poland’s exceptionalism was an open 
letter issued in November 2013 and addressed by the Congress of Polish 
Women (the nation’s largest women’s rights organization) to Pope Francis, 
alerting him to the misdoings of Polish bishops:
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This mad hatred towards “gender ideology” – which is really a hatred 
of women and egalitarian ideals – has flooded Poland far and wide 
and is giving rise to fear, which poisons people’s souls and destroys the 
civic debate. As an inevitable result, both the public opinion and state 
officials in Poland are becoming fearful of speaking not only in terms 
of “gender,” but also in terms of non- discrimination and equality, even 
though these are Christian ideals at the core.
(Kośmiński 2013)
The underlying assumption of this document and many other responses was 
that the war on gender was a Polish invention unknown to and unsupported 
by the Vatican, and especially by Pope Francis, often portrayed as liberal 
and sympathetic to the pleas of women and sexual minorities. Even today, 
some commentators, scholars and journalists in Poland continue to inter-
pret the anti- gender mobilization as a local phenomenon, a sign of Poland’s 
intellectual and social provincialism, still believing that the West is free of 
such aberrations.
Meanwhile, the anti- gender campaigners continued attacks on sexual 
education programs in kindergartens and schools, focusing mainly on 
WHO standards for sexuality education being implemented by NGOs such 
as the Foundation of Pre- School Education (Grabowska 2014; Duda 2016). 
One key target, consistently demonized and misrepresented as an incite-
ment to sexualization and masturbation, was the handbook Równościowe 
przedszkole (Equality- based Kindergarten) published by feminist educators 
in 2011. Rumors were spread that sex educators forced little boys to wear 
dresses. These attacks on “gender” were consistently framed as efforts to 
protect children who are to be made confused about gender roles at an early 
age, only to become slaves of the homo/ feminist/ anti- Church lobby later. 
The source of demoralization was usually located in the West, colonizing 
the local population by imposing values and policies that are at odds with 
the local culture. The problem is not only moral but also political; the pro-
cess of introducing anti- discriminatory and gender mainstreaming measures 
was viewed as undemocratic and top- down, a critique that is not entirely 
unfounded (Duda 2016; Grabowska 2014; Rawłuszko 2019). As we will 
discuss further in the book, there are, indeed, some interesting convergences 
between anti- gender critiques of the ways in which equality policies were 
introduced and critical feminist analyses of gender mainstreaming.
One popular argument was that sex education offered in public schools and 
kindergartens should be regarded as an unacceptable form of the state’s inter-
vention into citizen’s private lives. The idea that children need to be protected 
against exposure to allegedly corrupting sex education programs is central to 
conservative cultural politics in many contexts. Controversies over sex edu-
cation in Polish schools bear resemblance to the battle over sex education in 
the U.S. in the 1980 and 1990s: in both cases, the focus was on protecting 
children and on parents’ rights to decide what is best for their children (e.g. 
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Irvine 2002; Johnson 2018). Activism of the likes of Father Oko in Poland 
bear striking resemblance to the efforts of Anita Bryant, an American model 
and singer, who in 1976 led a campaign against new gay- rights legislation, 
first in Miami- Dade County and then nationally. The successful campaign 
warned the parents of school children against gay teachers and homosexu-
ality as a danger to families. Bryant “drew on popular perceptions of gay 
men as child molesters and popularized the idea that ‘since homosexuals 
cannot reproduce, they must recruit’ ” (Johnson 2018: 239). The controversy 
over the textbook Równościowe przedszkole (Equality- based Kindergarten) 
in Poland resembles the struggle over the multicultural Children of the 
Rainbow school curriculum, presenting different types of families, including 
families with two moms or two dads, which erupted in 1993 in New York 
City (Irvin 2002). In both cases the main source of controversy was that the 
authors validated different types of families and sexual orientation and that 
the textbooks were addressed to children. Consequently, the opponents of 
gender equality education in both Poland and the U.S. claimed that the main 
aim of the authors was to teach children how to become homosexuals, and 
they argued that talking about sex with children was practically the same 
thing as molesting them. A similar vision is propagated by activists in other 
countries, such as Russia, as exemplified by the 2013 pronouncements of 
Anatoly Artiukh, leader of a Saint Petersburg nationalist organization. He 
claims that liberal groups and politicians:
[…] take children from decent families and give them to pederasts. Or 
[...] they teach children masturbation instead of embroidery in school, 
with the help of German or Swedish cartoons.
(Höjdestrand 2017)
While both Polish and Russian campaigns against sex education and gender 
ideology are fueled by anti- Western sentiment and presented as a local 
reaction to ideological colonization by the EU, they are clearly inspired by 
arguments coined by Western experts and activists. Polish scholar Marta 
Rawłuszko proposes to interpret the opposition to the Równościowe 
Przedszkole textbook as a legitimate grassroots resistance to “the techno-
cratic manner of developing particular gender equality policies” (2019: 18). 
She argues that:
Gender wars are manifestations of wider tendencies involving people 
becoming “strangers in their own land” (Hochschild 2016), whose par-
ticipation in decision- making or public deliberation is unnecessary or 
even redundant.
(2019: 18)
While we agree with the contention that gender equality policies were 
introduced in Eastern Europe in a less than democratic manner, it is also 
 
Poland’s anti-gender campaigns 77
important to note that local activists opposing “foreign interventions” are 
often inspired by ultraconservative Western organizations and engage in 
extensive transnational collaboration. Resistance to gender ideology in edu-
cation takes very similar form on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. 
Rawłuszko suggests that it is predominantly a matter of Eastern European 
resistance to Western influence (see also Kovats 2020). However, as shown 
by Imke Schmincke (2020) almost identical arguments were used in 
Germany by Demo für Alle activists in relation to the new handbook The 
Sexual Pedagogy of Diversity in 2014. It was claimed that children would 
be deprived of their “natural sense of shame,” parents would be deprived of 
control over their children’s education and schools would be infiltrated by 
pedophilic experts (2020: 63– 65). What seems crucial is not the East- West 
divide but the claim that such changes are introduced in a top- down manner 
by cultural outsiders. Positioning their struggle as a local and authentic 
opposition to a global assault on traditional lifestyle is a crucial part of the 
ultraconservative political strategy in the culture wars (see Chapter 4).
The specificity of the Polish variant of these claims is that progressive 
interventions in the realm of family and children’s education were routinely 
compared to communists’ attempts to gain full control over people’s private 
and family life, a form of “social engineering.” In other words, sex educa-
tion was disqualified as an imposition of the liberal West (UN, WHO, EU), 
but also as a remnant of communist practices. On 31 January 2014 the 
early phase of Poland’s anti- gender campaign reached its most spectacular 
moment: Father Oko delivered a lecture in Polish parliament at the invi-
tation of the Parliamentary Committee Against the Atheization of Poland 
and by a group of MPs identifying as “pro- life.” The aim was to draw 
public attention to the dangers of gender mainstreaming and “sexualiza-
tion” of children. Oko’s performance was theatrical to the extreme, a mix of 
prophecy and lament over the state of society: he presented gender as “a dire 
threat to civilization,” “a great evil that must be spoken about,” informing 
the public that “genderists propagate incest, pedophilia and homosexuality” 
and “atheists have been the greatest criminals in human history” (Oko 
2014). That lecture was a significant event, much discussed in the media, 
marking the politicization of the anti- gender debate.
That same month another right- wing party, United Poland (Solidarna 
Polska), formed the Parliamentary Committee STOP Gender Ideology 
headed by Beata Kempa. During the first half of 2014 alone, this body 
organized a conference that featured Gabriele Kuby – author of The Global 
Sexual Revolution, a key text of the anti- gender movement – as a keynote 
speaker, as well as meetings and workshops in over a dozen Polish cities. 
Involvement in the anti- gender campaign paid off for the most engaged 
MPs: in November 2015, after Law and Justice won the elections, Kempa 
became the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister in the new gov-
ernment. The war against gender, already inscribed in the Law and Justice 
electoral program, became part of the governments’ official policy known as 
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“Change for the Better.” Jarosław Gowin, the newly appointed Minister of 
Science and Higher Education, announced his intention to remove unnamed 
“gay and lesbian studies journals” from the official rankings of academic 
journals and the new Minister of Education, Anna Zalewska, stated: “School 
must be free from various ideologies. Children will study normal, classic 
subjects. We will deal with this problem without causing unnecessarily tur-
moil and press conferences” (Stelmasiak 2015).
Strengthening the ties: the second and third phases of anti- gender 
campaigns in Poland
The second phase of Poland’s anti- gender mobilization (2016– 2018) – 
which we discuss in more detail below and in Chapter 6 – involved the 
consolidation of the bonds between ultraconservative anti- gender actors 
and right- wing populists. On the one hand we witnessed the further politi-
cization of “gender” by Law and Justice, which employed key tropes of the 
anti- gender campaign during the elections, linking the gender threat with 
anti- refugee rhetoric. On the other hand, the ultraconservative groups came 
to rely on political alliances with the populists in their own political strat-
egizing. Simply put, it was pay- back time. Soon after the elections in the fall 
of 2015 the anti- choice network “STOP abortion” led by the Ordo Iuris 
Institute Foundation launched a massive campaign in favor of a total ban 
on abortions. Since many of the Polish organizations and networks involved 
in the anti- gender mobilization are linked to the national and transnational 
anti- choice movement, it is hardly surprising that the issue of abortion 
became an important theme in the war on gender in our country. In the spring 
of 2016 Stop Abortion Committee started to gather signatures supporting 
citizen’s law proposal. In Poland, civil society actors can introduce a piece 
of legislation for parliamentary debate under the rubric of a “popular ini-
tiative” or “civic initiative,” and the law requires that the submitting group 
register and then gather 100,000 signatures within three months. The Stop 
Abortion Committee was confident that the new law would be supported by 
the government. Indeed, Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło and the leader 
of the ruling party Jarosław Kaczyński initially declared that as Catholics 
they would support the total ban on abortion.
The drafted bill included a total ban on abortion and the threat of crim-
inal prosecution for both doctors and women (see Chapter 6 for more 
details). Polish law already strictly limits access to abortion, which is illegal 
unless one of the three exceptions occurs: when the pregnancy results from 
rape or incest, if the woman’s life is in danger, or the fetus is “seriously mal-
formed.” Despite the severe limitations, anti- choice organizations strive to 
have a blanket ban imposed on abortion. Hence, this was not the first time 
such a restrictive law was submitted to the parliament, but never before 
had the country’s leading politicians announced their support for such a 
proposal. Had the law been passed, it would have affected not only women 
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seeking to terminate a pregnancy but also patients treated for ectopic preg-
nancy, cases of severe physical defects present in a fetus such as spina bifida 
and rape survivors forced by law to give birth. In retrospect the link between 
the anti- gender campaign and this political initiative is clear: putting a total 
ban on abortion fits well with the overall goal of groups which oppose 
promiscuity, chaos in gender order and depopulation. However, as we elab-
orate in Chapter 6, the attack on reproductive rights – to ultraconservatives 
and religious fundamentalists an obvious exemplification of the evils of 
“gender” – turned out to be a dead end for right- wing populists, a strategy 
leading to massive opposition rather than political victory. Due to the mass 
protests of Polish women throughout 2016 – including the Black Protests 
and the Polish Women’s Strike – the ruling party backed back away from 
the proposal, burying this and subsequent bills in parliamentary committees 
(Graff 2019; Korolczuk 2016; Majewska 2017). Thus, in subsequent years 
the opposition against gender equality was presented mostly as a struggle 
against comprehensive sex education and sexual minorities’ rights.
During the third and most recent phase of anti- gender mobilization, the 
phrase “gender ideology” has largely been replaced by the equally ominous 
and foreign- sounding “LGBT ideology” (Ciobanu 2020b; Mierzyńska 
2020a; Provost and Milburn 2017; Wielka Koalicja 2020).This develop-
ment testifies to the growing politicization of homosexuality in Poland, 
which had been ongoing for several years (Graff 2010; O’Dwyer and 
Vermeersch 2016). The triggering event was the signing in March 2019 of 
the so- called LGBT+ Charter by Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski. The 
document included basic legal protections as well as the promise to pro-
vide sex and anti- discriminatory education in public schools based on World 
Health Organization (WHO) guidelines. Trzaskowski’s decision met with an 
immediate hostile response. The tweet by Krystyna Pawłowicz, with which 
we began this chapter, is just a sample of the heated public debate that 
followed. Law and Justice representatives and Catholic clergy claimed that 
sex education would lead to “early sexualization” of youth, that it would 
violate parents’ rights to decide about the upbringing of their children and 
would ultimately bring about the destruction of the family as a social insti-
tution (Mierzyńska 2020b).
Clearly, this campaign capitalized on the earlier phases of the “war 
against gender” – the theme of children in danger of “sexualization” was 
still fresh in the public memory. The cultural script, the language and basic 
claims were already there. No extended arguments about the evils of gender 
ideology were necessary, it was enough for Kaczyński to use the word gender 
in connection with the LGBT+ Charter to make it immediately suspect in 
the public eye. In April 2019 Jarosław Kaczyński went on record claiming 
that “the LGBT movement and gender pose a threat to our identity, a threat 
to our nation. They threaten the Polish state” (Chrzczonowicz 2019). While 
this statement appeared in the context of the May 2019 European parlia-
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on the LGBT community became one of the dominant themes of political 
struggles in Poland that year, leading up to October 2019 parliamentary 
elections. On the eve of the vote, the news channel of public television (TVP 
Info, by then fully controlled by Law and Justice) released a documentary 
film about the LGBT community in Poland entitled “Invasion.” It pictured 
Catholics in Poland as an embattled and oppressed community, under siege 
from an aggressive LGBT lobby funded and controlled by the West. In 
Chapter 4 we return to this film as well as the complex moral geography, 
which often escapes the attention of scholars engaged in studies of gender 
and nationalism.
In the third phase of Polish anti- gender campaign, Law and Justice, 
the episcopate and ultraconservative groups, as well as the public media 
dominated by the ruling party, acted in unison, scapegoating gay men and 
arguably inciting violence. In July 2019 the ultra- conservative magazine 
Gazeta Polska announced they would include “LGBT- free zone” stickers as 
a free gift for readers in their next issue. The stickers featured vertical stripes 
in rainbow colors crossed out by a thick black “X.” The initiative, obvi-
ously reminiscent of Nazi policies of exclusion, prompted a wave of out-
rage. Poland’s largest bookstore chain and major press distributor EMPIK 
refused to sell the paper; a gay rights activist named Bartosz Staszewski filed 
a lawsuit on the grounds of infringement of personal rights and succeed 
in blocking the distribution of the weekly; U.S. Ambassador to Poland 
Georgette Mosbacher made a public statement on Twitter expressing her 
“disappointment and worry” that certain groups would use the stickers to 
promote hatred and intolerance.
Soon after, on 20 July, an equality march in the town of Białystok was 
violently attacked by football hooligans and neo- Nazis, who descended 
upon the city from all over Poland. Dubbed by many “Poland’s Stonewall,” 
this was a watershed event – the first time that Poland’s “culture war” 
erupted into street violence barely contained by the police. The event gained 
wide media coverage both in Poland and abroad (Dehnel 2019), and many 
expected that it would cause a turn in public sentiments in favor of sexual 
minorities. This seems to be true on the part of the liberal mainstream. The 
liberal daily Gazeta Wyborcza, whose position on the Pride marches had 
long been ambivalent, issued an official statement entitled “There is no 
freedom without solidarity,” declaring that this conflict is about democracy 
and defending fellow citizens against fascism (Zespół GW 2019).
On 1 August, the use of a single powerful word – “plague” – signaled 
that the ultraconservative side had no intention of backing down in the 
conflict. On the anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the Archbishop of 
Kraków, Marek Jędraszewski warned in his sermon that “the red plague 
is not gripping our land anymore, which does not mean that there is not 
a new one that wants to control our souls, hearts and minds. Not red, but 
rainbow” (PAP 2019). Not surprisingly, the remark was met with harsh criti-
cism from liberal commentators, while the right- wing media commended 
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the archbishop’s bravery. Letters of support and loyalty soon came in from 
abroad: from the head of Hungary’s Episcopal Conference, Bishop András 
Veres and from the head of the Slovak Episcopate, Stanislav Zvolenský 
(Pawlicka 2019).
Simultaneously, the anti- LGBT campaign moved to the local level. In 
March 2019 the county (powiat) of Świdnik in the southeastern part of 
Poland declared itself the first “LGBT- free” zone in the country. The coun-
cilmen signed a declaration stating that the local authorities aim to protect 
children and families from “homosexual propaganda” and moral degener-
ation. In this non- binding resolution, the local politicians pledged to refrain 
from taking any action to encourage “tolerance of LGBT people,” which 
includes withdrawing any financial assistance from organizations aiming 
to promote non- discrimination and equality. Soon, other local governments 
followed suit, with the support of the ruling party representatives and 
Catholic priests.
A group of activists has put together The Atlas of Hate (Gawron et al. 
2020; see also Ciobanu 2020a), which lists the places where similar declar-
ations have been signed. They show that as of March 2020 over 80 Polish 
local and regional authorities, including four voivodships, have declared 
the commitment to be free from “LGBT- ideology.” This means that local 
authorities have either adopted declarations similar to the one signed in 
Świdnik, or have signed the Charter of the Rights of the Family aggressively 
promoted the Ordo Iuris Institute. Both the declarations and the Charter 
are efforts to control local governments, preventing them from issuing any 
type of anti- discriminatory resolutions or measures that would help combat 
homophobia and discrimination against minorities.
The story of The Atlas of Hate is instructive as in illustration of the 
ultraconservatives’ evolving strategies. Since the 2016 proposal to ban 
abortion in Poland, the Ordo Iuris Institute has become one of the key 
organizations engaged in the Polish campaign against “LGBT ideology” 
(Mierzyńska 2020b; Suchanow 2020; Wielka Koalicja 2020). Its main 
activities included producing core arguments used by local authorities, 
writing law proposals, such as the Charter, and harassing progressive NGOs 
and activists on the local level. After The Atlas of Hate hit the headlines, 
Ordo Iuris declared it would help the municipalities listed therein to sue 
the authors for defamation, on the grounds that the Charter does not dis-
criminate against the LGBT community. In an open letter published on the 
Institute’s website it is claimed that the Charter simply “aims to promote 
the constitutional principles of protection of the family marriage, parent-
hood and motherhood” and protect children “against demoralization.” 
Hence, they interpret listing the municipalities which signed the Charter 
in The Atlas of Hate as misinformation and manipulation. Simultaneously, 
the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights challenged the declarations 
signed by local governments in Administrative Courts. In December 2019 
the European Parliament passed a resolution strongly condemning both the 
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Polish zones and cases of homophobic violence in other countries, calling 
for a revoking of all resolutions attacking sexual minorities (European 
Parliament 2019). The outcomes of these legal proceedings are yet to be 
seen, but it is clear that the ultraconservative organizations and the Catholic 
Church aim to continue the campaign against “LGBT ideology” by means 
of strategic litigation and mobilization of local communities.
The entire sequence of events is neither spontaneous nor accidental. It 
is best understood as part of the ongoing electoral campaigns preceding 
the October 2019 parliamentary and 2020 presidential elections. The aim 
of the populist right is to discredit the opposition party, Civic Platform, 
as well as its allies and supporters, by branding them with the stigma of 
homosexuality. A broader aim is to re- direct the public debate: to focus it 
on the alleged outrages of the LGBT community, while deflecting attention 
from Kaczyński’s successes in dismantling liberal democracy, several recent 
scandals featuring Law and Justice politicians, and the recently revealed 
information about the enormous scale of pedophilia in Polish Catholic 
Church. The 2019 report on cover- ups of the crimes against children by 
the clergy released by the “Do Not Be Afraid” Foundation (Fundacja Nie 
Lękajcie Się) and the simultaneous release of the documentary Tell No One 
by the Sekielski brothers, watched on YouTube by over 20 million viewers, 
exposed the staggering level not just of abuse but also of the complicity of 
the highest figures in the Polish church (Flis 2019).
While the primary target is now the gay community, anti- gender 
campaigners are continuing their efforts to influence public education and 
curtail women’s reproductive rights. In autumn 2019, ultraconservative 
organizations submitted to the Polish parliament a law proposal that 
included an effective ban on comprehensive sex education and anti- 
discriminatory education in schools (at the time of writing, the proposal 
had been sent for consideration to a parliamentary committee). In October 
the same year, a new anti- choice campaign was inaugurated in relation 
to the release of the American anti- abortion propaganda film Unplanned. 
Polish President Andrzej Duda publicly endorsed the film via social media, 
claiming that “watching it is a life- changing experience,” and teachers were 
encouraged by Church officials and anti- choice organizations to take pupils 
to cinemas and discuss the “horrors of abortion” in class. Ultraconservative 
organizations have also continued to harass academics, artists and progres-
sive organizations. The Ordo Iuris Institute made an official complaint to 
the prosecutor’s office regarding artworks that allegedly “offend religious 
feelings” and sent requests to a number of progressive NGOs demanding 
access to all documentation regarding publicly funded projects.
The events in Poland share a common pattern with concurrent 
developments in other countries: the gender- focused campaigns of AfD in 
Germany, vicious attacks against feminists by Vox in Spain, the Italian party 
Lega’s explicit support of anti- gender initiatives or the efforts of the Sweden 
Democrats to discredit gender studies and change abortion legislation. What 
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we see happening in each of these cases is an opportunistic synergy between 
anti- genderism and right- wing populism. Our claim is not that they consti-
tute two sides of the same coin, or that they are identical in terms of polit-
ical genealogies, key actors or strategies. We do argue, however, that more 
than similarity is at stake. The connection between the two phenomena 
is powerful and complex. Political actors on the populist right engage in 
close cooperation with religious organizations and take up the anti- gender 
narrative and arguments, but only to the extent that these moves are expe-
dient for their political agenda, saturating the anti- gender discourse with 
nativist and anti- Islam themes. For anti- gender organizations, on the other 
hand, the rise of right- wing populism presents an opening in the political 
opportunity structure. Hence, they are eager to collaborate, even though 
they do not always trust the ideological purity of their allies, and such 
cooperation does not guarantee the success of specific campaigns.
Political (ab)uses of gender: who is afraid of “gender ideology”?
The anti- gender campaign in Poland provides a vivid example of how an 
ultraconservative agenda can facilitate the electoral victory of right- wing 
populist parties, and how it can be used for the continuous mobilization of 
specific groups, especially parents, young men and older, deeply religious 
voters. Given the focus on the welfare of children, it is no surprise that 
the proponents of anti- gender rhetoric have been successful in mobilizing 
parents. Father Oko stressed in an interview that:
Nobody has a right to encroach into the sanctuary of the family wearing 
boots and with a bludgeon. Therefore, we must take part in marches 
and other forms of protest, write and send letters to the Minister of 
Education and other members of the government, publicize scandals 
in the media and look for private help, and we must not be afraid of a 
judicial fight. We must also closely monitor what is happening at school, 
we must look carefully at its lessons. The headmaster has no right to do 
anything in this sphere without parents’ agreement.
(Cichobłazińska 2013, our translation)
The seemingly politically neutral agenda of “saving the children” broadens 
popular appeal and ensures the support of existing parents’ groups, previ-
ously engaged in other issues such as educational reform or father’s rights 
(Korolczuk and Hryciuk 2016). Thus, it is not a coincidence that two key 
parents’ organizations involved in fighting “gender ideology” in Poland have 
been the Mother and Father Foundation (Fundacja Mamy i Taty) and the 
“Ombudsman for Parents’ Rights” Foundation (Fundacja Rzecznik Praw 
Rodziców). This trend is transnational: in many countries, including France, 
Germany, Russia and Ukraine, conservative parents’ rights organizations 
are key actors of the anti- gender campaigns (Fábián and Korolczuk 2017; 
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Höjdestrand 2017; Mayer and Sauer 2017; Paternotte and Kuhar 2017b; 
Strelnyk 2017). While the motif of a child in danger has often been noted 
in analyses of the anti- gender mobilizations, it is rarely acknowledged that 
the movement has given voice to the real challenges and anxieties that many 
parents face in neoliberal societies (see Chapters 2 and 5).
Research on fathers’ rights movements shows how activism against real 
and perceived injustices experienced in custody cases turns into ideologic-
ally motivated activism for the restoration of patriarchal masculinity. These 
movements routinely critique women’s emancipation, stressing the need for 
solidarity among men and for men to take back “their rightful place” in society 
(Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2017: 128). This message attracts some divorced 
fathers, but also makes fathers’ rights groups a natural ally of the anti- gender 
movement – examples range from the Polish organization Brave Dad (Dzielny 
Tata), opposing the Istanbul Convention, to Italian senator Simone Pillon from 
the Lega party, proposing a new divorce law that would enforce joint cus-
tody over children and liquidate child support. An important theme of these 
mobilizations is that women lie about domestic violence and that the state vili-
fies men in court proceedings. Hence, they welcome initiatives that aim to limit 
state intervention and restore “paternal” authority in the family.
The anti- gender discourse is employed to mobilize voters who are anx-
ious about cultural changes and socio- economic marginalization. The main 
socio- demographic groups that have supported the far- right, openly neo- 
fascist actors, as well as the populist parties in Poland in the 2019 par-
liamentary elections are young men and less affluent older religious voters 
living outside of big cities (Lipiński 2019). According to recent studies, these 
two groups have also been the most susceptible recipients of the anti- gender 
discourse. A 2019 opinion poll published by OKO.Press showed that when 
asked about the biggest threats for Poland in the 21st century, the majority 
of young men and older people declared that their biggest fear is the threat 
of the “gender ideology and LGBT movement” (Pacewicz and Jurszto 2019). 
Women, especially those of younger age, were far more likely to fear climate 
change, Polexit, or the rise of nationalist movements in the country, which 
confirms earlier studies demonstrating that gender does make a difference, 
both in terms of political choices and the likelihood of supporting a far- 
right agenda (e.g. Spierings and Zaslove 2015, 2017). This does not mean 
that all women support a progressive agenda or that women are somehow 
immune to homophobic propaganda. In fact, some of the best- known public 
intellectuals supporting the anti- gender movement and its national leaders 
are women. Rather, such data show that right- wing populist and far- right 
parties adopt anti- gender rhetoric strategically in order to exploit the anx-
ieties and hopes of groups that are experiencing relative deprivation and 
precarity, along with those who fear socio- cultural change and losing their 
power and status (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2019). The anti- gender message 
appeals not only to “angry men” but also many women, who embrace the 
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being defended by the right against Muslim men or are simply tired of 
juggling their many roles and react with a conservative turn to the unful-
filled promises of emancipation (Dietze 2020; Gutshe 2018; Gwiazda 2020; 
Sauer 2020).
While religious affiliation appears to be an important factor strengthening 
people’s tendency to adopt anti- gender views, the type of religiosity may 
play a key role in this process. As shown by a group of scholars who studied 
attitudes of Catholics in Poland, some people tend to perceive “gender 
ideology” as a secret plot by powerful others aiming to hurt the Catholic 
Church, family and the nation. “Such convictions function similarly to con-
spiracy beliefs, which can be defined as beliefs in secret plots by powerful 
and malevolent groups” (Marchlewska et al. 2019: 2; see also Cichocka et al. 
2015). In a nationally representative sample, around 30% of respondents 
agreed with the claim that “gender studies are involved in a conspiracy.” 
Interestingly, this study shows that such convictions were associated pri-
marily not with demographics, such as age or gender, but with a specific 
form of religious identity, namely religious narcissism, which describes a 
defensive identification with one’s religious group. Both studies show that 
“Catholic collective narcissism emerged as a robust predictor of adopting 
gender conspiracy beliefs” (Marchlewska et al. 2019: 12).
Anti- gender campaigns affect people’s views, albeit not always in the 
ways anticipated by the ultraconservative actors. As a result of the struggle 
over abortion, attitudes toward this issue became more liberal: in 2016 only 
37% of respondents believed that the current law should be liberalized, 
but in 2018 already 46% declared that abortion should be available “on 
demand”; when asked “what if your friend needed an abortion,” 60% of 
women and 50% of men were of the opinion that it should be available 
(Chrzczonowicz 2018). At the same time, homophobia seems to be still 
firmly entrenched in Polish society. A 2019 report by CBOS shows that 41% 
of Poles declare hostility toward gays and lesbians, while only 25% declare 
acceptance. Comparisons of opinion polls from over a longer period of time 
suggest that this is a negative change in an otherwise stable trend toward 
increased tolerance observed in recent decades. Whereas between 2007 and 
2017 the acceptance rate rose twofold, in the next two years it dropped by 
2% in response to the aggressive anti- LGBT rhetoric promulgated by the 
public media dominated by the Law and Justice party, right- wing groups 
and the Church (Pacewicz 2019).
However, even if society’s views regarding issues such as abortion 
are becoming more liberal, state discourse and policies are increasingly 
influenced by the anti- gender agenda. Anti- gender discourse has become 
increasingly normalized as part of public debate. During the last couple of 
years we can observe a process of institutionalization of the anti- gender 
movement within state structures. As of January 2020, the Ordo Iuris 
Institute has two representatives on the Polish Supreme Court. One of them 
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in Datta’s report as involved in Agenda Europe meetings. The organization’s 
associates are also employed or appointed as experts in a number of min-
istries and parliamentary commissions (Mierzyńska 2020a). With time, the 
state itself becomes saturated with ultraconservative activists and influences.
Femonationalism vs good old nationalism? Poland in  
comparative perspective
Polish anti- gender mobilization is part of a boarder transnational trend. 
Depending on the context, the triggers and core themes of anti- gender 
campaigns vary. In Russia, claims that homosexuals and promoters of gender 
equality threaten local traditional values were employed to strengthen 
popular support for Putin’s regime (Bluhm and Varga 2018; Moss 2017); in 
France, mass mobilization focused on the opposition to marriage equality, 
whereas in Italy the spotlight was on issues such as sex education, repro-
ductive rights and family law, taken up by the Lega and its charismatic leader 
Matteo Salvini (Garbagnoli 2017; Lavizarri and Prearo 2019). In the U.S., 
Donald Trump’s open misogyny did not prevent his victory, nor did voters 
seem mobilized by the possibility of electing the country’s first female presi-
dent (in fact, 53% of white American women voted for Trump), while his 
attacks on transgender rights helped mobilize the religious right during his 
first term in office (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Stern 2019). The issue of gen-
dered domestic violence appears to have played a key role in forming pol-
itical cleavages in Spain, where in the end of 2018 a far- right party named 
Vox strode into mainstream politics, gaining 12 seats in Spain’s most popu-
lous region, Andalusia, with an extreme anti- immigration and anti- feminist 
agenda (Alonso and Lombardo 2018; Rivera 2019). These examples illus-
trate the strong connection between the rise of anti- genderism and right- 
wing populism, but the nature of synergy between the two – especially the 
way nationalism interacts with views on gender – is context- specific.
Poland may appear peculiar or even exceptional to both insiders and 
outsiders in regard to matters of gender equality and LGBT rights. This 
is not only a matter of the continuing political and cultural power of the 
Catholic Church but also of the politicization of gender and sexuality in 
Poland during the pre- accession period. Since the mid- 1990s, governments 
as well as the media have repeatedly presented gender conservatism as key 
to Poland’s uniqueness in Europe, a matter of national pride and national 
sovereignty in the process of EU accession (Graff 2009, 2014). Poland’s anti- 
gender campaign can be thus interpreted as a struggle to redefine Poland’s 
relationship to the EU in nationalistic terms. Whereas the groups identified 
as most dangerous are Polish feminists, LGBT organizations, sex educators, 
state administrators, the roots of the evil are identified as being “global” and 
“totalitarian,” with anti- gender actors often targeting specific legal changes 
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Right- wing opposition to EU policies on gender equality and LGBT 
rights already played an important role in the anti- European propaganda 
and mobilization in the early 2000s (Graff 2009, 2010). Eurosceptics 
often referred to the European “homolobby” and “pro- abortion lobby” as 
ultimate threats to the Polish national identity. Those campaigns were not 
fully successful, as the level of support for EU integration in Poland was 
the highest among the new member states and remains so today: in 2019 
public support for EU membership reached a record level of 91% (GUS 
2019). However, mass support for modernization brought by EU funding 
does not necessarily translate to acceptance of cultural and social trans-
formation associated with sexual democracy. Polish Eurosceptics have 
capitalized on this gap by arguing that Poland has the right to benefit from 
European integration economically, but must retain its cultural integrity as a 
Catholic country. Arguably, the anti- gender mobilization marks a new phase 
of these efforts: the concept of “gender ideology” explicitly links homosexu-
ality, abortion and the alleged threat of arbitrary sex change with the West 
and the liberal elites within the EU.
Gender and sexuality have long been instrumentalized by nationalism 
(Yuval Davis 1997; Einhorn 2006), and the new populist right is no excep-
tion in this regard. As Ruth Wodak points out, “[v] alues related to traditional 
patriarchy are part and parcel of the exclusionary and nativist, nationalistic 
belief systems which most right- wing populist parties endorse. However, 
they manifest themselves in different images, symbols and domains” 
(2015: 174). Around 2015 the anti- gender rhetoric in many countries was 
partly displaced by and partly merged with panic over Europe’s refugee 
crisis. People in Germany, France and the Netherlands were warned about 
the threat of “our women” being raped by racialized hypermasculine others, 
a theme that was increasingly present in the media, especially following the 
events in Cologne. This discourse relies on the juxtaposition of the gender 
progressive West and barbaric, sexist traditionalist Muslim cultures (Dietze 
2019, 2020; Fassin 2016; Farris 2017). Racialized immigrant women are 
routinely positioned as victims in need of rescue from patriarchal norms 
(and from their men, who are stigmatized as oppressors).
Sara R. Farris has dubbed this form of thinking and policymaking 
“femonationalism” (2017), characteristic of Western countries where right- 
wing groups readily co- opt some elements of the feminist discourse for use 
in anti- Islam and xenophobic campaigns. Anti- immigrant sentiments are 
fueled by images of refugees as virile young men, stigmatized as violent and 
sexist because of their isolation from their countries or origin. Their sexual 
appetites are portrayed as insatiable and out of control, hence they pose 
a danger to white Western women. Within this discourse, both the burqa- 
wearing woman and the oversexed Muslim man function as symbols of the 
barbaric Orient. A vivid example of this dynamic is the moral panic in the 
German media in the aftermath of New Year’s eve events in Cologne in 
2016, when a number of sexual assaults were reported to the police (Dietze 
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2019). As shown by Gabriele Dietze, the right was remarkably successful 
in reviving ethno- sexist imagery associating the racial other – the “Arab 
men” – with sexual violence (2019: 48).
Vis- à- vis foreign racialized “barbarians,” right- wing populist and far- 
right parties position themselves as defenders of gender equality and lib-
eral democracy, which helps to downplay the ways in which these actors 
endanger democratic principles such as political pluralism, protection of 
minorities and individual freedom. According to Akkerman, “[the] Janus 
quality of the parties, showing different faces in different policy domains, 
suggests that their commitment to liberalism is merely instrumental to an 
anti- Islam agenda” (2015: 56). In Western Europe gender is often used stra-
tegically by right- wing populist actors, who aim to intervene in the field of 
immigration and integration policies, whereas in countries such as Poland 
right- wing populists readily subscribe to widespread patriarchal and socially 
conservative views on gender and sexual equality. The trope of the racialized 
rapist has also been employed in Poland around 2015 and 2016, but in the 
absence of actual refugees and minority groups, emphasis was placed on 
European elites as accomplices in the “rape of Europe.”
What are the implications of these differences for anti- gender campaigns? 
Arguably, both tactics are, in fact, examples of the instrumentalization of 
gender by right- wing populism. While Eastern Europe is an ideal site for 
building strong alliances between anti- gender actors and right- wing populists, 
in countries such as Spain, Germany or France, both types of actors need 
to carefully calibrate their discourse. For instance, in Poland and Croatia 
right- wing populists use openly homophobic language, but Germany’s AfD 
employs a careful distinction between homosexuality as an acceptable life-
style and genderism as a dangerous ideology (Wielowiejski 2020; Davidson- 
Smich 2020). In Sweden, where gender equality and sexual democracy are 
promoted as a part of the national identity, anti- gender mobilization focuses 
mostly on undermining the legitimacy of gender studies. The right- wing 
Sweden Democrats party aims to present itself as women- friendly (Ekman 
and Engström 2017; Sager and Mulinari 2018), but before the 2018 elections 
its spokesperson Robert Stenkvist went on record claiming that politicians 
should tighten control over academia, because some areas of research, such 
as gender studies, are overtly politicized and unscientific (Gunnarsson Payne 
2019). Perhaps the difference is best understood as resulting from polit-
ical influence or lack thereof. While Sweden Democrats’ proposals to limit 
access to abortion in Sweden appeared bizarre and easily dismissible at the 
time, it is worth considering what the party’s approach would be if it were 
to form a government in the future. Given that in the beginning of 2020, 
with 25% popular support, SD was the most popular party in Sweden, such 
scenario cannot be ruled out.
The femonationalistic tropes employed in Germany or Sweden were pre-
sent in right- wing discourse also in Poland, but the underlying theme of 
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to Western contexts, the 2014– 2015 Polish campaign against “genderism” 
was partly displaced by and partly merged with panic over Europe’s refugee 
crisis. Arguably, it was the ability to combine the two themes that paved 
the way to the Law and Justice party electoral victory in 2015. However, 
the logic of this combination is significantly different from the nationalist 
grammar of sexual democracy vs macho- Islam. In Poland, “genderists” 
along with refugees (now referred to as “invaders” and “terrorists”) were 
demonized as enemies of the nation, both groups partaking in a conspiracy 
engineered by Brussels elites aimed against Polish culture and sovereignty. 
Moral panic around gender combined seamlessly with “enemies at the gates” 
rhetoric. “Gender ideology” was presented as a plot to soften Polish men 
and make them unable to defend the country. Looming in the background 
was the vision of a demographic catastrophe and what nationalists around 
the globe call “the great replacement”: with Polish men going “soft” and 
Polish women becoming feminists, Poland would soon be depopulated. The 
ethnically Polish population would then be replaced by hordes of racialized 
“barbarians.” Nowhere was this narrative presented more vividly than in 
the image of a white woman dressed in an EU flag, screaming and being 
groped by a number of brown- skinned male hands, which was published 
in the summer of 2016 on the cover of the right- wing Polish weekly Sieci. 
The image was accompanied by the following headline “Islamic rape 
of Europe: what are the media and Brussels’ elites hiding from EU citi-
zens?”. The opening of Europe’s borders to refugees was here portrayed 
as a plot engineered by EU elites against ordinary people, and especially 
against women. Such a juxtaposition between cynical elites and vulnerable, 
manipulated citizens is, of course, the essence of populist logic. This openly 
racist image evokes the tradition of fascist propaganda, e.g. it bears striking 
resemblance to the American mythology of black rapists pursuing white 
virgins as depicted in W.D. Griffith’s Birth of the Nation (1915) or Italian 
posters of 1943 presenting young white women being accosted by Black 
African and Jewish rapists.
In contrast to femonationalistic discourse, which strategically assumes 
that the West is uniformly gender progressive, attachment to equality is 
interpreted in Poland as a sinister plot of the West against the East. Feminism 
and LGBT rights are viewed as a source of Western Europe’s vulnerability, 
which blinds it to the dangers of mass migration. Within the radical version 
of this narrative, we find a classic conspiracy theory, in which the ultimate 
goal of the liberal Left, including feminists, is the extermination of white 
populations everywhere (white genocide). The position of countries such as 
Poland in this discourse is both precarious and ambivalent: gender conser-
vative Eastern Europe is engaged in a heroic struggle against both Western 
demoralization and Muslim barbarism; it is both victim and potential savior 
of the West. “Genderists” – along with refugees whose “invasion” they facili-
tate and welcome – are demonized as part of an international conspiracy 
threatening Poland’s borders, national culture and the safety of Polish 
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women and children. Thus, in the fall of 2015, Kaczyński’s Law and Justice 
party won the elections as a force offering safety against twin foreign- bred 
dangers: genderists and refugees.
Conclusions
In the eyes of the Polish Catholic clergy and ultraconservative activists, gender 
studies are equivalent to totalitarian ideologies such as Stalinism and Nazism, 
atheists become mass murderers and sex education can be equated with 
“organized gang rape on the child’s soul” (zorganizowany, zbiorowy gwałt na 
duszy dziecka) (Oko 2014). The sense of the region’s uniqueness and Poland’s 
special importance as a Catholic country permeates the local version of anti- 
gender rhetoric, endowing it with a peculiar tone of urgency and drama.
It is clear that the Polish battles against “gender ideology” have had 
significant political consequences. They have served as a springboard for 
the political careers of previously lesser- known right- wing politicians 
and opened up opportunities for ultraconservatives to enter positions of 
power and influence, to become a new elite. However, it is more than indi-
vidual careers that is at stake. The discourse of besieged dignity, wounded 
pride, moral panic and righteous anger has strengthened the polarization 
of the country’s public debate and political scene, paving the way for the 
right- wing populist regime and helping to consolidate its rule. The cooper-
ation between ultraconservative and political actors has evolved over 
time, following the logic of opportunistic synergy: right- wing populists 
employ key themes and arguments coined by the anti- gender movement, 
while the ultraconservative worldview becomes increasingly normalized in 
public debates, and the movement becomes institutionalized within state 
structures. Other scholars have conceptualized this phenomenon as a pro-
cess of state- sponsored elite change. It is along these lines that Stanley Bill 
(2020) examines the collaboration between the Law and Justice Party and 
The Polish League against Defamation (Reduta Dobrego Imienia– Polska 
Liga Przeciw Zniesławieniom) – a far- right organization whose mission is 
to improve the image of Poland abroad.
In these interactions […] PiS has sought to achieve several mutually 
reinforcing aims. First, the party has utilized the discourse and policy 
agenda of the League and other groups in its own political communica-
tion and legislative program […]. It has then rewarded the organization 
and its leader with funding, positions, and policy influence. Finally, the 
organization and its leader have used these benefits and influence for the 
direct promotion of PiS’s policies and positions.
(2020: 13)
The strategy of the ruling right- wing coalition is the same vis- à- vis Ordo 
Iuris and other anti- gender actors: PiS aims to “strengthen its own cultural 
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and political narratives by advancing the ideology and interests of friendly 
civil society elites” (Bill 2020: 13). In fact, this process can be interpreted as 
the constructing of new elites by giving previously marginal actors voice, 
influence and significant recourses.
Such synergy has also been observed in other countries, as exemplified 
by the Lega party’s engagement in the organization of the World Congress 
of Families in Verona in 2019 (see Chapter 2). However, the ways in which 
gender is employed by right- wing populists in Western and Eastern Europe 
differ. In the West, right- wing parties tend to adopt the femonationalistic 
frame, which juxtaposes gender- equal, tolerant, enlightened Western soci-
eties to patriarchal, intolerant and deeply religious migrants from Islamic 
countries, even if they often do not support gender equality in practice 
(Dietze 2019, 2020; Meret and Siim 2013; Mulinari 2016). Marine Le Pen’s 
2016 call for a referendum on migration, which followed the New Year’s 
Eve incidents in Cologne, is a case in point (Le Pen 2016). In Poland, gender 
equality is seen as part of a broader plan to weaken the nation, in which 
Muslim refugees are about to finish what Western liberals and feminists 
have started: the uprooting of local religious and cultural traditions and the 
creation of a multicultural society, which has lost its moral compass and can 
be easily manipulated by the global elites. An important component of this 
imaginary, as we elaborate further in Chapter 4, is the employment of an 
anti- colonial frame, whereby “genderism” is presented as a sinister global 
force, a new form of colonial power exercised by the EU, UN and WHO 
against the worlds’ poor. Eastern Europe is accorded a special place in this 
geography of gender as a part of the world that was left untouched by the 
sexual revolution and proved resistant to Marxism. The idea is that the East 
will save the West from its own decadence.
Notes
 1 The network of anti- gender actors attracted many anti- choice groups, which 
emerged already in the 1990s and early 2000s, such as the Association of Large 
Families (Stowarzyszenie Rodzin Wielodzietnych), the Center for Supporting 
Initiatives for Life and the Family (Centrum Wspierania Inicjatyw dla Życia i 
Rodziny), the Polish Federation of Pro- life Movements (Polska Federacja Ruchów 
Obrony Życia) and the Civic Coalition for the Family (Koalicja Obywatelska Dla 
Rodziny).
 2 The ratification process was finalized in March 2015.
 3 Struggles over the Istanbul Convention have continued ever since it was signed 
and the process of ratification by individual states began in May 2011. The 
Convention is the most comprehensive international policy instrument focusing 
on the problem of gendered violence and the ways in which violence is linked 
to discrimination. All members of the EU have signed the document, but eight 








4  Gender as “Ebola from Brussels”
The uses and abuses of the  
anti- colonial frame
As we have shown in our analysis of the Polish case, the use of anti- gender 
discourse by the populist right is largely opportunistic and strategic – a 
medium or tool for mobilizing collective emotions such as fear, nostalgia and 
resentment. In this chapter we demonstrate that anti- genderism is well suited 
for this purpose, in part because it is structurally a populist discourse. It 
establishes and exploits a powerful binary: an opposition between a corrupt 
global elite and innocent local populations. The people are imagined as local 
Christians, allegedly marginalized or even persecuted by the forces of secu-
larism and liberalism. This conceptualization is not inherently nationalistic, 
but it easily accommodates to local nationalistic frames and sentiments. The 
urgency of the anti- gender call to action in defense of the traditional family 
and faith is in tune with the radical- right’s tendency to justify violence as 
self- defense. As Dietze and Roth (2020a) have argued, the turn to gender is a 
way to sanitize extreme right- wing discourse, making it seem more palatable 
for the mainstream audience.
This chapter deals with the phenomenon that can be classified as a discur-
sive appropriation: the conservative version of anti- colonial rhetoric, prom-
inent especially in Eastern Europe and the Global South. This discourse 
equates gender egalitarianism with colonization, and often compares it with 
20th century totalitarianisms and global terrorism, or even the deadly Ebola 
virus. An important aspect of this rhetoric is the link it draws between cul-
tural threats and economic deprivation. Whereas historically conservative 
movements tended to either ignore economics or support free- market cap-
italism (especially in the U.S., see Brown 2006, 2019; Cooper 2017), the 
post- 2008 right- wing populist rhetoric in Europe has included a critique of 
global elites as both cultural colonizers and economic exploiters. Within this 
narrative, feminism is just a cover- up for rampant individualism and eco-
nomic exploitation.
This shift is consistent with the change in the ways in which right- wing 
populist parties in Europe situate themselves vis- à- vis market capitalism. 
In recent decades many right- wing parties in Europe have refashioned 
themselves into protectors of the welfare state, abandoning their prior 
commitment to market liberalism (Eger and Valdez 2015; Mudde 2002). 
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As we discuss in more detail in Chapter 5, Poland’s Law and Justice and 
Hungary’s Fidesz have both introduced generous “pro- family” programs, 
combining social policy measures aimed at parents with heightened moral 
panic around homosexuality and “gender ideology” as a threat to children. 
Today’s ultraconservatives take part in this process as experts and advisers, 
striving to position themselves as promoters of welfare provisions for fam-
ilies and children, as champions of marginalized people. This makes their 
discourse all the more conducive to being employed by right- wing populists.
Anti- genderism is a flexible but nonetheless coherent ideological con-
struction that is consciously used by right- wing populists worldwide. This 
chapter examines its basic tenets, shedding light on how this ideological 
construct has contributed to the contemporary transnational resurgence 
of right- wing populism. While selectively borrowing from liberal- left and 
feminist discourses, including critiques of colonialism and neoliberalism, 
ultraconservative actors aim to construct a new universalism, which replaces 
individual rights with family rights and positions religious conservatives as an 
embattled minority. Just like populist leaders, the movement’s key ideologues 
are self- proclaimed defenders of freedom and democracy, which in their view 
have been hijacked by liberals and leftists. Anti- gender activists claim to 
represent the “true” civil society, which aims to replace bureaucratized and 
alienated elites with their foreign- funded non- governmental organizations 
and supranational institutions. They mobilize members of existing national 
and local groups, churches and political parties, and they are increasingly 
networking on the global level through international anti- choice coalitions.
The arguments promulgated by anti- gender ideologues must be under-
stood as part of a global social conservative “ideoscape” (Appadurai 1996), 
in which local actors draw heavily on each other’s agendas while accommo-
dating their claims and strategies to specific sociopolitical situations. While 
Kováts and Põim (2015) demonstrate that resistance to gender has become 
a “symbolic glue” linking the programs and discourses of far- right and con-
servative parties in Europe, we show that it is the anti- colonial frame that 
provides ideological coherence to the coalition of religious and political 
players worldwide.
Social movement scholars identify frames as social schemata of interpret-
ation, which “render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function 
to organize experience and guide action” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). 
Framing theory highlights “the symbolic and meaning work done by 
movement activists as they articulate grievances, generate consensus … and 
present rationalities for their actions and proposed solutions to adherents, 
bystanders, and antagonists” (Williams 2008: 93). Anti- genderists deploy 
symbols and identities which are key to postcolonial theory, but they do not 
subscribe to this theoretical strand; in fact, some may not be aware of its 
existence. However, the wide resonance of the anti- colonial discourse is an 
important ingredient of today’s populist moment. In the context of a broader 
cultural tendency to valorize “victimhood” (Campbell and Manning 2018; 
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Sikora 2019), calling oneself a victim of colonization is a powerful way to 
stake one’s claims.
This chapter proposes a new way of theorizing anti- gender campaigns, 
one that links different cases of mobilization with anti- genderism as an ideo-
logical construct. We identify the anti- colonial frame as anti- genderism’s key 
discursive structure, and show that the appropriation of this frame by right- 
wing forces has serious consequences, both for the right and for the left.
Defenders of the common people: “gender” as colonial 
imposition
In January 2015 on his way from Manila, Philippines, Pope Francis warned 
the faithful against “gender ideology” – a dangerous imposition from wealthy 
Western countries upon developing nations. According to the Pope, foreign 
aid and education are routinely tied to acceptance of gender equality pol-
icies; “this is ideological colonization,” he claimed, adding that strong fam-
ilies can overcome this trend (Holdren and Gagliarducci 2015). These ideas 
have been repeated many times since, e.g. in Naples 2015 and in Kraków 
2016, where the Pope stated:
In Europe, America, Latin America, Africa, and in some countries of 
Asia, there are genuine forms of ideological colonization taking place. 
And one of these – I will call it clearly by its name – is [the ideology of] 
“gender.” Today children – children! – are taught in school that everyone 
can choose his or her sex.
(Quinlan 2016: 1)
Such claims are not entirely new – anti- colonial rhetoric has long been 
used as a strategy for both resisting and promoting gender equality, e.g. in 
debates about feminism and women’s rights in non- Western countries (e.g. 
Hoodfar 1997; Narayan 1997). The charge of colonialism has also figured 
prominently in efforts to delegitimize conservative interventions by the U.S. 
Christian Right in Malawi, Uganda and Nigeria (e.g. Kaoma 2012). What is 
remarkable about the present scenario, however, is the extent to which the 
anti- colonial frame as used by the right is no longer about colonialism. It has 
evolved into a powerful metaphor for the arrogance of Western liberal elites; 
a discursive device divorced from actual colonial history, which is why it has 
worked so well in countries such as Poland.
The following three quotes from plenary speakers at the 2019 World 
Congress of Families aptly illustrate the movement’s self- identity as a 
defender of ordinary people and the family against the individualistic global 
order imposed by liberal elites, referred to as a sinister “they”:
They support fragmented individualist “nomadic man”, [as] only eco-
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of a man, not consumer but embedded in family. […] We also fight for 
labor rights and the right to not work on Sundays […] It is family that 
protects the weakest and old people.
(Nicolas Bay, MEP from Front National)
They know that if the family is strong, they will be defeated. Multinational 
global forces will be defeated. Those who want to give our children 
porn magazines will be stopped.
(Simone Pillon, Italian Senator)
This cultural war is a global war. They control the mainstream media, 
the parties, they run NGOs funded by Soros, the enemies of the family 
have multiple faces.
(Ignatio Arsuaga, CitizenGo)1
What we see here is three white, middle- aged, wealthy and influential men 
presenting themselves as champions of the world’s poor. Anti- genderists 
enter this role with astonishing consistency and self- assurance. They position 
themselves as challengers of the existing elites (the vaguely defined “they”), 
protectors of the world’s colonized peoples, the disenfranchised and eco-
nomically disadvantaged, whose livelihoods as well as authentic cultures and 
traditional value systems are threatened by globalization. An unexamined 
assumption underlying the anti- gender worldview is not only that local and 
authentic cultural identity is always “familial,” that is socially conservative 
and heteronormative, but also that gender conservatism constitutes this sov-
ereign identity’s essential core. Anti- genderists fashion themselves as defenders 
of an oppressed, silent majority, as in a 2015 in- flight interview, where Pope 
Francis stressed that “colonizing empires […] seek to make peoples forget their 
own identity and make them (all) equal” (Pope Francis 2015). This populist 
strategy allows anti- gender actor to justify attacks on enemies or even violence 
by claiming the need for self- defense against all- powerful forces. As Ruth 
Wodak elaborates: “the discursive strategies of ‘victim- perpetrator reversal’, 
‘scapegoating’ and the ‘construction of conspiracy theories’ therefore belong 
to the necessary ‘toolkit’ of right- wing populist rhetoric” (2015: 4).
The alleged colonizers include what anti- genderists view as power 
elites: feminists, left- wing and liberal politicians, transnational NGOs and 
international bodies. The enemy is by definition powerful, even when spe-
cific targets of attacks are members of culturally and socially marginalized 
groups such as the LGBT community, hence, phrases such as “LGBT 
ideology” or “homolobby” are employed. The source of demoralization 
is “the West,” while many representatives of anti- gender movements also 
stress the destructive power of global markets. In the words of Kuby:
This global sexual revolution is now being carried out by power elites. 
These include international organizations like the United Nations and 
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the European Union, with their web of inscrutable sub- organizations; 
global corporations like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft; the big 
foundations like Rockefeller and Guggenheim; extremely rich individ-
uals like Bill and Melinda Gates, Ted Turner, George Soros, and Warren 
Buffett; and non- governmental organizations like the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation and the International Lesbian and Gay 
Association. […] And they all share one interest: to reduce population 
growth on this planet.
(Fantini 2013)
The list may appear somewhat broad and random, but it has an internal 
logic: the elites are always global, the people are always local. The key sites 
of global power are said to be transnational institutions: the UN, UNICEF, 
UNAIDS, the World Health Organization and the World Bank, along with 
international foundations and associations, including the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (e.g. Nykiel 2014: 45).
Anti- genderists are also deeply critical of existing civil- society structures, 
especially in the post- socialist region and in so- called developing countries, 
where many NGOs were founded by Western donors in the 1990s (Jacobsson 
and Korolczuk 2017). They claim that gender equality policies are imposed 
by transnational elite organizations, often backing these charges with 
arguments concerning funding; in recent years George Soros has become the 
main villain in this discourse. This framing gains considerable traction at the 
grassroots level. In October 2011 some 80 Russian parental organizations, 
most of them local groups, issued an open letter (the so- called Saint Petersburg 
Resolution), which states: “We are seriously concerned about the activities of 
some relatively small groups proclaiming their ideals in the name of the entire 
civil society, while in reality their objectives contradict the authentic interests 
of sovereign peoples” (Hojdestrand 2017: 30). The statement refers to a draft 
recommendation by the Council of Europe on the rights and legal status of 
children and parental responsibilities, portraying it as an assault on families, 
local democracy and Russia’s sovereignty.
Such statements reflect the populist tendency to portray political enemies 
as representing foreign self- elected elites, rather than the popular will. 
Interestingly, however, this charge can be reversed: while researching anti- 
gender organizations, one is struck their wide transnational connections and 
lack of financial transparency (Datta 2018; Rivera 2018; Suchanow 2018, 
2020). While these organizations aim to appear as initiatives funded by 
common people, and claim to be uncorrupted either by state or transnational 
funding, many of them – as in the case of Poland’s Ordo Iuris Institute – 
carefully avoid presenting detailed financial documentation, reporting their 
sources of funding. For example, in the 2019 financial statement published 
on their website, Ordo Iuris acknowledges receiving over 6 million PLN 
(approx. 1.3 million EUR) in donations, but fails to specify the donors.
In contrast to “foreign global elites,” the anti- gender movement presents itself 
as local, authentic civil society. For example, conservative parental movements 
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in Russia and Poland strive to re- configure the very notion of civil society 
along moral and religious coordinates, with patriotism, “traditional” religi-
osity, and the institution of heterosexual marriage as core values (Höjdestrand 
2017; Korolczuk 2017). This conservative, illiberal civil society legitimizes 
itself by references to the will of the people, as expressed in demonstrations 
and petitions, with “authentic” values opposed to dangerous abstractions 
promulgated by the corrupt elites (Duda 2016: 21). The movement’s atti-
tude toward democracy is, however, deeply ambiguous. Anti- genderists stress 
their reverence for democratic methods such as mass mobilization, citizens’ 
initiatives or referenda, but they oppose the very idea of democratic deliber-
ation over the “natural order of things”: traditional gender roles, marriage, fili-
ation, reproduction and parental authority. In many countries, the anti- gender 
campaigns have focused on pushing for constitutional referenda regarding the 
definition of family, in effect prohibiting marriage equality in Croatia in 2013, 
but failing to achieve the same in Romania in 2018.
Within this framework, global efforts to promote reproductive health, 
family planning, gender equality and sexual rights are seen as a cover- up for 
a Western neo- Malthusian project. Allegedly, global elites strive to prevent 
population growth in the developing world by spreading homosexuality and 
“killing the unborn.” This is viewed as a legacy of the sexual revolution 
and the West’s self- destructive fixation on sexuality, whose sources include 
Freud, Marcuse and Kinsey. This message comes across with particular force 
when uttered by a native of Africa, such as Cardinal Robert Sarah, one 
of the key proponents of anti- genderism worldwide. Sarah has repeatedly 
warned against colonization by gender, which he compares to fundamen-
talist Islamism and ISIS: “To use a slogan, we find ourselves between ‘gender 
ideology and ISIS.’ Islamic massacres and libertarian demands regularly con-
tend for the front page of the newspapers” (Catholic News Agency 2015).
He has also gone on record claiming that “gender ideology” is “a deadly 
impulse that is being experienced in the world increasingly cut off from God 
through ideological colonialism” (Mena 2016). Interestingly, the same dis-
cursive construct was heard in Poland in 2019, when ultraconservative jour-
nalist Paweł Lisicki explained that, today, we have only two active forces 
that struggle for the soul of man in the West:
only Islam and secular radicalism are left on the battlefield; the latter 
has feminist- homosexual movements as its army. Both Islam and LGBT 
movements aim for universal conquest of the world, aspiring to change 
laws, custom and education. Contrary to the popular propaganda, 
LGBT movements do not want tolerance. Their goal is a brutal conquest 
of social consciousness […] We can say that the aim of this revolution is 
a homeland, a state in which homosexual practices are the norm.
(Kolanek 2019, our translation)
In this worldview, ultraconservative ideology constitutes a moderate and 
inherently peaceful middle ground between two violent extremes. The 
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anti- gender movement portrays itself as a safe haven from the turbulent and 
dangerous world, a sort of Heimat to use a term popular in Germany.
Genderism is portrayed as a global force, while resistance is always 
presented as local. Thus, the set of values that anti- genderists aim to defend 
and preserve includes national sovereignty and economic autonomy. The 
global liberal forces are said to introduce eugenic depopulation politics 
especially in poor, underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia in order to 
strengthen their own economic and political position (e.g. Peeters 2007). 
Anti- genderists view family planning as stemming from corporate greed, 
which drives global capitalism. The UN’s population policies (consistently 
renamed by ultraconservatives as “depopulation policies”) are seen as a 
form of eugenics, bringing profits to the “abortion industry” and pharma-
ceutical companies that sell contraception and offer IVF. Sometimes, as 
in the case of Czech conservative groups opposing the ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention, the idea that the common people are being exploited 
by wealthy elites takes the form of a conspiracy theory, in which:
children [are] taken away from their parents by social services [and 
they] do not end up with adoptive or foster parents, but function as 
blood and organ resources for rich people.
(Svatonova 2019)
Just as in the case of right- wing populist parties, it is debatable whether 
the critique of globalism and neoliberalism is an authentic part of new 
ultraconservative ideological stance or just a rhetorical strategy of anti- 
genderists. What is beyond doubt is that critique of capitalism has become 
an integral part of this way of thinking, one that facilitates close cooperation 
between right- wing populist parties and ultraconservative movements.
While this narrative is not new, the anti- colonial frame has been dissociated 
from discussions of actual colonialism. The metaphor reveals remarkable 
fluidity and adaptability. Depending on the context, it may or may not 
involve explicit antisemitism. Anti- genderists occasionally express thinly 
veiled antisemitic views, e.g. when attacking George Soros as the embodi-
ment of both global capital and a Jewish conspiracy against Christianity, 
or when focusing on Judith Butler, the “Jewish lesbian” credited with being 
genderism’s main inventor. Gabriele Kuby (2015) bases her account of the 
roots of the sexual revolution on a book by Michael E. Jones (2005), a 
notorious U.S.- based anti- Semite, member of a fringe Catholic movement 
known as Radical Catholic Traditionalism (see Weitzman 2015). Jones is a 
proponent of the claim that the sexual revolution is a Jewish conspiracy (in 
fact, he has written an entire tract about the “Jewish revolutionary spirit”), 
but Kuby carefully omits references to the Jewish origins of the alleged 
global plot when citing him as her source. At the same time, she repeatedly 
accuses “genderist elites” of racism, claiming that UN population policies 
are aimed against the people of Africa.
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Though Jews as such are almost never mentioned in attacks on “gender 
ideology,” genderists, and especially sexual minorities, are consist-
ently Judaized in anti- gender discourse, that is, described in a language 
strongly reminiscent of conspiratorial antisemitism. The link becomes most 
obvious when Soros and Butler are mentioned, or when the term “Cultural 
Marxism,” notorious for its antisemitic subtext, is employed (Jamin 2019; 
Busbridge et al. 2020). The discursive pattern linking gender to Jews in 
right- wing discourse is quite complex. Its core elements were examined by 
Polish sociologist Adam Ostolski in a 2007 study of the “Judaization of 
gays” in homophobic hate speech. He compared politicized homophobia in 
Polish media of this period and the political antisemitism of the right- wing 
press of the 1930s (Ostolski 2007). Like Jews in antisemitic attacks, sexual 
minorities are presented as engaged in a secretive plot: they are scheming, 
devious and powerful. To this end, the term “homosexual lobby” is often 
used, and the link between homosexuality and cosmopolitanism or root-
lessness is persistently made. Furthermore, LGBT activists are routinely 
accused of sacrilege, their very presence is said to contaminate sacred events 
and spaces, while the rainbow flag is seen as offensive to religious and 
patriotic feelings. Finally, like Jews in pre- World War II Eastern Europe, 
gays are blamed for provoking violent attacks by making themselves too 
conspicuous.
How significant is the antisemitic component of anti- gender discourse? 
This remains open to debate. We may dismiss it as a vestige of an earlier 
era (after all, gender has replaced Jews in the role of the despised Other, 
so why bother with what is now gone). We might also toy with the idea 
that antisemitism links the anti- gender movement to certain strands of the 
extreme right. In fact, a popular conspiracy theory linking Jews to obscenity 
does enjoy popularity in certain realms of the far right in the U.S. Jews, it 
is believed, deliberately produce and disseminate pornography as well as 
lobby for homosexual rights in order to undermine the traditional family – 
all part of their plan to destroy Western civilization (Kerl 2019, 2020). No 
such claims are made – at least not explicitly – by the anti- gender movement. 
Gender is a conspiracy, yes – but who is behind it? George Soros comes 
to mind, but only rarely and in very particular cultural contexts does an 
explicit answer to this question come to the surface. When Michael E. Jones 
travelled to Poland on a book tour in 2013, his reputation for antisemitic 
views followed him without becoming much of a liability. Articles appeared 
in liberal media outlets signaling his notoriety in the U.S. (e.g. Jęczmionka 
2013), but this did not deter respectable Catholic institutions from hosting 
him as an authority on the dangers of gender. We are not claiming here 
that the anti- gender authors are anti- Semites in disguise, though some of 
them may hold antisemitic views. Nor do we suggest that anti- genderism is 
really a new version of antisemitism as some scholars have done (Chetcuti- 
Osorovitz and Teicher 2018). Rather, our point is to demonstrate histor-
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inextricably connected as parts of the same cultural code: anti- modernist, 
conspiratorial, polarizing and heavily gendered (Graff 2021).
Many scholars observe that the radical right often expresses antisemitic 
views in the guise of a critique of capitalism. Wodak notes that during the 
financial crisis of 2008, “fantasies of powerful and greedy Jewish bankers, 
Jewish capitalism and Jewish speculation served to trigger many stereotypes 
of a Jewish world conspiracy” (2018: 6). In such discourse, “big capital” 
oppressing the “common man” is simply a code for wealthy Jewish bankers 
who allegedly rule the world. Some scholars of the anti- gender movement 
suggest that this is also the case with anti- genderists, whose:
seemingly anti- capitalist stance has to be understood with regards to 
right- wing populist articulations […] These articulations have histor-
ically been grounded in anti- Semitism and do not present a critique of 
capitalist structures but of specific (types of) actors. Therefore, they do 
not conflict with the neo- liberal belief in the free market, an anti- state 
agenda and a focus on (national) competitiveness.
(Mayer and Sauer 2019: 27)
While we do not underestimate the role of antisemitic conspiracy theories 
in anti- gender thinking, we also do not believe that the movement’s critique 
of contemporary capitalism is merely a code for antisemitism. We need to 
contend with the fact that, unlike earlier waves of anti- feminism, contem-
porary anti- gender campaigns do include a critique of certain aspects of the 
neoliberal order. It is thus that the movement becomes capable of addressing 
anxieties and grievances of people living in this system. The fact that cri-
tique of capitalism is historically grounded in antisemitism, and occasion-
ally includes antisemitic rhetoric, does not make it any less poignant and 
effective. Instead, we would claim, anti- genderism is an ultraconservative 
language of anti- capitalist critique, wherein George Soros is not targeted as 
a rich Jew but as a symbol of contemporary global capitalism.
Race also plays an important role in the anti- gender imaginary. In post- 
socialist countries anti- gender discourse often takes on an explicitly racist 
form, especially in anti- refugee propaganda where genderists are seen as 
clearing the way for the influx of racialized others (as we have shown in 
Chapter 3). In the American context the charge of colonization becomes 
the charge of race- based eugenics. When identifying key players on the 
“genderist” side, Kuby points to:
the rich and powerful of the United States, generally white Anglo- Saxon 
Protestants (WASPs), who perceived the danger of “differential fertility.” 
They feared that the low birth rate of the upper class and the high birth 
rate of the underclass, especially blacks in the US and poor Third World 
countries, would cause them to lose political and economic power.
(2015: 17)
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Taken out of context, this passage could pass for left- wing anti- colonial dis-
course, with its heightened race and class consciousness, and a critique of 
population policies. A similar viewpoint was expressed during in Verona by 
participants of the panel titled “Global perspectives on the family” featuring 
exclusively Black speakers (see Figure 4.1). Dr. Teresa Okafor, director of 
the Foundation for African Cultural Heritage (FACH), a Nigeria- based 
ultraconservative NGO, explained that the “ferocious attacks against family 
at UN, and many EU countries [efforts] to delete motherhood, fatherhood, 
family from all documents” are especially dangerous for African countries, 
where the family rather than the state organizes social life: “in Africa we 
are not developed, so if you want to destroy society in Africa, you destroy 
family” (2019).
The fact that the World Congress of Families included speakers from 
Africa shows that many ultraconservatives are careful to maintain a repu-
tation for mainstream anti- racist views. It also testifies to the efforts to 
build broad transnational alliances, a contemporary version of the “Baptist- 
burqa” network of the 1990s (Bob 2012). However, this mainstreaming 
strategy stands in stark contrast with coalition- building efforts oriented 
toward extreme right groups in countries such as Italy, Hungary or Poland, 
whose leaders have publicly expressed openly racist and antisemitic views. 
The special guests in Verona included not only representatives of African 
nations, but also the German aristocrat Gloria von Thurn und Taxis, who 
went on record in 2001 claiming that Africa has the AIDS epidemic because 
“blacks like to copulate” (Open Democracy 2019). No doubt, it is difficult 
to achieve a balance between the official image of the movement as defender 
Figure 4.1  The World Congress of Families in Verona, Italy, 2019. Main stage, panel 
featuring Dr. Teresa Okafor.
Photo by Elżbieta Korolczuk
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of the world’s colonized people, and the much darker reality of building 
a network that includes right- wing extremists and neo- fascists (Hatewatch 
Staff 2019).
Overall, the movement’s rhetoric is based on an overarching oppos-
ition between powerful, demoralized, global gender elites and vulner-
able, innocent, local people. This populist logic of polarization allows the 
ultraconservative agenda to be articulated as a noble and ennobling mission. 
As expressed by the leader of the World Congress of Families, Brian Brown, 
in Verona: “We are here today to defend, promote, protect and lift up some-
thing so true, something so basic, something so beautiful – the family.”
The anti- colonial frame in practice: Poland as victim of the 
gender invasion
In this section we examine closely several episodes of the Polish anti- gender 
campaign that employed the anti- colonial framing, including the rhetoric 
used in the 2015 campaign against sex education in schools and key elem-
ents of the 2019 anti- LGBT mobilization. The cases examined show how 
eclectic the anti- gender discourse can be, capitalizing on a rhetoric of both 
victimhood and cultural superiority.
Our first example is a banner displayed during a large anti-sex-education 
rally held on 30 August 2015 in Warsaw. In crude English, the sign 
announced: “Gender + Convention about so called ‘violence against the 
women and violence in the family’ this is the Ebola for Poland from Brussels” 
(see Figure 4.2). Ebola, a virus spread through contact with body fluids, causing 
vomiting, diarrhea and rash, is commonly associated with tropical regions of 
sub- Saharan Africa. In the context of the rally, the word Ebola epitomizes 
fear of the abject and the racial Other. By linking the horrible African disease 
with the European Union’s (EU) gender equality legislation (e.g. the Istanbul 
Convention), anti- gender actors position Brussels as both a colonizer and a 
source of contagion, as it spreads the virus of genderism, aiming to destroy 
the healthy body of the Polish nation. Such ultraconservative discourse is 
readily adopted by Poland’s right- wing populists, who strive to undermine 
the generally positive attitudes toward the EU.
The choice of an African disease may seem odd, but is by no means 
accidental. The key metaphors here are those of contagion and contamin-
ation, which is characteristic of moral panics and emphasizes the speedy 
and uncontrollable spread of immoral impulses, desires and behaviors 
(Thompson 1998). Moreover, the geographical roots of Ebola signal what 
the source of real danger is. Many politicians on the right assert that Poles 
are being targeted as the last frontier of “undamaged Christianity” and “true 
moral values” in Europe, while the real purpose of global elites is to enable 
mass migration from Africa to Central and Eastern Europe. The ultimate 
danger awaiting Poles is the destruction of the nation and construction of a 
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easily controllable and unable to oppose transnational institutions and local 
agents of the “civilization of death.” Such conspiracy theories are legitimate 
political currency in today’s Poland, as exemplified by the public statement 
of Paweł Kukiz, an MP and former presidential candidate who received 
over 20 percent of the vote in the first phase of the May 2015 election. 
Commenting on the ongoing refugee crisis, he asserted that EU migration 
policies are in fact aimed at extermination of the Polish nation:
The plan is for Poles to be scattered around the world, and a compil-
ation of different ethnic groups is supposed to live here. Such a society 
would be easy to manipulate and will create a “natural moat” [buffer 
zone] between the East and the West. Maybe we are supposed to just 
abandon these lands, maybe we are supposed to die out.
(Kukiz TV 2015, our translation; see also Sosnowski 2015)
While this narrative may appear specific to Poland, in fact it partakes in 
a much broader pattern of discourse characteristic of the anti- gender 
movement’s conspiratorial view of the world. In this view the family plays 
Figure 4.2  Demonstration “Stop Depravation in Education,” Warsaw, Poland, 2015. 
Banner stating: “Gender + Istanbul Convention is Ebola from Brussels.”
Photo by Elżbieta Korolczuk
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a key role in resistance to a vaguely defined global power, whose aim is to 
enslave and control the masses. Leaders of the World Congress of Families 
in Verona also warn that:
[…] a human society disjointed and deprived of intermediate bodies like 
the family would result in a mass of obedient, servile consumers who 
would not recognize their roots and traditions and as such would be 
more easily manipulated by those powers who would exploit them for 
profit. This would represent the end of the Millennial civilization that 
human society has so far built.
(Verona Declaration, 2019)
These two narratives – one that identifies the peoples of Africa as victims 
of a global conspiracy and the one placing Poles in this role, a nation to be 
replaced by Africans – may appear mutually exclusive. In fact, however, they 
converge in their valorization of victimhood, ethnic and national homogen-
eity and local rootedness, as well as in their vilification of Western elites. 
“Gender ideology” is perceived as an aggressive pseudo- religion, whose 
success depends on the previous uprooting of indigenous value systems. 
According to Kuby:
Rootless, dependent, malleable masses may be ready to celebrate a new 
– global – savior. The cultural revolution of our time increasingly limits 
individual freedom and broadens the power of the state over the indi-
vidual and of international organizations over the states – in the service 
of the financial oligarchy and for toppling the moral order.
(2015: 278)
“Genderism” is thus portrayed as a criminal plot aimed at demoralizing the 
people and eventually bringing about the Great Replacement – eradicating 
entire populations with the purpose of replacing them with migrants or 
racial others. The pseudo- scientific theory of the Great Replacement (Camus 
2017), popular in neo- fascist circles on both sides of the Atlantic, states that, 
as a result of a Jewish conspiracy, whites are under threat of being replaced 
by people of color, especially Muslims. Recently, it has been embraced 
by identitarian movements in Europe and the alt- right in the U.S., and it 
occasionally surfaces in anti- gender discourse. Proponents of “gender” are 
viewed as part of the liberal elite, whose moral and spiritual degeneracy 
eases the way to racial and cultural substitution. The definition of those in 
danger is broad enough to encompass all traditional, heterosexual families 
around the globe, which in many countries helps to mobilize the grassroots.
Another case worth exploring in detail is the film “Invasion” produced 
and aired by Polish public television’s info channel, TVPInfo, on the eve 
of the October 2019 parliamentary elections. The film focused on LGBT 
organizations and Pride Marches organized in several Polish cities in 2019, 
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employing what appeared to be “investigative” journalist techniques. One 
of the main protagonists – a TVP journalist, a young woman – infiltrates an 
LGBT organization, going undercover as a volunteer in order to reveal the 
activists’ supposedly devious intentions and illicit financial machinations. 
Despite these efforts, no incriminating evidence is found. Nonetheless, the 
film is constructed in such a way as to convince the viewer that an ugly 
truth is being uncovered. This aim is achieved mainly through the inclu-
sion of footage from other countries, especially Germany, and elaborate 
stylistic devices, such as dramatic music, sinister images shot at bizarre 
angles at LGBT marches, as well as intercutting images of sexually explicit 
demonstrators with shots of confused looking children.
The message of “Invasion” is simple: the proponents of gender and sexual 
equality are wolves in sheep’s clothing, dangerous ideologues claiming to 
fight discrimination, but in fact aiming to dismantle the “traditional” family, 
the nation and, ultimately, “Christian civilization.” Charges against the LGBT 
community include accusations of pedophilia and “Christianophobia,” and 
the desire to destroy the Catholic Church, portrayed as the healthy core 
of the Polish nation. Similarly to the American anti- gay- rights campaigners 
of the 1970s, who employed the conservative master frame of “saving our 
children” and “protecting the traditional family” (Fetner 2001; Johnson 
2018), Polish ultraconservatives spread false information suggesting that 
gay men are disproportionally more prone to pedophilia and that sex edu-
cation in schools is in fact just a smokescreen for the “sexualization” of 
children, which would make them easy prey for sexual predators. Several 
journalists and right- wing activists featured in the film (all of them middle- 
aged white men) insist in their commentaries that the LGBT movement is in 
fact pushing for “Pedo- Pride” – the normalization of pedophilia.
The film’s core claim is that “LGBT ideology” is an external force that 
aggressively targets religion and endangers the Polish nation. Historical ana-
logies to the Swedish, German and Russian invasions of the past are evoked 
to suggest that LGBT activists are inspired and paid for by foreign elites, that 
they are acting in the interests of the enemies of Poland. Consequently, the 
ultraconservatives and far- right groups were portrayed as valiant defenders 
of the homeland.
2019 was a watershed year for the home- grown LGBT movement 
in Poland. For the first time, Pride Marches were organized in over 30 
cities and towns, including areas where PiS and its allies had considerable 
power. “Invasion” aimed to discredit these developments by insisting that 
the movement is in fact foreign- bred, an invasion from the outside. The 
authors of the documentary portrayed “LGBT ideology” as the work of 
a dangerous and powerful international network, with headquarters in 
Germany, which continuously attacks and provokes Catholics and Polish 
patriots. The aim was to prove to Poles that ordinary citizens are victims 
of leftists’ provocations, not perpetrators of anti- LGBT discrimination 
and violence. Pride Marches were portrayed in the film as a deliberate 
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effort of the “LGBT lobby” to provoke violence and pose as victims. This 
victim- perpetrator reversal, a classic tool of right- wing populists, allows 
violence to be justified as self- defense. The film should be viewed in the 
context of rising homophobic violence, e.g. the attacks on participants of 
the Equality March in Białystok in July 2019, when tear gas was deployed 
against aggressive far- right groups, and several people were injured. In 
“Invasion,” the attacks were portrayed as a desperate reaction of des-
perate “normal people” assaulted by the all- powerful “homo- lobby.” It 
is debatable whether the film merely aimed to justify the violence that 
had already occurred, or in fact constituted an incitement for further vio-
lence. The latter possibility was suggested by the Poland’s Human Rights 
Ombudsman, Adam Bodnar, in his official statement published on 21 
November 2019, condemning the film as giving permission for violence, 
justified as defense against the enemy (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich 
2019). Novelist Jacek Dehnel (2019) compared the Białystok events to 
a pogrom, thus drawing a powerful link between antisemitic and homo-
phobic violence in Poland.
How the East will save the West: moral geography of anti- gender 
campaigns and worldview
The Polish case attests to the existence of an imagined moral geography of 
anti- genderism, which is based on assigning Central and Eastern Europe 
a special position vis- à- vis the West. The West is often portrayed in anti- 
gender discourse as the source of moral decay and contagion, whereas the 
East remains a region relatively untouched by and robustly resistant to the 
corruption resulting from sexual revolution. Some anti- gender authors in 
the region have identified genderism as a left- over from communism, a form 
of cultural Marxism (e.g. Nykiel and Oko), but this view is entirely con-
sistent with the narrative of Western colonization expounded by others (e.g. 
Kuby and Peeters). The colonizer is not the West as such but a West whose 
healthy (Christian) core has been destroyed by neo- Marxism and feminism 
already in the 1960s. Eastern Europe and Poland are singled out as the 
region whose inhabitants are aware of the dangers of Marxism and com-
munism, and hence are able to oppose the global colonizers. Thus, as we 
have shown in previous chapters, the region is often praised for the strength 
of its resistance by both European and American figures.
Such praise is much appreciated by local exponents of the movement. 
Prominent Polish anti- gender author Marzena Nykiel ends her book with a 
quotation from Michael Jones’s enthusiastic affirmation of Poland’s special 
mission in the global culture war:
It is Poland’s calling to save the West. Jan Sobieski came to Vienna with 
his cavalry and thus saved the West and saved Christianity. Now there is 
a new enemy at our gates. The new enemy is Wilhelm Reich and sexual 
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education. The world looks to Poland with hope that Poland shall save 
the West once again.
(Nykiel 2014: 305, our translation)
In 2019 Jones was hosted as a guest by far- right online TV outlet wrealu24! 
To the interviewer’s delight, he drew an analogy between Poland as a savior 
of the Catholic Church and the Horse Lords of Rohan from the popular 
Tolkien saga, who saved the realm of people against the forces of Mordor 
(wrealu24! 2019).
The excesses of right- wing rhetoric should not blind us to the political sig-
nificance of such exchanges. For a long time, Poland and other post- socialist 
countries appeared to many Western observers as in need of support, help 
and advice; as “laggards” in regard to democracy in general, as well as 
gender equality and sexual democracy in particular. Contemporary right- 
wing discourse reverses this relationship: the East is cast as the conservative 
world’s avant- garde and possibly a savior of the West.
This shift is related to the ways in which global conservative networks are 
constructed. Whereas in the 1980s and early 1990s Western conservatives 
worked hard to include “third world” actors (Bob 2012), since 1989 the 
alliances have tended to attach more significance to Eastern Europe and 
Russia. The vision of Russia as a country destined to become the savior of 
European civilization is a central tenet not only of Russian anti- genderism 
(Moss 2017), but more generally of the Messianic nationalist ideology 
whose central proponent is Alexander Dugin. Similar claims have been made 
regarding countries such as Armenia (Shirinian 2020), Bulgaria (Darakchi 
2019) and Croatia (Brakus 2018), not only by local activists and politicians, 
but also by the representatives of transnational networks such as Tradition, 
Family and Property (Datta 2019). Here is an example of such discourse 
from the TFP website:
In the past, Croatia was known as the Shield of Christendom thanks to 
her glorious defense of Europe against Mohammedan invasions. Today, 
we can deem it as the Shield of the Family. May her example be followed 
in the West and throughout the world!
(Campos 2014)
As shown by Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga, today it is Russia and 
Eastern and Central Europe that lead the way in re- imagining and pro-
moting conservatism “as an intellectual and political counter- movement 
to liberalism and socialism” (2019: 10). What appears to be a key to the 
success of this endeavor is a reinterpretation of transition as imposed imita-
tion. Whereas the liberal understanding of transition focuses on strenuous 
and not always successful efforts to catch up with the West, the conservative 
framing highlights the East’s cultural sovereignty and the need to defend 
it against Western influence. Over the years, the refusal to imitate western 
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ways became the core source of identity for populists and their electorates. 
Jarosław Kaczyński has often stated that it is high time for Poles to “rise 
from our knees,” to refuse to be “shamed” – and effectively colonized – by 
Western liberal elites and their local allies. In their widely discussed book 
The Light that Failed (2019) Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes examine the 
power and consequences of this idea:
The striving of ex- communist countries to emulate the West after 
1989 has been given an assortment of names – Americanisation, 
Europeanisation, democratisation, liberalisation, enlargement, integra-
tion, harmonisation, globalisation and so forth – but it has always sig-
nified modernisation by imitation and integration by assimilation. After 
the communist collapse, according to Central Europe’s populists, liberal 
democracy became a new, inescapable orthodoxy.
(2019: 7)
What is troubling about Krastev and Holmes’s conceptualization is that 
they appear to take the populist rhetoric of imitation at face value, blaming 
western liberalism for its failure to take into account Eastern Europe’s desire 
for authenticity and recognition. What the book fails to acknowledge is 
that authenticity, shame and sovereignty are carefully designed rhetorical 
constructs, meant to fuel resentment and mobilize the people against liberal 
democracy. Moreover, it is a mistake to follow the populists in collapsing 
the difference between liberal democracy and neoliberalism. The authors of 
The Light that Failed do not appreciate the fact that Eastern and Central 
Europe received a package deal from the West; liberalism as an ideology and 
practice based on liberty, freedom and equality before the law came together 
with an economic regime and value system promoting rampant individu-
alism, a small state and the decay of social citizenship. While the definition 
of liberalism is highly contested, we can safely assume that what most Poles 
and Hungarians hoped for in 1989 was system akin to the Swedish welfare 
state of the seventies, which combined individual freedoms with economic 
opportunities. What they got, however, was closer to the American model 
in the eighties, characterized by a propensity for nurturing inequalities 
and proudly announcing that from now on it is “every man for himself.” 
Analogously to Janos Kis, who famously said that “What we wanted was 
civil society, and what we got were non- governmental organizations,” we 
can conclude that what Eastern Europeans wanted was liberal democracy, 
and what they got was neoliberal governance.
In the narrative promulgated by right- wing populists, liberalism is per-
sistently conflated with what the left calls neoliberalism, so that legitimate 
grievances concerning economic injustice can be seamlessly transformed 
into mobilization against liberal democracy. Anti- gender rhetoric is what 
mediates this elision: in order to harness grievances and frustrations resulting 
from the present stage of capitalism and the high social costs of systemic 
transformation, right- wing populists demonize “decadent elites” and the 
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sexual revolution. Our point in this book is that the success of contem-
porary right- wing populism is owed largely to its ability to moralize issues 
and concerns that the left would like to frame in economic terms.
Poland has become a key battleground in a reactionary effort to “save” 
civilization from genderism not only because it is a Catholic country, but 
also because here the right had already been successful in mobilizing the 
anxieties resulting from neoliberal reforms by playing on anti- elitist resent-
ment (Ekiert and Kubik 2001; Ost 2005; Stanley 2017). Politically, what 
followed the first wave of anti- genderism is the Law and Justice party 
regime: an authoritarian and conservative version of welfare state, with pro- 
natalist policies, cash transfers to parents and a strong focus on heterosexual 
family. These developments were legitimized through a prideful narrative of 
resistance to colonization and shaming, a rhetoric largely absent in the West, 
where the history of actual colonialism is being downplayed by the populist 
right in the context of the current migration crisis.
Contrary to Paternotte and Kuhar (2018) we claim that the East- West divide 
is very much relevant to the development of the anti- gender movement. The 
relationship between populism and gender equality is clearly highly dependent 
on the national context, while the moral geography of anti- genderism is best 
understood by analyzing who is seen as colonizer/ invader and who is being 
colonized/ invaded. In Western Europe it is mostly Muslim immigrants who 
are targeted by the extreme right as barbarian invaders, whereas “genderists” 
are critiqued as those who facilitate their uncontrolled influx. In Eastern 
Europe after 2015, when the anti- refugee panic subsided, hate campaigns 
have been aimed primarily at proponents of gender and sexual equality, while 
immigrants have featured as secondary targets, a more distant threat than 
the “LGBT invasion” from the West. One could say that it is a matter of 
emphasis rather than a substantial ideological difference, which attests to the 
opportunistic nature of right- wing populism, its thin- centeredness (Mudde 
and Kaltwasser 2017). Examples of transnational alliances of right- wing 
populist and nationalist actors with anti- gender movements show that such 
differences are easily overcome through the common ground: a worldview 
in which social conservatism, misogyny and xenophobia come in various 
shades and proportions, but are always interconnected.
In view of these developments, Poland should not be seen as an excep-
tional or provincial case but rather as a paradigmatic one, an important pre-
dictor for possible future trends in Western Europe. Given the current rise of 
gendered nationalism and right- wing populism in countries such as the U.S., 
Sweden, Germany and France, it is clear that the ultraconservative efforts to 
undermine the hegemonic position of liberal democracy as a political and 
intellectual project have gone global.
Theoretical and political implications of the anti- colonial frame
This chapter has shown how the use of the anti- colonial frame facilitates the 
collaboration between the anti- gender movement and right- wing populists. 
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It is worth considering the theoretical implications of this trend for both 
postcolonial studies and feminism. As many authors have pointed out, anti- 
colonialism has historically taken many forms in different contexts:
it is sometimes associated with an ideology of racial liberation [...] it 
may accompany a demand for a recognition of cultural differences on 
a broad and diverse front [... and] was often articulated in terms of a 
radical, Marxist discourse of liberation.
(Ashcroft et al. 1998: 12; see also Warren 2017)
Scholars who, like ourselves, have examined references to colonialism in con-
temporary right- wing discourse often suggest that it is an inherent problem 
with postcolonialism itself that makes the seemingly hostile takeover 
unavoidable: namely, the tendency to essentialize cultures, and to validate 
authenticity and the local at the expense of the foreign and universal (e.g. 
Snochowska- Gonzalez 2012; Bill 2014). They also highlight the tendency 
of postcolonial theory to define imperialism mainly in cultural terms while 
disregarding material reality (Snochowska- Gonzalez 2012: 720). Stanley Bill 
asserts that “postcolonial theory defends the specificity of local cultures but 
in doing so it risks falling into a form of ‘culturalism’ ” (2014: 6). A similar 
argument about postcolonial theory is put forth by other scholars, including 
Vivek Chibber, whose controversial book on Subaltern Studies predicts that 
“while postcolonialism presents itself as the new face of radical critique, as 
the leading edge of criticism in an age of global capitalism, its arguments res-
urrect key pillars of conservative ideology” (2013: 286). The case of Poland 
confirms that the notion of colonization is remarkably adaptable to right- 
wing populist discourse, and it can be effectively used in countries with no 
obvious colonial history as a powerful signifier for humiliation that needs 
to be resisted.
As an ideology, anti- genderism interpellates subjects as victims of a global 
conspiracy, manipulated by the neoliberal elites targeting their true nature as 
men, women and children, as mothers and fathers. This idea is used to pre-
sent the new religious conservatism and right- wing populism as legitimate 
and just, helping to mobilize individuals on a mass scale in what appears as 
a vastly de- politicized modern world. This new ideological configuration, 
one that links gender conservatism and critique of neoliberalism, has pro-
found implications for any attempt on the left to develop effective strategies 
to counteract right- wing populism.
The consequences of our findings for feminist theory and practice are 
urgent and somewhat unsettling. First, it is useful to consider certain intri-
guing affinities between anti- gender discourse and recent interventions in 
feminist theory concerning the relationship between feminism and neo-
liberalism. The anti- genderist conceptualization of feminism, equating it 
with rampant individualism, with feminists as heralds of neoliberal glo-
balization, is reminiscent of Nancy Fraser’s influential argument about the 
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“perverse subterranean elective affinity” between feminism and neoliberalism 
(Fraser 2009: 108; see also Charkiewicz and Zachorowska- Mazurkiewicz 
2009; Eisenstein 2012; McRobbie 2009). While acknowledging her critics’ 
objections that her narrative overgeneralizes the faults of contemporary 
U.S. feminism and elides the heterogeneity of women’s movements world-
wide (Aslan and Gambetti 2011; Funk 2012), we nonetheless share Fraser’s 
concern that “the cultural changes jump- started by the second wave [of fem-
inism], salutary in themselves, have served to legitimate a structural trans-
formation of capitalist society that runs directly counter to feminist visions 
of a just society” (2009: 99). Her pessimistic diagnosis is accurate as far as 
the internationally successful part of Western feminism is concerned – pre-
cisely the part caricatured as “colonialist” by the anti- gender movement.
Leftist critics of feminism’s affinity with, or seduction by, neoliberalism 
view the two as separate currents that converged in some contexts and 
at a certain point in time, a development they perceive as an unfortunate 
anomaly, a betrayal of the original spirit of feminism as a movement for 
social justice. This is also our view of the matter. From the right- wing per-
spective, the story is much simpler: feminism has always been part and parcel 
of the neoliberal project, which sells rampant individualism as emancipa-
tion, corroding community and family. Obviously, the proposed solutions 
to the neoliberal crisis are also irreducibly different: socialist reforms in one 
case and gender re- traditionalization in the other.
The two critiques of neoliberalism clearly converge in their concern with 
the undervaluing of care, the dismantling of welfare provisions and the effects 
of these trends on women and families. We are profoundly skeptical about 
the possibility of dialogue or cooperation with anti- genderists, but we do 
believe that the current political configuration opens up new possibilities for 
feminist strategizing. In fact, a new wave of feminist mobilizations in Poland 
and other countries testifies to this change (see Chapter 6). Paradoxically, 
right- wing populism has ushered the problems of care and parenthood into 
public debate, which may be seen as an entry point for feminist activists to 
re- claim the territory of care, social provisions, welfare and community in 
the future. Contemporary women’s movements appear much more set on 
representing “the people,” taking a critical stand toward neoliberalism and 
the crumbling of the welfare state (Arruzza et al. 2019; Di Marco 2020; 
Gunnarsson Payne 2020a, 2020b; Roth 2020).
Our analysis may also have implications for the decades- long alliance 
between feminism and postcolonial theory. Our findings are compatible with 
some critiques of the inherent flaws of postcolonial theory, although they do 
not depend on them. It is of secondary importance to our study whether or 
not conservative uses of postcolonial theory are interpreted as a hostile take-
over or as an inevitable effect of features of the theory itself (Warren 2016). 
The key point is that this emergent trend can effectively undermine advances 
of both transnational and local feminisms and left- wing movements around 
the globe. Those on the liberal left who believe that postcolonial theory 
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offers tools to counteract right- wing forces need to acknowledge that the 
anti- colonial frame is routinely being put to use by these actors, and with 
remarkable success. To grasp the implications of this trend is to acknow-
ledge that we are facing a new political reality.
Conclusion
The anti- colonial frame plays a central role in the war against gender, and 
more broadly in the contemporary resurgence of right- wing populism 
opposing corrupt liberal elites and authentic conservative people. This is 
not just a rhetorical embellishment, but a set of beliefs crucial to the coher-
ence of anti- genderism as an ideology and to the movement’s identity as a 
coalition of diverse groups within and across national boundaries. It is also 
a key element facilitating the opportunistic synergy between the anti- gender 
movement and right- wing populists.
Firstly, the anti- colonial frame determines the targets of hate campaigns; 
they tend to be transnational bodies and policies regarding gender equality, 
as well as minority groups that are positioned as elites. Anti- genderism and 
right- wing populism both vilify not only global/ transnational institutions 
but also liberal governments, which are accused of collusion with genderists, 
e.g. by implementing transnational treaties on gender equality, and all non- 
conforming populations, such as the LGBT community. Secondly, the anti- 
colonial frame allows for alliances between actors and organizations in 
various locations: it is always the local, authentic, indigenous culture, the 
local traditional family (whatever its tradition) that is under threat and in 
need of protection. Anti- colonialism is a populist meta- discourse that trumps 
some local particularisms and geopolitical conflicts; it presents itself as an 
effort to defend ordinary people, the poor, the helpless, the abused against a 
network of corrupt global elites. Finally, skillful use of the anti- colonial frame 
allows for successful mobilization at the grassroots. It appeals to constitu-
encies that had not previously construed themselves in political terms, such 
as parents. As we further elaborate in Chapter 5, conservative parenthood 
has emerged globally as a new political identity, a site of social solidarity 
and a form of resistance in relation to the state, transnational institutions, 
the market and feminism, which is viewed here primarily as a form of indi-
vidualism (Fábián and Korolczuk 2017). Within this framework, feminism 
is presented as an integral part of neoliberalism, while the traditional family 
becomes the last frontier of resistance, a place where there is still hope and 
a sense of community. It is a narrative with enormous affective power, one 
that endows subjects with a sense of dignity and collective agency, while at 
the same time giving voice to anxiety, which results from increasingly pre-
carious working and living conditions under global capitalism.
Relying on this anti- colonial frame, the Law and Justice party can insist 
that it is continuously under attack, thus justifying the sweeping changes they 
introduce, the colonization of the political- institutional infrastructure of the 
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state (e.g. Bill and Stanley 2020). By employing such discourse the right also 
strives to delegitimize its political opponents, to undermine the left- wing 
monopoly on voicing critique toward capitalism and to offer a new version 
of cultural universalism, an illiberal one. In short, anti- genderism has become 
the new language of anti- capitalist mobilization. This may seem paradox-
ical from the American perspective, given the persistent alliance between 
neoconservatism and neoliberalism in the U.S. (cf. Brown 2006, 2019), but 
the U.S. may be an exception rather than the rule. Globally, contemporary 
right- wing movements and ideologies tend to be illiberal and populist: at 
the core of their ideology is an equation between neoliberalism and indi-
vidualism as a value system and ideological project, which heralds human 
rights and gender equality to colonize the world’s impoverished nations. In 
effect, right- wing critique of neoliberalism and globalization takes the shape 
of anti- feminist mobilization, and employs the anti- colonial frame as its key 
discursive strategy.
Note
 1 All quotations from the World Congress of Families in Verona used in this chapter 




5  Anxious parents and children 
in danger
The family as a refuge from 
neoliberalism
On 13 January 2013, hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets 
of Paris to oppose the legalization of gay marriage. Many of them were 
parents with young children and the main slogans of La Manif Pour Tous, 
as the protest was named, included the call to resist the familiophobie of 
the state administration and to defend the “natural family” (Fassin 2014; 
Môser 2020). In Germany, in the southern and western regions of Baden- 
Württemberg and Cologne, an alliance called Concerned Parents (Besorgte 
Eltern) organized a series of protest in 2014 to oppose the new sex educa-
tion curriculum initiated by the coalition of the Green Party and the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany. They, too, protested with slogans such as 
“Marriage and Family! Stop gender ideology and sexualization of our chil-
dren!” (Bluhm 2015: 47– 48). Very similar arguments were made by people 
protesting against the No Outsiders program, which was introduced in 
Birmingham and other British cities to familiarize pupils with gender and 
sexual diversity. Local Muslim leaders mobilized parents to picket in front 
of schools with slogans such as “Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve” 
and “We have a say in what they learn” (BBC News 2019). In the Czech 
Republic, conservative women formed a group called Angry Mothers to 
fight feminism, “genderism” and immigration. The group’s leader took the 
stage during an anti- immigration protest in Prague in 2015, explaining:
Today, I wish to speak on behalf of women, mothers, and, most of all, 
angry mothers. Because we, women, are more sensitive when it comes 
to injustice. We are not afraid to use our instincts that help us protect 
our kids from dangers and threats. And we feel very much threatened 
these days.
(Svatonova 2019)
In Poland, an important site of anti- gender mobilization was the mass par-
ental movement “Save the Little Ones!”, which emerged in 2009 after the 
government announced its plans to lower the compulsory school age from 7 
to 6. Originally, the protesters were opposing the planned reforms and gen-
erally the low quality of education in Poland. But when the “war on gender” 
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hit the media in 2012, they joined forces with anti- genderists in contesting 
sex education in schools and the ratification of the Istanbul Convention.
While the specific causes for the mobilization of conservative groups 
varied, the main campaign slogans as well as the imagery employed were 
strikingly similar. All these movements referenced the need to protect chil-
dren and families, which resonated with conservative moral panics around 
the family worldwide. As Paternotte and Kuhar point out, anti- gender 
campaigns everywhere focused on the welfare of families, children and 
heterosexual marriage; they even employed strikingly similar symbols and 
graphics: silhouettes of parents holding hands or protective gestures sym-
bolizing the need to defend their kids (2017b: 269). The family resemblance 
among logos used by movements in various countries testifies to effective 
circulation of ideas and tactics across borders, but it also speaks to the 
power of the movement’s central ideas: the mobilization of parents and the 
politicization of parenthood.
Existing scholarship analyzing anti- gender campaigns tends to interpret 
the “child in danger” imagery as a strategy of legitimization, explaining that 
“the Western construction of ‘child innocence’ is a particularly effective frame, 
which can rally larger crowds than anti- gender claims alone” (Paternotte and 
Kuhar 2017b: 265). Indeed, claiming to represent the interests of parents 
and children and to defend “family values” has been a tried and tested 
strategy of conservative cultural warriors worldwide. “Saving the children” 
was one of the rallying cries of the right throughout the political struggle 
known as the “culture wars,” which emerged in the U.S. in the mid- 1970 in 
response to new social movements demanding gender and sexual equality 
(Bob 2012; Hartman 2015). Among the precursors of contemporary anti- 
LGBT rhetoric was Anita Bryant, a modestly successful singer and former 
beauty queen, who formed the organization Save Our Children Inc. in 1977 
in an effort to prevent equal rights for gays and lesbians in Florida (Johnson 
2018). In a fundraising letter she proclaimed:
I don’t hate the homosexuals! But as a mother, I must protect my chil-
dren from their evil influence. […] They want to recruit your children 
and teach them the virtues of becoming homosexual.
(Fetner 2001: 411)
Calling on parents to defend their children from homosexuals is more than 
a mere rhetorical strategy. Anti- gender groups have recognized the political 
potential of deeply felt familial identities, roles and experiences and have 
managed to capture it. While there is nothing inherently conservative about 
parenthood and care, it is also true that progressive movements such as 
feminism have largely neglected this issue (Eisenstein 2012; Fraser 2009; 
Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2015; Graff 2014b; Kováts 2020). Meanwhile, the 
populist right has made parenthood its focus, monopolizing issues such 
as broadly defined child welfare, parental rights and the well- being of the 
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family (in the conservative version the family is of course nuclear, hetero-
sexual and bounded by marriage).
The strategy of mobilizing parents has been so effective because it harnesses 
the emotional dimension of politics, something that liberals often distance 
themselves from. During the last decade or so, the political, cultural and 
social dimension (or sociality) of emotions and the political consequences of 
“public feelings” became the object of interest of sociologists, many of them 
feminist and queer studies scholars (Ahmed 2004; Illouz 2007; Kosofsky 
Sedgwick 2003). As Eva Illouz put it:
Emotion is certainly a psychological entity, but it is no less and per-
haps more so a cultural and social one: through emotion we enact cul-
tural definitions of personhood as they are expressed in concrete and 
immediate but always culturally and socially defined relationships. […] 
Emotions are deeply internalized and unreflexive aspects of action, but 
not because they do not contain enough culture and society in them, but 
rather because they have too much.
(2007: 3)
Among political emotions, shame holds a particularly significant position. 
It is more than just one of many emotions. A powerful negative affect, it is 
the reaction to not being recognized, to the failure of communication that 
constitutes identity. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick emphasizes the link between 
shame and identity, claiming that the relationship is “at once deconstructing 
and foundational, because shame is both peculiarly contagious and peculi-
arly individuating” (2003: 36). It is this link that gives shame its political 
potential: shame undermines identity but also leads to efforts to re- build 
identity. Sara Ahmed also points at the transpersonal dimension of shame, 
as distinct from guilt: the latter involves the subject’s recognition of the 
badness of an action, but the former touches the entire self, it is “bound 
up with self- recognition” (2004: 114). Shame is an emotion that produces 
social hierarchies. Once transformed into righteous anger, it becomes a 
powerful tool for political mobilization (Jasper 2011). This is precisely what 
the populist right have achieved through anti- gender campaigns: they have 
managed to present the feminist and LGBT movements as shamers of the 
masses and enemies of the common people. Similarly effective have been the 
efforts to instigate fear that sex educators and trans men will harm children. 
The ultimate message is shame on you if you cannot prevent the demoral-
ization of your own child.
This politics of emotions has been combined with policy measures 
designed to cater to families. Contemporary right- wing populist parties 
such as Law and Justice and Fidesz recognize the potential of parents as 
an electorate and have invested in a host of pro- family social policies, some 
of them quite generous. Since 2015 Law and Justice has introduced sev-
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(direct cash transfer of 500 PLN monthly for each child), increased finan-
cing of child care (from 151 million PLN in 2015 to 450 in 2018) and 
increased general public spending on pro- family policy from 1.78 percent 
of Poland’s GDP in 2015 to 3.11 percent in 2017 (Gov.pl 2020; MRPiPS 
2019). Ultraconservative organizations, such as Ordo Iuris, have whole-
heartedly supported these changes, presenting themselves as experts and key 
advisers of the Law and Justice government in the realm of family policy. 
In Hungary, no significant anti- gender movement exists, but the anti- gender 
discourse has also been adopted by Fidesz (Kováts and Pető 2017). Right- 
wing populists readily adopted welfare chauvinism, which combines gen-
erous social policies with ultraconservative rhetoric (Grzebalska and Pető 
2018; Kováts 2020; Cinpoes and Norocel 2020). These policies include a 
30,000 EUR interest- free loan for every married couple if the woman is 
between 18 and 40 years old and pregnant, subsidized loans for such couples 
to build or buy a house, and grants to buy a bigger family car. Furthermore, 
mothers of at least four children are exempt for life from personal income 
tax, while grandparents can receive a bonus if they are willing to care for 
their grandchildren. As anonymous authors explain on the official web-
site of the Hungarian’s government: “God, marriage, family and children. 
There is an authenticity about Hungary’s policies that speaks to Europe 
in these ancient, foundational times” (About Hungary 2020). In the light 
of these data we can safely claim that scared and concerned faces of little 
children in the anti- gender propaganda are not just an effort to provoke 
fear of genderism, but also a public relations strategy of right- wing populist 
governments, promoting the pro- family policies.
There is a fine line between instrumentalization and politicization of pre- 
existing identities, and we believe that in this case we are dealing with both. 
Religious groups and right- wing populists have a long history of strategic-
ally presenting themselves as apolitical grassroots movements of traditional 
families in order to attract wider social support. However, it is also true that 
grassroots movements of parents sometimes embrace conservative agendas 
and oppose sex education in schools, non- normative family arrangements, 
and sexual and reproductive rights (e.g. Höjdestrand 2017; Fabian and 
Korolczuk 2017; Fassin 2014). In our view, there are at least three distinct 
ways in which the rhetoric of politicized parenthood is used in anti- gender 
campaigns. First, in some cases, e.g. the World Congress of Families, anti- 
gender activists and right- wing politicians strategically pose as a pro- family 
movement, in order to downplay and sanitize what is effectively a radical 
ultraconservative agenda. The second way in which parenthood becomes 
politicized is when ultraconservative actors effectively appeal to parents 
whose original grievances were framed in purely pragmatic terms (as in the 
case of “Save the Little Ones!”). Third, some grassroots parental networks 
exhibit an ultraconservative orientation from the start: they oppose sex 
education, abortion and divorce. Such groups have readily joined the 
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scenarios show that the mass appeal of the anti- gender movement has much 
to do with the culturally entrenched idea that parents always have the best 
intentions with regard to their children. Speaking as a parent is a way to 
authenticate one’s political engagement: parenthood is a form of political 
identity, wherein the personal becomes political, though not in the fashion 
envisioned by feminists. As we will demonstrate in this chapter, it is the 
ability to mobilize people as concerned parents that makes the movement 
so powerful and effective. Anti- gender rhetoric consistently sides with com-
munity against individualism, with family and love against loneliness and 
alienation, with solidarity against selfishness.
The dynamic in question is part of a larger trend of populist mobilization 
of emotions such as fear and anger (Salmela and von Scheve 2017; Wodak 
2015). Right- wing populism transforms economic grievances into a moral 
division between Us and Them, juxtaposing the people and corrupt elites, 
hence it is sometimes interpreted as moralized anti- pluralism (e.g. Mueller 
2016). We complement this argument by showing that parenthood and 
family have become the terrain where this moralization takes place. Without 
explicitly mentioning neoliberalism, conservative discourses on family and 
parenthood effectively harness legitimate anger and shame stemming from 
the neoliberal condition. As observed by Sauer, it is primarily men who are 
targeted by this discourse, while masculinity is invoked as a fragile identity 
in crisis:
[…] right- wing populist parties across Europe […] try to capture the 
fears of insecurity in the relations between men and women, the shame 
of “failed patriarchs,” in order to safeguard against commodification of 
labor and life, by restoring the inequality of gender relations. Moreover, 
neoliberal affective strategies of self- entrepreneurship, of competition 
and insecurity have created masculinist affective subjectivities – entitled 
to compensate for fear and shame by anger and irresponsibility for 
others.
(Sauer 2020: 33)
As we have shown in the previous chapter, a key element of the anti- gender 
campaigns was the narrative of “colonization” threatening local cultures. 
Indeed, most grassroots parental mobilizations pride themselves on being 
authentic and home- grown, representing the true voice of ordinary people, 
their everyday needs and grievances. They also criticize the trend toward 
the professionalization and institutionalization of civil society, which makes 
citizens’ initiatives donor- dependent and accountable to foreign funders 
rather than to the constituencies they claim to represent. In the following 
analysis we show how right- wing populist discourses on gender employ pol-
itical emotions by appealing to people as members of families, actual or 
potential, and stigmatizing their political opponents as bearers of loneliness 
and alienation.
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Family heroes and motherless children: politicized parenthood in 
Verona and Paris
The first thing a participant of the 2019 World Congress of Families would 
see upon entering the Della Gran Guardia Palace in Verona was a huge banner 
announcing: “WELCOME FAMILY HEROES!” in both English and Italian. 
Indeed, panelists seemed to take on this very role in their speeches: they 
positioned themselves as heroic patriarchs and matriarchs, deeply concerned 
about the fate of the family – a sacred institution, the bulwark of Christian 
civilization. Talking about the family allowed the representatives of the 
movement, many of whom are affiliated with powerful religious institutions, 
to present their cause as one rooted in common sense and everyday experi-
ence rather than religion. Each panelist would start by mentioning his or 
her own family: their beloved wife or husband, their number of children 
(usually larger than three) and grandchildren. Their private lives as fathers 
and mothers, however, were not presented as the primary reason for public 
engagement. Rather, they served a strategic purpose: to avoid the stigma of 
hate- mongering bigots, add warmth to their public image and legitimize 
their engagement in political struggle (Kalm and Meuwisse 2020). The 
“heroes” were there to protect THE family, not their particular families. As 
we will see in the following section, this sets them apart from representatives 
of grassroots parental movements, who often perceive their public engage-
ment as an extension of their private, familial roles.
WCF participants demonstrated an awareness of the political power of 
the family as an image to be weaponized in the political struggle. Here is 
how Edward Habsburg- Lothringen, father of six, Austrian ambassador to 
the Holy See and an aristocrat with quite an impressive lineage, described it 
in his speech:
We need to use Twitter. The best is to talk with pictures about little family 
moments. Positive nice stories win hearts. Let us cater to people’s wish 
to have a family. And the real way to have a family is Christian family.1
In a similar vein, Claudio d’Amico, Lega party politician and member of 
the WCF executive committee, opened his talk with a touching story about his 
mother and the importance of love. He concluded with the statement: “Only 
the relation of a woman, man and children is a true family.”
In the WCF narrative “the family” is a discursive construct masking a 
homophobic and anti- choice agenda. The most important fact about their 
vision of “the family” is that this category excludes any familial configur-
ation other that the heterosexual married couples with children. Speakers 
appeared to take for granted that audience members would share this point 
of view; their talks were designed to provide not only a sense of community 
but also to instruct fellow activists on how to build a more palatable image 
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A somewhat different framing of family and parenthood, one that 
focuses mostly on kinship and biological reproduction, can be found in the 
French context. As many scholars note, the French anti- gender movement – 
represented primarily by La Manif Pour Tous (LMPT) – strives to downplay 
its religious origins and inspirations (e.g. Garbagnoli 2016; Môser 2020; 
Stambolis- Ruhstorfer and Tricou 2017). Instead, LMPT insists on its iden-
tity as a French movement, secular and firmly grounded in local civic cul-
ture. Thus, it routinely uses “symbolic repertoires of national symbols, past 
social movements and anti- capitalist rhetoric, with precise local resonance” 
(Stambolis- Ruhstorfer and Tricou 2017: 80).
An examination of the movement’s materials shows that this discourse 
is centered primarily around a particular understanding of filiation. Eric 
Fassin (2014) explains how filiation has been both biologized and sacralized 
in the French context, and how this way of thinking provides justification 
for opposition to gay marriage. Following legal scholar Daniel Borillo, 
Fassin elaborates:
if filiation is modeled after reproduction, then homosexuality could per-
haps find a place in parentalité (parenting), but it should certainly be 
excluded (by definition) from parenté (kinship) […]. Biology as a foun-
dational fiction has now become the last refuge of heteronormativity.
(2014: 286– 287)
This French construction of kinship explains why so much of La Manif 
Pour Tous propaganda focuses on protecting children from being denied the 
right to have both parents, or at least to know their identity. The alarmist 
tone of the movement’s rhetoric and a sense of acute danger threatening 
“the family,” however, are a common feature of most, if not, all anti- gender 
campaigns (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017).
LMPT’s visual trademark, featured on posters and banners used at 
demonstrations, shows the silhouette of a nuclear family with parents at the 
center, holding hands with two children. Many slogans stress the importance 
of fertility, reproduction and “natural” kinship, that is one based on bio-
logical parenthood and the legal recognition thereof. This agenda stems from 
LMPT’s adamant stance against gay marriage, surrogacy and availability 
of in vitro fertilization techniques for same- sex couples and single women. 
One prominent slogan, employed continuously at demonstrations on various 
issues, references the French revolution: “Liberté, Égalité, Paternité!” stressing 
the key role of parenthood and biological kinship ties to the French identity. 
Another demonstration poster proclaims: “There are no eggs in the testicles,” 
stressing that only heterosexual couples can produce offspring and warning 
against the chaos that will inevitably ensue if biomedicine is made available 
to same- sex couples (Liberation 2013). In response to the proliferation of 
assisted reproductive technologies, which opens up the way to new family 
configurations, separating genetic from gestational and social motherhood 
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and fatherhood, activists take to the streets with slogans such as “Tell me 
daddy, what is it like to have a mommy?”; “I am a man, not a sperm- donor” 
or “She doesn’t need a man, but don’t the children need a father?”
Some of the imagery used in this context denounces the exploitation of 
the women’s bodies, as exemplified by a poster featuring a pregnant woman’s 
belly with a barcode. The accompanying slogan opposes the French court’s 
decision to allow the adoption of a child born in Canada through gestational 
surrogacy. The LMPT president, Ludovine de La Rochère, claims that the 
possibility to conceal the identity of a surrogate mother is a violation of the 
fundamental rights of women and children: “The child is not born without a 
mother! The child is born from an unknown mother – and this is unaccept-
able!” (La Manif Pour Tous, 2018). In a similar vein, in February 2019 the 
activists issued a press statement protesting against the replacement of the 
terms “father” and “mother” in children’s school documentations with 
the words “parent one” and “parent two”:
We are all born from a father and a mother. This reality is incontest-
able and provides the basis for human equality. This equality is to be 
preserved just as the family, the primary space of solidarity and refuge 
for the vulnerable, especially in periods of crisis.
(La Manif Pour Tous, 2019, our translation)
Although the issue of surrogacy is especially prominent in France due to 
current debates on regulations concerning such procedures, the topic has a 
well- established place in the anti- gender movements’ political agenda. The 
Verona Declaration of 2019 includes the following strategic goal: “An inter-
national ban on surrogacy of any kind – a total prohibition on trade or 
donation of gametes – for the woman is not an incubator and the child is 
not a product” (WCF Verona Declaration, 2019). The movement’s phil-
osophy as pronounced in the Declaration expresses profound distrust toward 
capitalism’s impact on family life and the value of the human being. Notably, 
however, nowhere is the word capitalism itself used. Instead, the document’s 
authors employ phrasing such as “the current cultural and economic crisis” 
or “commodification” of human relations and bodies. Their position is 
articulated in terms of morality and values, rather than systemic critique:
Sustainable economic development is not possible without reaffirming 
the profound link that must exist between economics and morality: the 
well- being of the human person must always take precedence over the 
pursuit of profit.
(WCF Verona Declaration, 2019)
In this perspective, the family – and more specifically the parent- child bond, 
both biological and social – becomes a sanctuary protecting people from 
the greed of markets and the alienating and uncontrollable developments in 
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science, epitomized by l’idéologie du genre. In the words of Giorgia Meloni, 
leader of the far- right party Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia):
[The enemies of the family] would like us to no longer have an identity 
and just become slaves, the perfect consumers. And so national identity, 
religious identity, gender identity and family identity are under attack. I 
must not be able to define myself as Italian, Christian, woman, mother – 
no, I must be citizen x, gender x, parent 1, parent 2, I must be a number. 
Because when I am only a number, when I no longer have an identity, 
when I no longer have roots, then I’ll be the perfect slave at the mercy of 
huge financial speculation. The perfect consumer.
(Transcript from the speech at WCF in Verona, 2019. 
Translation: Cecilia Santilli)
References to “financial speculations” function in radical right discourse as 
code for Jews, and are readily recognized as such by like- minded audiences 
(Wodak 2018). Meloni comes remarkably close to naming the enemy as 
Jews, but she does not do so for good reason. The anti- gender movements’ 
version of conspiratorial thinking avoids explicit antisemitism and prefers to 
target consumerism and modernity in general. The family appears as the last 
frontier of opposition to global markets and their sinister power to deprive 
people of identity.
In both Verona and Paris the opposition to new types of familial 
configurations is framed in a secular discourse that is universalistic (in refer-
encing human rights), and anti- neoliberal (in its critique of commodification 
and commercialization of reproduction). The absence of religious claims 
may come as a surprise, given the roots of the anti- gender movement, but it 
testifies to its present- day political ambitions. Participants of the WCF are in 
fact ultraconservatives, some with fascist leanings, and the event’s focus on 
the family is aimed to convince the mainstream public that the movement 
is not to be feared. If we were to judge La Manif Pour Tous solely by its 
rhetoric, we may conclude that it is a movement of gender- traditionalists 
alarmed by social and cultural changes brought about by sexual revolu-
tion, women’s liberation and advances in reproductive medicine. Cornelia 
Möser documents, however, that the origins of LMPT lie in the cooperation 
between various far- right, religious and neo- Nazi organizations: Action 
Française, the Renouveau Français, Parti de la France and various funda-
mentalist Christian anti- abortion groups (2020:120). Thus, the defense of 
the family and the mobilization of parenthood becomes a smokescreen for 
what is really a far- right political project. While the term family is repeated 
endlessly in anti- gender discourse and while it is sentimentalized to convey 
love, connection and community, the actual aim is that of gaining polit-
ical power. As Claudio D’Amico, a prominent Lega member, proclaimed 
in Verona: “We will win in the next European elections, the pro- family 
[politicians] will be the majority in the European Parliament.”
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Parental movements as a conservative response to neoliberalism
There is an interesting difference between the rhetoric prevalent in Verona or 
Paris and the narratives disseminated by grassroots parental activists, espe-
cially in Eastern Europe. In France, where the status of citizen takes priority 
over private roles, such as mother and father, the anti- gender movement 
strives to include parenthood in the realm of politics. Hence the resonance 
of slogans such as “Liberté, Égalité, Paternité!” used by LMPT. In contrast, 
Polish or Czech activists tend to legitimize their claims by distancing them-
selves from politics and through references to apparently more “authentic” 
and culturally valued familial commitments (Korolczuk 2017; Kubik 2000; 
Svatonova 2019). Whereas the representatives of the WCF and LMPT often 
employ an abstract conceptualization of the family as a treasured value to 
be protected against “genderists,” in the Polish and Czech context leaders 
of conservative groups tend to legitimize their engagement by emphasizing 
their identity as parents or grandparents.
Existing analyses of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia 
show that many activists indeed perceive their social engagement as an exten-
sion of their parental experiences and identities (Fabian and Korolczuk 2017; 
Hryciuk 2017; Korolczuk 2017). It is as parents that they can transgress 
the public- private divide; they conceptualize political activism as a result of 
insights gained in the process of raising children. Being a parent is viewed as a 
morally superior position allowing people to be future- oriented and respon-
sible for the well- being of society. The mission statement of the socially con-
servative Mother and Father Foundation (Fundacja Mamy i Taty) states:
Nothing sharpens your social sensibility as much as becoming a parent. 
Thanks to our children we look at the world around us with new eyes, 
asking ourselves what has or can have influence on children’s upbringing, 
safety, and their future. Thus, it is not a coincidence that mothers and 
fathers often become leaders of different, very active social movements 
or consumer groups, motivated by honest concern for their children and 
their future.
(Fundacja Mamy i Taty 2020)
Very similar rhetoric is noted by Eva Svatonova (2019), who interviewed a 
number of women engaged in Czech anti- gender campaigns. When asked 
about motivations for joining the movement, one activist stated: “I did not 
engage in activism as a member of a party, but as a mother and a grand-
mother” (Svatonova 2019). It is this type of politicization of parenthood 
that we focus on in this chapter, aiming to explain the mass involvement of 
parents in anti- gender campaigns.
We draw mostly on examples from Central and Eastern Europe (including 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Ukraine) with the aim of shedding 
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region. We claim that the emotional power of anti- genderism may lie not 
only in effectively fueling the moral panic around “sexualization of chil-
dren,” but also in promoting and exploiting the view of the “traditional” 
family as a nexus of solidarity, the last frontier of social cohesion, a defense 
against rampant individualism and consumerism. These are not empty 
claims. Depending on the context and specific needs of local populations, 
the movements in question address the state’s failures in the realm of care 
(e.g. Hryciuk 2017). Opponents of “gender ideology” attribute the growing 
precariousness of everyday lives to the erosion of community and family 
for which they blame feminists and proponents of the sexual revolution. 
The source of hope, on the other hand, is in being together: as families, as 
communities, as good people who love their children. In effect, parental 
movements have evolved into an alternative to liberal civil society promoted 
in the transition era (Fabian and Korolczuk 2017; Kubik 2000).
In Poland, the parental movement with greatest public visibility was 
the mass resistance against the government’s plan to lower compulsory 
school age, which emerged around 2009 and later institutionalized into the 
“Ombudsman for Parents’ Rights” Foundation. Led by the couple Karolina 
and Tomasz Elbanowski, the “Save the Little Ones!” movement collected 
1.6 million signatures nationwide under petitions against this reform: early 
scholarization was demonized as an outrage against a carefree and innocent 
childhood. Mr. and Mrs. Elbanowski became household names in Poland 
due to their many public appearances and the media interest in their growing 
family (by 2018 they were proud parents of eight). They often talked about 
their children, claiming that their social engagement against school reform 
grows out of concern for the kids’ well- being. As a vivid example of building 
political capital on parenthood, the Elbanowskis initially presented the ini-
tiative as a politically neutral single- cause movement gathering people of 
diverse views and backgrounds, a grassroots rebellion against the repres-
sive school system. In 2012, however, they joined the unsuccessful cam-
paign against the ratification of the Istanbul Convention coordinated by the 
anti- gender alliance. By 2015 they were appointed as an advisory NGO by 
the Ministry of Education, generously funded by the Law and Justice gov-
ernment. This development illustrates what may seem as a cooptation of a 
grassroots movement, but can also be interpreted as a natural move for the 
leaders who never hid their socially conservative views on family life and 
parenthood.
A different trajectory is exemplified by the Mother and Father Foundation, 
which was openly ultraconservative from the outset. Its founders aimed to 
counteract cultural and social changes such as the proliferation of divorce, 
abortion and “homosexual propaganda” in schools and in media (Korolczuk 
2017). The foundation did not strive to become a mass movement, but 
strove to impact society through media campaigns condemning contra-
ception, divorce and LGBT activism. The 2019 campaign under the slogan 
“Marriage: Our way of life,” which aimed to promote heterosexual marriage, 
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was widely discussed in mainstream media, because it was financed from 
the Justice Fund, administered by the Ministry of Justice and earmarked 
for supporting the victims of crimes. Responding to the allegations of mis-
appropriation of funds, the foundation’s spokesman explained that they 
had analyzed Polish and international data on crime rates, and the results 
suggest that the type of family in which the children are raised influences the 
propensity to commit crimes in adulthood, and good, stable marriage can 
protect people from engaging in criminal activity (Fundacja Mamy i Taty 
2019). Echoing arguments used by the religious right in the U.S. in the 1970 
and 1980s (Dowland 2015), the Mother and Father Foundation presents 
the protection of family values as a remedy for social ills. At the same time, 
its representatives employ the language of human rights and freedoms, 
accusing the left, especially the LGBT movement, of hijacking and misusing 
these concepts.
These two parental initiatives emerged independently of each other 
around 2009 and eventually joined forces with the anti- gender movement. In 
both cases activists presented themselves as the advocates and protectors of 
children: while mobilization against education reform went public with the 
phrase “Save the Little Ones!”, the Mother and Father Foundation’s main 
slogan is “The Whole of Poland Protects Children.” As already indicated, 
similar initiatives emerged in many Eastern European countries. Czech 
parental groups, such as the Angry Mothers and the Czech Traditional 
Family, became key supporters of religious authorities and ultraconservative 
politicians opposing the ratification of the Istanbul Convention in 2018 
(Svatonova 2019). In the Ukrainian context, a socially conservative parents’ 
organization was established in 2011, called the Parents’ Committee of 
Ukraine, PCU (Roditel’skiy komitet Ukrainy) (Strelnyk 2017). The Russian 
grassroots mobilization in the defense of traditional family values included 
over 80 organizations, groups and networks that Tova Höjdestrand (2017) 
termed the Parents’ Movement (Roditel’skoe Dvizhenie). It is not only 
parents who get involved, however. As shown by Roman Kuhar (2017), in 
Slovenia the engagement of grandparents in the campaign around the second 
referendum on marriage equality led to a change in the logo used by the 
movement. All these initiatives have emerged prior to, or at the very begin-
ning of, anti- gender mobilizations in their respective contexts, responding to 
both the global economic crisis and to what at the time was seen as the vic-
tory of progressive liberalism (e.g. signaled by the legalization of marriage 
equality in many countries and EU- driven gender mainstreaming policies 
in CEE).
The ultraconservative response to neoliberalism merges cultural and eco-
nomic liberalism, presenting “the return to the family” as a viable alterna-
tive, both on the personal and political level. Ethnographic research confirms 
that many parental activists genuinely cherish conservative values as central 
to their worldview (Höjdestrand 2017; Strelnyk 2017; Svatonova 2019). 
It is as defenders of the “traditional family” that they oppose specific state 
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policies, such as cuts in welfare provisions, lack of economic support for 
families or lowering the school age in order for children to enter educational 
system and the work force sooner. Activists frame these problems in moral 
as well as economic terms: as changes paving the way for demoralization, 
rampant individualism, the demise of family and community, which leaves 
common people at the mercy of global economic powers.
Parent- activists often present themselves as defenders of true democ-
racy and rejuvenators of the spirit of community. A vivid example of such 
a stance is the report produced by the Mother and Father Foundation 
in Poland, entitled “Against Freedom and Democracy – The political 
strategy of the LGBT lobby in Poland and in the world: Goals, tools and 
consequences.” This document presents the fight against LGBT rights and 
gender equality education in schools as an expression of civic- mindedness, 
responsibility and commitment to the well- being of the larger community. 
In a similar vein, the Ordo Iuris Institute continuously engages parents 
of school children in petition drives against sex and anti- discriminatory 
education. In 2019 the foundation’s lawyers prepared a special website 
addressed to parents entitled Dla Rodziców (For Parents), featuring a guide-
book on “Parents’ Rights in Schools” and an information brochure “How 
to Stop Vulgar Sex Education in Schools?” Parents could also download 
a preformatted “Parental Declaration” to be submitted to the homeroom 
teacher at the beginning of a school year, preventing their child from taking 
part in any extracurricular activities that may have anything to do with 
gender, sexuality or anti- discrimination education. From a feminist perspec-
tive such efforts seem like examples of manipulation, but ultraconservatives 
view them as civic activism. As early as 2013 the ultraconservative pundit 
Tomasz Terlikowski claimed that parental initiatives, such as “Save the Little 
Ones!”, the Mother and Father Foundation and the Marches for Life and 
Family organized in several Polish cities, constitute evidence that “Polish 
civil society is thriving and the republican spirit is not dead” (2013).
The critique of individualism on the part of parental movements goes 
beyond the debate on lifestyle choices and demographic trends. It is highly 
emotional, but it is also issue- focused, and at times remarkably specific in 
its demands and grievances. Activists address specific social policies, e.g. 
cuts in the sphere of education which lead to the closing of local schools 
or the lack of investment in high quality care for children. In Poland, 
activists engaged in the “Save the Little Ones!” campaign not only opposed 
the school- age reform, but also advocated in favor of state subsidies for 
textbooks and educational materials for children. They also initiated an 
informational campaign helping parents to get tax exemptions. In Russia, 
most parental organizations combine advocacy, critique of the lack of public 
support for families and self- help activities. While Russian activists regu-
larly take part in writing petitions and organizing conferences, many of 
them have also engaged in organizing help for families in need: vacation 
homes for multiple- child families, summer camps or leisure activities for 
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whole families (Höjdestrand 2017). They stressed the need for solidarity 
and local community building and engaged in “grassroots charity,” e.g. in 
“assisting families in dire need by pooling resources (toys, clothes, money, 
help with renovations, legal advice, etc.) or finding others who can help 
out” (2017: 43). The Parents’ Committee of Ukraine, cooperating closely 
with the Orthodox Church, focused mostly on “anti- gender” education and 
advocacy, but even this organization occasionally addressed the economic 
and social conditions faced by parents in contemporary Ukraine (Strelnyk 
2017:65).
Analyses of parental mobilizations show that linking a socially conserva-
tive stance with opposition toward some aspects of consumerism and indi-
vidualism results in a very ambiguous relation to the state. Similarly to some 
feminist thinkers representing the maternalist strand (Ruddick 1995; O’Reilly 
2009), parental movements interpret the family as the basic social, economic 
and emotional unit, which stands in contrast to the neoliberal practice of 
individualism. Hence, both strands of activism call for policies that would 
protect and support families, such as sufficient maternal leave, cash transfers 
in the form of benefits paid to families with children or good quality educa-
tion. In contrast to feminists, however, conservative actors define the family 
very narrowly and do not recognize the rights and conflicting interests 
of individual members within the family. Hence, they oppose the state as 
the source of regulations influencing parent- child relations. For example, 
the representatives of the Polish parental organizations support the state’s 
more active role in providing for stay- at- home mothers, but strongly resist 
mandatory sex education; they advocate for greater financial and institu-
tional support of the family, but harshly criticize state interventions within 
the family, e.g. when parents abuse their children. This explains why these 
organizations joined forces with ultraconservative opponents of ratifica-
tion of the Istanbul Convention: the argument was that the state should not 
interfere in relations between family members.
Emphasis on the need to re- establish paternal authority and hostility 
against measures counteracting gender- based violence is what attracts many 
fathers’ rights groups to anti- gender campaigns, even though they rarely 
form the backbone of anti- gender networks. The majority of such groups 
were established in reaction to custody and alimony conflicts, but in some 
countries the activists joined forces with the anti- gender movement (Hryciuk 
and Korolczuk 2017; Strelnyk 2017). This tendency has been prominent in 
Poland, where one of the main fathers’ rights groups, Brave Dad (Dzielny 
Tata), took part in several anti- gender rallies and mobilized their members 
to participate via a website and Facebook page.
In Italy, father’s rights, specifically changes in divorce regulations, became 
a focal point of gender- related struggles. A 2018 law drafted by Senator 
Simone Pillon from the Lega party, one of the leaders of the anti- gender 
movement in the country and a speaker at WCF in Verona, proposed to 
change custody rules significantly. Presented as a way to achieve “perfect 
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shared parenting” and prevent “parental alienation syndrome,” the bill was 
meant to force children to share their time equally between the divorced 
parents, liquidate child support and cause women who falsely accuse their 
former spouses of domestic violence to lose custody rights (Giuffrida 2018; 
Martin 2018). Italian women’s organizations vigorously protested, claiming 
that this would effectively erase decades of women’s struggle for equal 
rights and profoundly destabilize children’s lives (Stagni 2018). Clearly, 
some anti- gender initiatives aimed at defending children and stability of the 
family profoundly undermine the rights of women. The Italian case reveals 
the value system underlying the anti- gender position: in the end women’s 
emancipation and family values are opposed to each other, and women need 
to be disciplined into compliance. This explains why so much anti- gender 
activism across Europe has been focused on preventing the passage of the 
Istanbul Convention. The suggestion that violence against women is not a 
real problem is what draws openly misogynistic men’s movements toward 
anti- genderism.
The cooperation between conservative parental movements and the state 
evolves along with shifts in the political context. In Italy, the Pillon law 
was shelved partly due to public outrage fueled by the feminist movement 
but mainly because Lega lost its majority in parliament in 2019. In Poland, 
ultraconservative organizations gained financial support and political influ-
ence thanks to the electoral victory of Law and Justice. Speaking against 
the plans for lowering the schooling age in the Polish parliament, before 
the 2015 elections, Karolina Elbanowska asserted: “We are discriminated 
against as parents in this country. We feel oppressed by the state [which does 
not listen to us]” (Elbanowska 2015, our translation). After the Law and 
Justice party ascended to power, however, this organization became engaged 
in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education, despite the fact that 
the reform proposed by the government was heavily criticized by many 
parents and experts, not least because it was not sufficiently consulted with 
the parents. This shows that conservative parental movements strive for a 
version of a non- intrusive socially conservative welfare state. Such a state 
promotes pro- natalist policies and offers high quality social services for in- 
groups, while respecting the autonomy of parents when it comes to children’s 
upbringing and education. It also excludes the out- groups, such as migrants, 
refugees and non- normative families. The emotional dynamic behind these 
political preferences is a mixture of suspicion (toward the state – as poten-
tially oppressive and always under suspicion of being too liberal) and pride 
(my family is my castle). The anti- gender discourse, with its valorization 
of family, community and paternal authority, was readily appropriated by 
these actors as it resonated with their commitments and values.
To sum up, today’s anti- gender campaigns combine gender conservatism 
with a critique of neoliberal globalization and support for social policies 
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seldom, if ever, use the word neoliberalism but they do address many aspects 
of economic, social and cultural changes associated with this phenomenon. 
Through constantly oscillating between economic and moral arguments 
(accusing their enemy of greed and demoralization), anti- gender discourse 
creates a compelling story about a conflict of values in the modern world. 
This narrative involves a call for the protection of the people against what 
is seen as excessive focus on the individual and family relativism. As we 
elaborate in Chapter 4, “gender ideology” is viewed as a global colonial 
plot. The logic of resistance is simple: while families, especially strong “trad-
itional” families, can oppose economic and cultural colonization, individuals 
become easy prey for the colonizers. The endangered child is the emotional 
center of all this: parents are called upon to become engaged in the struggle 
for the sake of their children. And many of them have responded.
The parental role legitimizes conservative efforts for social change. Anti- 
genderists present themselves as oriented toward the common good and the 
best of possible futures, while portraying feminists and “genderists” as a 
threat to children and a cause of dissolution of family, the rise of loneli-
ness and depression. The following section examines a particularly poignant 
campaign, which builds a powerful associative link between the negative 
effects of capitalism and feminism, accusing the two of having deprived 
ordinary Polish women of the dignity of motherhood and a chance for 
personal happiness.
Shaming the shamers, protecting the not- yet- born: the political 
emotions of anti- genderism
Anti- gender campaigners worldwide routinely use shocking representations 
of children in their social media campaigns, brochures, posters and banners, 
as well as propaganda materials. The image of a terrified child is a powerful 
tool for mobilizing strong emotions such as anxiety, guilt, fear and shame. 
One case in point is the striking poster used as background for the “Stop 
Sexualization” campaign, featuring faces of confused pre- schoolers looking 
straight into the camera with an expression suggesting plea for help and 
a large slogan “Stop sexualizing our children.” Visitors of the website are 
thus appealed to as adults who are responsible for the welfare of children 
and who should be shocked into action. Another example of such rhetoric 
can be found in banners from 2015 demonstration against sex education 
in Polish schools proclaiming: “Gender is danger” and “Children belong to 
parents since the beginning of time. Sex educator – persona non grata!”. In 
a documentary film titled “Dusk: Gender Ideology Offensive” (Zmierzch – 
Ofensywa ideologii gender, Dublański 2019) produced by the “Polish Soil” 
Foundation (Fundacja Polska Ziemia) in cooperation with ultraconservative 
Catholic channel TV Trwam most of the speakers are middle- age priests, 
but at one point the audience is addressed by a plea for help voiced by a 
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child. This sentimental message comes to us in voice- over while we watch a 
blurred image of children playing in a park:
Childhood is beautiful. But when someone tells me about adult- only 
things, I am overtaken by fear. My childhood world is irreversibly 
damaged. Do not deprive me of happy memories and innocence for the 
sake of experiments you want to prove right. A child should not see 
everything. […] My dear Mommy, Daddy I am just a child! Only you can 
defend me and my small world against evil. I cannot do it on my own!
(our translation)
The message here is clear: a powerful link exists between “gender ideology” 
and child abuse; between LGBT rights and pedophilia. In the film, the naive 
cry for help expressed by the child’s voice is directly preceded by footage about 
the signing of the LGBT+ Charter by the mayor of Warsaw in spring 2019. It 
is suggested that concerned parents should defend their offspring’s innocence 
against predatory attacks from both the gay movement and the liberal admin-
istration. This is similar to the tactic of shaming one’s audience by suggesting 
that they have failed to save the helpless unborn from abortion, which is 
persistently employed by the global anti- choice movement (Mason 2019; 
Rohlinger 2002; Saurette and Gordon 2018). Interestingly, as the anti- gender 
discourse appeals to the audience in its capacity of parents and protectors, this 
logic has been extended to children not yet conceived and never to be born. 
The children may be concrete, insofar as actual children’s faces, sad and fearful 
ones, are used to evoke strong emotions. However, they may also be abstract 
and absent, referencing the depopulated future world, dominated by loneliness 
and alienation resulting from the possible victory of “gender ideology.”
In June 2015 the Mother and Father Foundation inaugurated its pro- 
natalist campaign with a 30- second video titled “Don’t put motherhood off” 
(Nie odkładaj macierzyństwa na potem). The clip features a woman in what 
appears to be her late thirties wandering aimlessly about a huge, modern 
and oddly empty house. We watch her walk an elegantly furnished but dis-
turbingly empty interior, taking stock of her life:
I managed to pass my specialization and have a successful career, I 
managed to go to Tokyo and Paris, I managed to buy an apartment and 
renovate a house. But I did not manage to become a mom. I regret this.
(Fundacja Mamy i Taty 2015, our translation)
As the video moves toward its closure, a tear rolls down the woman’s cheek, 
while sad music gives way to muted voices of small children. The clip’s final 
message is delivered in a tone of advice, warning and solicitude: “Don’t put 
motherhood off for later.”
The short film enjoyed an astonishing cultural resonance: it went viral on 
the internet (over 400,000 views) and was heatedly discussed for months 
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in various media outlets. The campaign gave rise to innumerable satirical 
memes, reflecting a desire to laugh away and ridicule the specter of the mis-
erable childless woman propagated by the ultraconservatives. Some of the 
memes featured “shameful confessions” of famous people who somehow 
did not manage to become parents. The childless woman was replaced by 
childless right- wing politicians (including Jarosław Kaczyński) or fictional 
characters such as Jon Snow (Kit Harington) of Game of Thrones, or the 
Witcher, warrior- hero of the celebrated Polish- made computer game and 
Netflix series. Some memes used the clip’s formula to make openly feminist 
arguments. In one, a happy- looking man boasts having “managed” to do 
everything, including becoming a dad, because a woman slaved away for 
him at home. In another, a sad woman says she did not manage to become a 
mother because her female partner died, and their child was taken off to an 
orphanage. A popular meme featured the heroine of the original clip with 
the following caption “Don’t put motherhood off. Give it up altogether!” 
(see Figure 5.1). Rather predictably, there were also memes with childless 
bishops and the Pope.
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What makes this fleeting cultural moment worth re- examining is the way 
it partakes in the campaign against “gender ideology,” employing the dis-
course of embattled parenthood. Viewed outside of its immediate context – 
i.e. a country in the midst of anti- gender campaign, heading swiftly for a 
right- wing populist regime – the clip might appear like yet another example 
of a familiar media trend: that of blaming feminism for the “infertility epi-
demic” and the sad lives of women who opted for careers and now regret 
their childlessness. In her history of 20th- century U.S. feminism, Ruth Rosen 
recalls that in the late 1980s a popular T- shirt featured a similar image with 
the text “Oh dear, I forgot to have children!” (2000: 335). Discussed at 
length in Susan Faludi’s Backlash (1992: 46– 58), the miserable- childless- 
woman- who- regrets- her- choices continues to thrive as a popular media 
narrative. Two recent examples include Tanya Selvaratnam’s book The Big 
Lie: Motherhood, Feminism, and the Reality of the Biological Clock (2014) 
and Susan Shapiro’s New York Times autobiographical essay “Childless, 
With Regret and Advice” (2015). The latter may in fact have inspired the 
Mother and Father Foundation, as it appeared online just weeks before the 
filming of the clip. The article ends with a confession that is almost iden-
tical to the latter’s voiceover lesson: “By 50, I felt blessed in work, love and 
real estate. Yet some nights I’m haunted walking by the empty room in our 
apartment” (Shapiro 2015).
Each time the regretful wealthy childless woman appears in public dis-
course, her sorry predicament is presented as a new and alarming discovery, 
an unveiling of feminism’s alleged big lie. Feminism is accused of having 
convinced women that childbearing can be put off indefinitely, and here 
comes the much needed wake- up call. The women featured in such stories 
are filled with shame, regret and resentment: they blame feminism and their 
own selfishness. The social fall- out of such campaigns is the stigmatization 
of career- women and the pitting of mothers against childless women. The 
emotion most prominent in such messaging is shame. Heedless of biology, 
besotted with consumerism, intoxicated by ambition, “forgetful women” are 
presented as those who failed to reproduce and now regret it. Indeed, they 
have failed as women and feminism is put to shame for having destroyed 
their lives. The witness to the shaming here is the imagined unborn child, 
the unfulfilled possibility of personal happiness. In the clip, it is the spectral 
child or children crying in the background without appearing on screen. 
Just as in the familiar backlash narrative, so too in anti- gender discourse, 
childlessness – the opposite of joyful parenthood – is presented as a source 
of profound regret and misery.
There is also a class dimension to this narrative. In the clip, childlessness- 
due- to- postponement is represented as a middle- upper- middle class predica-
ment, caused not just by excessive emancipation, but by too much wealth, 
too much comfort, too much consumption. The shaming and humiliation 
of the woman portrayed in the film are protracted and meant to fill us (the 
viewers) with Schadenfreude. We are invited to witness her shame and enjoy 
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it. Meanwhile, she herself is silenced – the voice- over, thoughts spoken in 
first person, is delivered in another woman’s voice. The luxurious setting of 
her misery constitutes an important clue to the viewer’s intended response. 
The combination of luxury, minimalist design and sparse furnishing is pro-
foundly alienating. In the Polish context, where most homes aim for a look 
of warmth and coziness, it appears foreign. The same can be said about the 
woman’s expensive clothes: stiletto heels, beige trousers and shirt all suggest 
a corporate environment inimical to feminine warmth. She is dressed to com-
pete, a style foreign to mainstream Polish tastes and the Polish ideal of fem-
ininity as motherhood. The foreign- looking setting invites hostility rather 
than sympathy toward the suffering woman. She chose to be emancipated, 
modern and Western, so her suffering is deserved.
The actress who played the role of the childless victim of excessive ambi-
tion claims that after the release of the campaign she found herself on the 
receiving end of spontaneous hostility from strangers. As she was unaware 
of the political intention behind the script, the intensity of public response 
that followed the spot’s release shocked and wounded her. “For me it was 
simply a job,” she told us in an interview “but people seemed to think it 
was all true. They took me for an emancipated, selfish rich bitch who forgot 
to have children. They would stare me down in the street to show me how 
much they despised me. There was also a lot of hate on Facebook” (personal 
communication, 08 August 2017). The hostility should not surprise us. The 
clip was a set- up, an act of public shaming and an invitation to further put- 
downs. Its carefully orchestrated sequence of images and sounds was meant 
to elicit a strong emotional reaction – to unsettle and infuriate. Shame, 
unlike guilt, is a public feeling. Thus, the goal of the ultraconservatives is to 
put the liberal elites – the alleged shamers of the people – to shame.
Given the context of Poland in 2015 – the cultural atmosphere set up by 
rampant xenophobia, media talk about the need to defend Polish culture 
against western “colonization” and the anti- gender discourse that linked all 
these themes – the source of shame in the clip is easily located. The heroine is 
childless because she has allowed herself to become westernized and seduced 
by feminism. She has only herself to blame: she has travelled as far as Tokyo, 
but has failed to produce her own (Polish) babies. She is uprooted, homeless 
in her own home because her space has been colonized by a foreign force, 
that she herself invited and followed. The real villain here is not the woman 
herself but the force responsible for her terrible choices: a force associated 
with wealth, travel and personal ambition, a force that is also somehow 
foreign. It is embodied in the look of house, modern and impersonal, the 
expensive objects that fill it, the way the woman is dressed, the way she 
inhabits her living space, almost like a visitor. She inhabits a house that is 
haunted by what the ultraconservatives call gender – the immoral core of 
the liberal West.
The clip never mentions “gender,” but the connection to the anti- gender 
campaign is evident. The Mother and Father Foundation has long been 
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involved in promoting “family values,” understood as the prevention of 
divorce, warning couples against the alleged harm caused by hormonal 
contraception, and honoring the hard work of fathers. The clip went viral 
at a time of intense political and social polarization around gender issues. 
Its central theme – motherhood – was heavily politicized within the “war 
against gender.” Two Polish anti- gender books published during the pre-
ceding year, both authored by women, insist that “genderism” is responsible 
for the infertility epidemic and that it undermines the dignity of motherhood 
(Niewińska 2014; Nykiel 2014). In fact, the women who spoke publicly 
against gender at the time usually did so as mothers or prospective mothers 
and claimed that social hostility toward motherhood is feminism’s fault.
In Poland, anti- genderism expresses in moralistic terms what is really 
a deep- seated hostility toward the West, associated with excessive con-
sumption, individualism and precarity. The West is also routinely accused 
of degrading motherhood, encouraging women to undergo abortions and 
use contraception. The motivation ascribed to these practices is profit 
mongering – according to anti- genderists, pharmaceutical companies are 
behind it all, driven by greed and the desire to de- populate the world, espe-
cially to limit the population of societies that still adhere to traditional values 
(Nykiel 2014). Viewed in this context, the childless woman clip embodies 
a gendered critique of western capitalism. The aptly named Mother and 
Father Foundation steps into the role of benevolent grandparent, warning 
Polish women about the dangers of succumbing to western values.
The clip’s message echoes one of the key tropes in the anti- gender campaigns, 
that of looming de- population. It is here that the religious ultraconservative 
critique of “gender ideology” meets neo- fascist tendencies and authoritarian 
discourse of a “demographic winter” promoted by Putin, as well as the 
discourses of Great Replacement and “white genocide” promoted by the global 
alt- right (Hennig 2019; Gökariksel, Neubert and Smith 2018; Stern 2019). As 
Gökariksel, Neubert and Smith (2018) show in their comparative analysis of 
the U.S., Turkey and India, there exists a striking similarity between cultural 
narratives deployed by the authoritarian and populist leaders in these coun-
tries. The narratives, which the scholars call “demographic fever dreams” are 
political fantasies – excessive, unfounded and seemingly absurd – designed to 
evoke panic about an imagined threat to the vulnerable majority population 
from religious, sexual and racial others. “Fundamentally, these fever dreams 
are motivated by the fears of the dominant population being made a sur-
plus population” (Gökariksel, Neubert and Smith 2018: 566): outnumbered, 
displaced and eventually forgotten. The clip can be read as one such dream, an 
apocalyptic vision in which future Poland is but an empty house, populated 
by voices of children that never got a chance to be born.
Conclusions
Parenthood, actual and potential, is at the heart of cultural conflict known 
as the gender wars, in most contexts strongly intertwined with nationalist 
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sentiments. This is not to say that the right has a monopoly on politicized 
parental identity. Well- known examples of left- wing mobilization of mothers 
include Moms Demand Action for Gun Sense in America and the Mothers of 
De Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, as well as the single mothers’ movement in 
Poland (Fell and Voas 2006; Hryciuk and Korolczuk 2015). Both progressive 
and reactionary movements employ the essentialist argument that women as 
mothers and caregivers are naturally predisposed to care for the world at 
large (Ruddick 1995). Today’s anti- gender activists have been effective in 
politicizing the discourse of parenthood and mobilizing people in its defense, 
extending these arguments to men in their paternal role as defenders of the 
family, whose authority is viewed as natural, much like women are endowed 
with maternal qualities. As we have shown in this chapter, this is achieved 
on two levels. First, traditional parental roles are presented as under siege 
by “gender ideology” and in need of protection in order to mobilize large 
groups of people. Secondly, ultraconservative movements valorize parental 
roles and experiences as a basis for political engagement and new forms of 
political community. Clearly, there is something about the contemporary 
state of societies that makes parenthood an attractive political identity. We 
argue that it results from the social, economic and cultural effects of neo-
liberalism, a system that not only brings about precarity but also drastically 
devalues the human experience of familial relations and care.
Anti- gender movements skillfully link the cultural with the economic and 
the political by combining a socially conservative agenda with a critique of 
some aspects of neoliberalism. The activists representing these movements 
oppose neoliberalism interpreted as (1) a value system equated with the pro-
motion of rampant individualism and the demise of family and community, 
(2) an economic trend equated with a lack of state support for families and 
minimal investments in social services and (3) a political trend equated with 
the colonization of local communities by liberal actors alienated from “the 
common people” and supported by foreign global powers. This discursive 
construction, combined with efforts to re- build local communities and advo-
cacy for the rights of the families, enables socially conservative actors to 
effectively tap into people’s sense of economic anxiety and disillusionment 
with political elites. Anti- gender rhetoric works because it reorients collective 
anger away from structural economic issues and toward moral ones. In the 
process, anti- genderism endows subjects with the memory of an imagined 
shame and with the promise of a new dignity; it offers moral satisfaction (our 
enemies are evil but miserable), a sense of purpose and a community.
Anti- genderism conflates “gender” with those aspects of capitalism that 
are most frustrating to members of the working and lower- middle class, 
especially to parents and would- be parents: precarity and the crisis of care 
resulting from unequal distribution of wealth. Instead of naming the problem 
in economic terms, as injustice and exploitation, anti- genderism presents 
the world of capitalism’s winners as degenerate and morally corrupt, an 
emotional wasteland destroyed by greed and consumption, peopled by 
regretful childless women, men deprived of their paternal roles, lonesome 
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and anxious children. Like the expensive but unwelcoming house in the 
clip, it is a cold universe cluttered with useless objects. Ultraconservatives – 
just like the right- wing populists – aim to convince people who stand little 
chance of becoming the winners in the neoliberal race for success that they 
have already won what is most important in life: family, love and a sense of 
community. Simultaneously, right- wing populist governments deliver social 
policies such as cash transfers to families with children, thus responding to 
the actual needs of the people and easing the burdens resulting from raising 
children. The opportunistic synergy between ultraconservatives and right- 
wing populists is grounded in recognition of the value of the family in the 
abstract and redistribution of resources to “our” families. With socially con-
servative actors successfully claiming the language of anti- neoliberalism and 
populist governments building their appeal on generous social provisions, 
feminism and the left face serious challenges in articulating their opposition 
toward the reign of global capital.
Note
 1 All quotations from WCF in Verona 2019 are based on the authors’ notes from 
the event and recordings available online on the Facebook page of the event. We 




6  Counteracting anti- gender movements
Toward a populist feminism?
Sitting on a city bus in Warsaw on the rainy afternoon of 3 October 2016, we 
looked at each other in astonishment. At least half of our fellow passengers 
were women of various ages, all dressed in black, many of them holding not 
only wet umbrellas but also feminist signs and banners. We were all heading 
in the same direction and with the same purpose: to take part in the protest 
against the proposed law banning abortion in Poland. We too were holding 
a homemade sign inviting men to join our struggle, and we too felt the wave 
of emotions sweeping over the city: anger, hope, exhilaration and a peculiar 
sense of solidarity. The feminist revolution we had long considered impos-
sible was apparently in progress.
Since the beginning of 2016, Poland has witnessed a women’s mobilization 
of unprecedented scale: marches, rallies, pickets, public debates and social 
media campaigns, initially responding to a proposed total ban on abortion 
rights brought about by one of the key actors of the anti- gender campaigns, 
the Ordo Iuris Institute. The first wave of protests peaked on 3 October 
2016 with the Polish Women’s Strike (henceforth “the Strike”) under the 
hashtag #BlackMonday, which mobilized 150,000 people in 200 cities and 
towns throughout the country. With moving visuals – pictures of a “sea of 
umbrellas” in Warsaw’s Castle Square, faces of countless angry women in 
black, and radical banners with memorable symbols (see Figure 6.1) – the so- 
called Black Protests hit the international media and became an important ref-
erence point a year later during the International Women’s Strike of 8 March 
2017 (Graff 2019; Gunnarsson Payne 2020b; Korolczuk et al. 2019; Kubisa 
and Rakowska 2018; Majewska 2016; Murawska and Włodarczyk 2017).
In this chapter we offer a brief overview of women’s mobilizations 
around the world, followed by a detailed account of the Black Protests in 
Poland. While we do not pretend to offer a comprehensive picture of fem-
inist developments in various locations, we highlight the Polish movement’s 
transnational connections, the international sources and resonances of the 
Polish Women’s Strike. Next, we examine the sources of the mobilization’s 
success: its effective employment of powerful cultural symbols, the 
implications of framing the protest as a Strike and the importance of the con-
nective logic of mobilization based on the use of flexible, easily personalized 
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Figure 6.1  Polish Women’s Strike at Castle Square in Warsaw, Poland, 2016.
Photo by Agnieszka Graff
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action frames. Finally, we develop an argument concerning “populist fem-
inism,” focusing in particular on participants’ self- definition as “ordinary 
women,” the mobilization of emotions and the use of embodied knowledge, 
a type of episteme characteristic of populist movements (Gunnarsson Payne 
2020b; Korolczuk 2020).
A new wave of feminist organizing: women opposing  
right- wing populism
While the Polish mobilization can simply be interpreted as a massive reac-
tion to the proposed total ban on abortion, we view it as part of a broader 
struggle against right- wing populism – a stage of this struggle in which 
feminism strives to take the initiative. The leadership group of the Polish 
Women’s Strike maintained strong bonds with other actors in the wider 
opposition to the Law and Justice government. In particular, the feminist 
organizers cooperated closely with other civic organizations, such as the 
Committee for the Defense of Democracy (Komitet Obrony Demokracji, 
KOD) or Citizens of the Polish Republic (Obywatele RP), while insisting 
on the Strike’s autonomy as a feminist movement. In some cases, protests 
against the abortion ban were organized by women and men engaged in KOD 
groups. Marta Lempart, one of the key organizers of the Polish Women’s 
Strike, had been engaged in KOD local structures in the city of Wrocław 
prior to the women’s mobilization and had not been previously involved in 
feminist organizing. Carrying distinctive signs – e.g. with Women’s Strike 
symbols, Gals4Gals banners, hangers, a fuck- you- uterus and Fighting Polish 
Woman images – participants were also known to engage in, and sometimes 
initiate, demonstrations for causes other than women’s rights, e.g. protests 
in support of people with disabilities in 2018 (Kubisa and Rakowska 2018). 
However, activists were remarkably consistent in refuting the expectation 
that women’s issues have to be put on the back burner, sacrificed to, or 
delayed by, the greater cause of “saving democracy.”
What set the Black Protests apart from the wave of protests against 
Law and Justice rule is that the women’s mobilization was openly chal-
lenging the hegemony of the Catholic Church. For women it was obvious 
that what needs to be challenged is not only right- wing populism but also 
its ultraconservative allies, as well as the political power of the Catholic 
Church itself. Thus, the Black Protests need to be situated within the broader 
context of evolving relations between the Church and the state in Poland. 
Only by doing so we can understand why the mobilization happened in 
2016, and why with such force. During the two decades following 1989, 
the Catholic Church occupied a position of unchallenged privilege in Polish 
public life. Religion was perceived as the stabilizing force of post- 1989 lib-
eral democracy; without the bishops’ support for Poland’s EU accession 
in 2003, it was argued, we may never have joined the European Union. 
The price for this support was the so- called compromise law on abortion 
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introduced in 1993, which is, in fact, one of the strictest bans in Europe. In 
the decade following accession to the EU, this law was rarely critiqued in 
the mainstream media since the Church was still broadly believed to be an 
ally of democracy and pluralism, a respected institution capable of stopping 
the dark forces of extreme nationalism. Hence, the marginalization of fem-
inism: women’s silence was viewed as a necessary price for the peaceful 
coexistence of political elites and the Catholic Church. Around 2013, this 
harmony was upset. The Church explicitly cut itself off from liberal democ-
racy by lending its support to the anti- European populist right. Motivations 
for this move had a lot to do with women’s rights and the rights of sexual 
minorities: the Church- inspired, conservative anti- gender campaign, which 
peaked in Poland in 2013, was explicitly anti- European.
The Church’s betrayal of liberal democracy in Poland has had many 
aspects and stages, but it revealed itself most fully in 2016 when the 
Episcopate lent its support to the “Stop Abortion” law. Thus, the Black 
Protests were both about women’s rights and about much more than gender 
equality: what made them possible was a massive realignment in Polish pol-
itics and the public sphere. But the movement was also part of this tec-
tonic shift in political culture, as well as a historic breakthrough in women’s 
history. It introduced angry women as a new political subject into Polish 
political life. Women refused to give up on their women’s- rights- centered 
agenda. They refused to be shamed, silenced or marginalized, neither by 
their opponents (the populist right and Catholic clergy) nor by allies (the 
broader movement of anti- PiS resistance).
The Polish case challenges the view shared by many scholars that anti- 
gender mobilization is a form of backlash or a countermovement to modern 
feminism (Corredor 2019; Krizsán and Roggeband 2019). In fact, it is the 
new wave of feminist activism that can be construed as a reaction to the 
rise of ultraconservatism and right- wing populism. The conceptualization 
of anti- genderism as a backlash or a countermovement ignores regional 
differences in feminism’s development and institutionalization. As we have 
shown in the preceding chapters, anti- gender movements seem to be most 
influential in countries such as Poland, where feminism has been less rather 
than more powerful. While some might argue that this simply reflects the 
tendency of post- socialist countries to “lag behind” the West in matters of 
gender equality, we propose another explanation which has to do with the 
social and economic consequences of neoliberalism. Throughout this book 
we have been arguing that anti- genderism is a right- wing critique of neo-
liberalism, thus it is no accident that the ultraconservative influence has been 
particularly strong in Eastern Europe, where both the market dogma and 
individualism were imposed throughout the 1990s as the ultimate path to 
modernization (Ost 2005; Dunn 2004). Central and Eastern Europe and 
Russia also play an important role in the ultraconservative imaginary as the 
repository of conservative family values (e.g. Bluhm and Varga 2018). This 
chapter examines the feminist response to these developments, showing how 
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a new wave of women’s mobilization sought to turn the tables on right- wing 
populism by claiming to represent “the people” and picturing anti- gender 
actors as “the elites.” Thus, we challenge the movement- countermovement 
framing as an explanatory model for the global struggle around gender 
equality, siding with researchers who interpret these developments within 
the framework of a populist moment (e.g. Biglieri 2020; Gunnarsson Payne 
2020b; Roth 2020).
We do not see feminism and the anti- gender movement in a temporal 
sequence, but rather as competing forces responding to one another, as well as 
to the neoliberal condition. If we were to insist on a chronology, however, we 
would risk the claim that the new wave of feminist activism that erupted around 
2016 in countries such as Argentina, Italy, Poland, Spain and the U.S. was a 
reaction to the rise of ultraconservative and right- wing populism discussed in 
this book: anti- genderism in its various manifestations as well as the misogyny 
of political leaders. The mass protests in these countries were in fact efforts to 
stop the progression of the right. In the States, the 2017 March on Washington 
was driven by fear and anger after the election of Donald Trump (Boothroyd 
et al. 2017; Gökarıksel and Smith 2017; Jamison 2017; Moss and Maddrell 
2017; Roth 2020). Similarly, in Brazil over the last two years, thousands of 
people continued to protest against the populist President Jair Bolsonaro, 
whom women’s activists view as racist, homophobic and a threat to indigenous 
people’s rights (Snyder and Wolff 2019). In Poland, women took to the streets 
to protest further restrictions in access to abortion (Gober and Struzik 2018; 
Korolczuk et al. 2019; Majewska 2018). In Argentina, Italy and Spain feminist 
mobilizations in the last three years were triggered by horrific cases of femicide 
and sexual violence, condoned by state apparatuses (Barros and Martinez 
2020; Biglieri 2020; Campillo 2019; Chirioni 2019; Di Marco 2020; García 
et al. 2018; Martinez 2019a; Sutton and Borland 2019; Szczepańska 2019). 
Activists responded to specific efforts and initiatives of ultraconservative 
organizations and right- wing populists, e.g. the Italian movement Non Una 
di Meno organized a series of public meetings and debates, as well as a mass 
demonstration in reaction to the World Congress of Families organized in 
Verona in 2019. The authors of NUM’s official statement, which was sent to 
the media, stated that feminists plan to:
occupy the city with rage, determination and wonder [because]…despite 
a rhetorical discourse that fosters the values of human life, the attacks 
against abortion rights and the celebration of a traditional idea of 
family, which are put forward by these “lords” of patriarchy, are closely 
intertwined with a whole social system based on violence and oppression. 
[…] Behind their defense of the “natural family” lays violence.
(Non Una di Meno 2019b, our translation)
In each of these cases, the attacks on women’s rights were waged by right- 
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tandem with religious authorities and transnational anti- gender networks. 
The feminist movements that emerged in connection to these developments 
have tended to be intersectional, composed primarily of young women and 
grassroots in character. They were often locally organized, driven by the 
logic of connective action and facilitated by social media (Korolczuk 2016). 
This new wave of feminist organizing has also been remarkably attentive to 
the claims of different social groups, including working class women, the 
LGBT community and indigenous people. While locally embedded, these 
movements quickly became aware of each other’s existence and increasingly 
developed transnational networks, sharing a sense of common goals and 
solidarity.
Movements partaking in this new wave share features that cannot be 
contained within the familiar narrative of feminist progress in Western dem-
ocracies, where women’s movements became increasingly sophisticated in 
theoretical terms but also elitist and bureaucratized, while feminist values 
were gradually entrenched in state policies (e.g. Hemmings 2011). The 
new feminist mobilizations are characterized by an emotional intensity and 
claims to represent the people rather than a specific marginalized group. 
Distrust of and refusal to cooperate with state institutions resonate within 
these new mass movements, although depending on the context, some 
groups and networks do cooperate with political actors.
The authors of the book Feminism for the 99%: A Manifesto construct 
a definition of this new trend based on the assumption that the feminism of 
the future should be not just anti- neoliberal, but thoroughly anti- capitalist:
What we are living through is a crisis of society as a whole. By no means 
restricted to the precincts of finance, it is simultaneously a crisis of 
economy, ecology, politics and “care.” A general crisis of an entire form 
of social organization, it is at bottom a crisis of capitalism – and in par-
ticular of the viciously predatory form of capitalism we inhabit today: 
globalizing, financialized, neoliberal.
(Arruzza et al. 2019: 16)
Based on the adoption of the strike as form of protest by the new feminist 
actors, Cinza Arruzza, Tithi Bhattacharya and Nancy Fraser claim that the 
movement is inherently anti- capitalist and that it has replaced what they 
see as a crumbling liberal feminist hegemony (2019: 82). But is this really 
true? As much as we ourselves happened to agree with the authors’ diag-
nosis of the state of the world, e.g. their left- feminist worldview, we are 
not entirely convinced that such a view was overwhelmingly shared by 
most participants of the new wave of mass protests. The problems of eco-
nomic exploitation, crisis of care and precarity were indeed often voiced by 
activists, but were not necessarily framed in explicitly anti- capitalist terms. 
Programmatic documents of the Italian movement Non Una di Meno do 
make an openly radical left- wing proclamation: the movement claims to 
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be “transfeminist, intersectional, anti- racist, anti- fascist and anti- capitalist 
political […] which aims at the radical transformation of society” (Non Una 
di Meno 2019a). The tendency toward left- wing intersectional orientation 
is also evident in Latin America and Spain, but even there some feminists 
are doubtful as to the movement’s position vis- à- vis capitalism. In a con-
versation with the co- authors of the manifesto, Argentinian activist Paula 
Valera explains that “NiUnaMenos, as yet, does not position itself as having 
a clear anti- neoliberal agenda; it does not have an anticapitalist discourse” 
(Arruzza and Bhattacharaya 2019). It also remains debatable to what extent 
the new wave of feminism is anti- capitalist in countries such as Poland. 
Women’s protests in many contexts erupted in response to religious funda-
mentalism, which had entered a strategic alliance with right- wing populism, 
both striving to be seen as forces protecting people against the excesses of 
global capitalism. Responding to these claims, feminists have tended to take 
the position of the people, but explicit anti- capitalist arguments were the 
exception rather than the rule.
A number of scholars observe that contemporary feminism both 
challenges right- wing populism and co- opts its majoritarian appeal and 
anti- elitist discourse (Emejulu 2017; Gunnarsson Payne 2020a, 2020b; Hall 
2019; Snochowska- Gonzalez and Ramme 2018). Julia Roth argues convin-
cingly that “what the new feminist movements have in common is strong 
opposition to the ways in which gender has become a central platform for 
right- wing mobilization, which can be observed in a number of right- wing 
patterns of en- gendering” (2020: 252). In other words, the new feminism 
responds not only to specific legal changes in the realm of gender proposed 
by right- wing populists but to the broader patterns of cultural change, 
including the re- masculinization of the public sphere, the gendering of fear 
and femonationalist discourses.
Our own research and activist experience have led us to the conclusion 
that the mobilization known as Black Protests can, indeed, be viewed as 
“populist feminism,” a gendered version of the “left populism” theorized 
by Mouffe (2018). We are not the first to propose such a conceptualiza-
tion: existing research shows that the self- perception of Black Protest 
participants cohered around the idea that they were “ordinary women” – a 
people rebelling against an arrogant patriarchal elite (Gunnarsson Payne 
2020a; Snochowska- Gonzalez and Ramme 2018). Emerging scholarship on 
other contexts, including Argentina, Italy, and Spain, shows that a tendency 
to formulate the feminist agenda in left- populist terms has been present 
worldwide (Biglieri 2020; Di Marco 2020; Emejulu 2017). These findings 
resonate with the proposal made by Chantal Mouffe (2018) that the only 
way to effectively oppose right- wing populism is to develop a left- populist 
discourse. In a similar vein, Graciela Di Marco and other authors in the 
special issue of Baltic Wolds entitled “Women and the People” (2020) con-
ceptualize the strategy of contemporary women’s movements in terms of a 




144 Counteracting anti-gender movements
of political community. The new “popular feminism” is not a sophisticated 
intellectual project involved in the deconstruction of patriarchal myths and 
dwelling on its own complicated identity. Rather, it engages in the collective 
expression of powerful emotions, the production of inclusive symbols and 
embodied knowledge in a rejection of ethno- nationalist definition of “the 
people” enforced by right- wing populist forces. In this chapter’s conclusions 
we will revisit this claim, outlining its theoretical grounds and implications.
The Black Protests’ story: mobilization against the 
ultraconservative agenda in Poland
The Black Protests’ story began with two groups of citizens striving to change 
existing abortion laws through civic initiative. In Poland, civil society actors 
may introduce a piece of legislation for parliamentary debate, but the law 
requires that the submitting group first register and then gather 100,000 
signatures within three months. On 14 March 2016, the legislative initiative 
“Stop Abortion” was registered with the Polish Parliament and aggressively 
lobbied for by the Ordo Iuris Institute.
The proposed law sought to outlaw abortion in all cases, including serious 
fetal damage, and stipulated up to five years in prison for women undergoing 
abortions. Fetal damage is one of three conditions under which abortion is 
legal as per existing legislation, and it constitutes the legal grounds for the 
vast majority of legal abortions in Poland. The proposed legislation was 
thus rightly perceived as an effort that would result in an effective ban on 
abortion in the country. If passed, the law would have forced women to 
give birth, not only to disabled children, but also to infants bound to die 
soon after birth. In addition, there was well- founded reason to believe that 
doctors would stop offering prenatal testing in fear of being prosecuted for 
facilitating abortion, and that involuntary miscarriages would be followed 
by criminal investigations. These was extreme even by Polish standards. 
Prior to 2016, neither the ruling Law and Justice party nor Poland’s Bishops’ 
Conference had supported the idea of putting women in jail for abortion. 
Yet, in the final days of March, the Episcopate of the Catholic Church made 
an official statement supporting the initiative, and Prime Minister Beata 
Szydło communicated her personal support for the proposed law. The threat 
of “Stop Abortion” becoming law was very real.
Feminist groups raised the alarm, and counter- mobilizations began on 
1 April 2016 with the appearance of the group Gals4Gals (Dziewuchy 
Dziewuchom) on Facebook. The profile gathered thousands of members 
within hours, and provoked the creation of dozens of local groups in the 
subsequent few days. On 3 April, the left- wing Together (Razem) party 
organized the first demonstration under the slogan “No to the torture of 
women.” Participants were armed with wire hangers – an international 
symbol meant to be reminiscent of the horrors of back- alley abortions. 
A video showing women walking out of church services began to circulate on 
 
Counteracting anti-gender movements 145
social media – they would leave ostentatiously while the bishops’ statement 
was being read in parishes throughout the country. Different groups and 
individuals began to initiate small- scale creative actions, which included 
sending packages with wire coat hangers to the Prime Minister’s office and 
posting detailed information about women’s menstruation cycles on her 
Facebook profile under the hashtag #toughperiod (#TrudnyOkres) as an 
ironic commentary to the government’s efforts to control women’s bodies. 
Many of these initiatives running alongside one another were started by fem-
inist activists, but some were instigated by persons with no such experience. 
Three former first ladies also announced their opposition to the proposed 
law and instead came out in support of the existing one.
On 13 April, a group of activists led by left- wing politician Barbara 
Nowacka registered the legislative initiative “Save the Women,” which 
aimed to legalize abortion and guarantee access to sex education and contra-
ception. This opened up a new stage of the conflict: two rival committees 
would now simultaneously collect signatures under their respective draft 
laws. “Stop Abortion” filed 400,000 signatures in July, whereas “Save the 
Women” filed 215,000 in August. The difference can be explained by the fact 
that anti- choice groups collected signatures in churches, with active support 
of (and often pressure from) parish priests. The parliament’s reaction to the 
two initiatives speaks volumes about the political power of the Church in 
Poland. On 23 September, the “Save the Women” initiative was rejected 
without debate, while “Stop Abortion” was directed for further work in 
committees. The following day, Poland’s most famous actress, Krystyna 
Janda, wrote a Facebook post reminding the public of the Islandic Women’s 
Strike of 1975 and calling for mobilization. The hashtags #czarnyprotest 
and #BlackProtest gave the entire mobilization its popular name. During 
the Wrocław rally, a speaker named Marta Lempart called for a nationwide 
women’s strike on 3 October. Together with Natalia Pancewicz, Lempart 
set up the Facebook profile Polish Women’s Strike, which would remain the 
center of the movement’s national and international connective leadership. 
Moreover, this site became known as the movement’s “helpdesk” – the go- 
to contact for media and the model for regional groups (Gober and Struzik 
2018: 133).
The 3 October Women’s Strike was undeniably the Black Protests’ largest 
success and most memorable event. Its iconic status is in part owed to the 
beauty of the images that soon flooded social media: the sea of umbrellas 
shot from above, and thousands of women dressed in black, soaking wet 
and visibly exhilarated. The black clothes worn by participants were meant 
as a sign of mourning for women’s reproductive rights, but there is an add-
itional symbolic dimension worth pausing over: the Black Protests harked 
back to the spectacle of Polish women wearing black during anti- Russian 
demonstrations in 1861 (see Graff 2019: 485; Kowalczyk 2018: 14). The 
umbrella would become one of the protests’ most popular symbols and, 
like the black clothes worn by participants, it carried additional symbolic 
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significance. One of the core myths of Polish women’s history – contested 
by historians but well- established in the collective imagination – is that in 
November 1918 a group of suffragettes gathered in front of the villa of the 
Chief of State, Józef Piłsudski, and (reportedly) knocked on the windows 
with their umbrellas to remind him of the need to grant women voting rights 
in the new republic. Thanks to the rain, the symbol was now revived and 
would soon become omnipresent in the movement’s iconography and dis-
course (as in the popular slogan “We will not fold our umbrellas”).
The Warsaw rally assembled over 30,000 people, but Warsaw was only 
a small part of what happened that day. There were demonstrations in 150 
cities and towns, some with over 10,000 participants. Solidarity events 
took place in 49 cities in 29 countries in Europe and elsewhere (Gober and 
Struzik 2018: 137). For the first time in Polish history, there were women’s 
demonstrations in small towns, where being seen at a protest could have 
immediate consequences at work and at home. All around Poland, women 
failed to show up at work (often with their employers’ consent, but some-
times with serious risk involved) and joined the innumerable rallies around 
the country instead. Thousands of others went to work wearing black.
A poll conducted a month after the Strike testified to the impressive res-
onance and popularity of the protests: 90% of the population knew about 
the Strike; 64% of women and 52% men declared their interest and support; 
17% of women and 6% of the men said they had dressed in black on 3 
October to show their support; 4% of women said they had participated 
in demonstrations in person (CBOS 2016). According to another poll, the 
year 2016 witnessed the highest level of participation in public protests in 
28 years (Kowalska and Nawojski 2019: 53). Politically, too, the Strike was 
a success: the “Stop Abortion” law was withdrawn from parliamentary 
proceedings. This was the first time that the Law and Justice government 
backed down under public pressure. The Church, too, eventually withdrew 
its support for the initiative.
Black Monday gave organizers and participants a heady sense of the 
movement’s power. It was the starting point of numerous initiatives leading 
up to the next great mobilization – a response to the new anti- abortion 
legislative initiative, which came to be known as Black Friday (23 March 
2018). In the interval between the two massive protests, much activity 
demonstrated the ongoing strategizing that was taking place on both sides 
of the political feud. The government introduced a special financial provi-
sion for women who give birth to disabled babies, emergency contraception 
was effectively banned, and there were direct repressive actions (including 
police raids) against women’s NGOs. Meanwhile, women continued to 
organize: there were protests against the emergency contraception ban and 
marches on Women’s Day (in solidarity with International Women’s Strike) 
and on Mother’s Day 2017. A network of doctors was established to advise 
women in crisis (Lekarze Kobietom, Doctors4Women). During summer 
2017, women activists played a central role in street protests in defense 
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of independent courts, and – dressed as handmaids (based on Margaret 
Atwood’s classic novel) – protested against Donald Trump’s visit to Poland.
Over time women’s protests underwent significant radicalization. In 
March 2017, after the ultraconservative forces proposed yet another total 
abortion ban, protesters from all around Poland descended on Warsaw 
employing a quasi- militaristic rhetoric. The main slogan was “Idziemy na 
Nowogrodzką” (“Marching to take Nowogrodzka street” – Law and Justice 
headquarters). It was the largest gathering in defense of women’s rights in 
Poland’s history – the headcount varied from 50,000 to 90,000. Banners 
and speeches showed a new level of anger aimed specifically at the Catholic 
Church: “I decide about religion, not religion about me”; “My uterus is 
not your chapel”; “Freedom of choice, not terror”; “Fuck the curia.” Some 
signs alluded to recent church pedophilia scandals: “Hey priest! I don’t look 
up your dress”; “Go play with your own organs.” Another favorite that 
appeared at this march and many others read: “I think, I feel, I decide.” As 
with Black Monday of the previous year, the protest’s outcome was a tem-
porary victory. In June, the reactionary law was rejected, but it was then 
clear to all, and so it remains at the time of writing, that its proponents 
would renew their efforts. The slogan “We are not folding our umbrellas” 
continues to circulate on social media, a clear sign that the struggle is far 
from over.
Local struggle in a global context
The Polish case must be seen against a broader transnational context. After 
all, the “Stop Abortion” campaign – the second stage of anti- gender cam-
paign in Poland – was itself part of a wider effort to roll back women’s 
rights worldwide. To global anti- gender networks, Poland – a predomin-
antly Catholic country ruled by right- wing populists – was a promising 
testing ground for radical solutions to what they perceive as “the culture 
of death,” and the Ordo Iuris Institute became an important player linking 
the local and the transnational. The global context mattered on the feminist 
side of the struggle, too. Cooperation across borders allowed the activists 
to position their struggle as part of a broader effort to defend democracy, 
equality and justice.
As we have already noted, key events in several countries, including 
Poland, Italy and Spain, were carried out under the banner of “strikes.” In 
Poland the choice of strike as a protest form and all- encompassing slogan for 
the movement was inspired by Icelandic women’s strike of 24 October 1975. 
The event was one of second wave feminism’s more spectacular initiatives: up 
to 90% of the country’s female population did not show up at their work-
place that day and did not perform any household tasks in order to dem-
onstrate the true value and indispensability of women’s work. This shows 
that the Polish Women’s Strike, an authentic grassroots movement with no 
external institutional funding, had a keen awareness of the broader context 
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of the struggle. For Polish feminists, however, to use the word strike was also 
to suggest a linkage with the struggle of Solidarity movement against the 
communist regime (Kubisa and Rakowska 2018; Majewska 2019).
Thanks to social media, the local groups that emerged not only built links 
with one another but also established lasting transnational connections 
with activists in other countries. The Polish Women’s Strike received online 
support from women all over the world, who posted photos of them-
selves – singly and in groups – with solidarity signs. These images were 
disseminated in Poland as evidence that “we are not alone.” Mobilization 
inside the country also led to the formation of a sizeable “transnational 
feminist diaspora,” comprised of Polish women living abroad who 
organized solidarity protests wherever they happened to live. According 
to Greta Gober and Justyna Struzik this experience had a transformative 
effect on participants – guided by a sense of solidarity and responsibility for 
“sisters” at home, they built new connections to Poland and to each other, 
and emerged with a new definition of feminism (2018: 143). Transnational 
connections became instrumental both for expressing solidarity across 
borders and for exchanging information about activities of the anti- gender 
actors in different national contexts. During the public debates organized 
by Non Una di Meno in Verona one of the authors (EK) presented an ana-
lysis of recent developments in Poland during an academic panel, while 
simultaneously representing the Polish women’s movement during the gen-
eral assembly meeting.
While Black Monday was modeled on the 1975 Women’s Strike in Iceland, 
the Polish Women’s Strike, in turn, inspired the International Women’s Strike 
of 2017. As early as 9 October 2016, the Facebook group Black Protest 
International (established by Polish activists including Marta Lempart and 
Klementyna Suchanow) posted the following call for a global mobilization 
for women’s sexual rights and autonomy:
Sisters and Brothers! An outrageous reminder of how much there is 
still to do about women’s rights in the context of rape culture. We 
must reclaim our feeling and thinking bodies from the hands of those 
who usurp power over us. Trump is just one striking, globally- vis-
ible example, but there is so much more violence occurring that goes 
uncovered by the news. It is hard to believe the ways in which rapes 
committed by powerful men, like Julian Assange, Dominique Strauss- 
Kahn and Roman Polanski, are publicly excused on the grounds of the 
high social and political positions and merits of the rapists. […] Let us 
learn from this experience and not let our voices fade!
(Gunnarsson Payne 2020b: 13)
Slogans and graphics originating in Poland enjoyed resonance around the 
globe, including the Women’s March on Washington on 9 January 2017. 
Two weeks after Black Monday, on 19 October 2016, the #NiUnaMenos 
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protest against femicide took place in Argentina in response to the murder 
of 16- year- old Lucía Pérez. Similar demonstrations were organized in 
Mexico, El Salvador and Chile, leading up to the #NiUnaMenos strike in 
Brazil (27 October 2017). As Gunnarsson Payne (2020b) documents, these 
mobilizations used slogans and images from the Black Protests, resulting in 
a kind of “fantasy echo” effect, which inscribed each of the local struggles in 
a much longer feminist history, giving participants a sense of common iden-
tity. One such obvious echo is the Polish activists’ use of wire coat hangers 
to reference women’s suffering under patriarchy. Originally employed in 
the U.S. as a symbol of self- induced abortions in the pre- Roe vs Wade era, 
in Poland – where illegal abortions have been carried out in gynecological 
offices or abroad – they came to symbolize women’s anger and solidarity. 
Gunnarsson Payne follows feminist historian Joan Scott in arguing that
fantasy is crucial in understanding any successful political mobilization. 
For an intense affective attachment to a political cause to be formed, it 
is necessary for the subject to form a narrative in which they imagine 
themselves taking part, and begin identifying with – this is precisely 
where fantasy comes in.
(2020b: 11)
This fantasy was based on a sense of shared oppression and solidarity, but 
its dissemination required coordinated efforts.
Polish feminists were also echoing international feminist voices, not only 
in terms of symbols, but also referring to iconic feminist foremothers, as in 
the following Facebook description of Black Protest International:
We want to show that international solidarity of women is a powerful 
political tool.
Let us remember Audre Lorde’s words “Any power you don’t use 
yourself is gonna be used against you”. Let’s remember Lorde’s con-
cept of “joint survival” – the notion that each individual survival is 
interrelated with the survival of others, so is the wellbeing. Let’s stand 
together and imagine the tools for the fight together!
(Black Protest International)
Prior to 2016, the Polish women’s movement had perceived itself as some-
what isolated in Europe, a “special case” viewed as hopeless by women from 
the West, due to the political power of the Catholic Church in the country. 
Following the mass protests of 2016 and 2017 this was no longer true. The 
Polish Women’s Strike leaders made efforts to coordinate the International 
Women’s Strike in 2017 and took pride in having initiated this broader 
movement. In the herstory of the Polish Women’s Strike published on the 
movements’ official website, this achievement occupies an important pos-
ition. Polish Women’s Strike leader Marta Lempart has often underlined 
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the grassroots nature of the movement and the key role of Polish activists 
in coordinating the global effort (e.g. in Wittichová 2019). Activists closely 
followed the unfolding feminist struggles in other countries, especially 
Ireland’s campaign for legal abortion (“Repeal the 8th”) and organized 
a number of solidarity actions, though the movement’s strategies were 
different in the two countries. Whereas in Ireland the “In her shoes” cam-
paign led countless women to relay their personal experiences of abortion, 
in Poland a similar initiative failed to take off and individual women, who 
came out with their abortion stories faced enormous backlash (Cullen and 
Korolczuk 2019).
Polish activists also spread information about the experiences of women 
living in countries where abortion is banned. El Salvador and Nicaragua 
were most often brought up. Polish feminists and Amnesty International 
activists publicized the fate of Evelyn Beatriz Hernández Cruz, who was 
sentenced to 30 years in an El Salvadorian prison after the court decided 
she had undergone an illegal abortion, a procedure qualified as murder. As 
is often the case, mainstream media outlets also started to report on the situ-
ation in those countries, picking up on the trends arising on social media. 
For example, on 9 April 2016 the daily Gazeta Wyborcza ran an extensive 
reportage piece on the situation of women in El Salvador, which was then 
widely shared via social media, reflecting the circular nature of contem-
porary news flow.
The fear and anger that such stories stirred became widespread, as 
reflected in slogans such as “We don’t want El Salvador here” painted on 
homemade banners that many women carried at demonstrations. As these 
slogans testify, El Salvador came to epitomize the mental backwardness and 
“barbaric” laws that are supposedly characteristic of developing countries, 
while Poland was imagined as part of the “developed civilized West.” This 
rhetorical strategy led to tensions in the movement. Some feminists criticized 
this phrasing as highly problematic and racist, claiming that we should focus 
on building transnational solidarities between women in different coun-
tries in order to lift the ban on abortion in both Poland and El Salvador. 
These critiques, however, did not resonate widely among protesters, many 
of whom carried EU flags at marches and chanted “We are in Poland, not in 
El Salvador,” voicing a sense of superiority rather than solidarity. A similar 
dynamic can be seen in the repeated usage of the figure of “Muslim women” 
in feminist debates as shorthand for women’s oppression at the hands of 
religious fundamentalism (Bobako 2017): a tactic that seems obvious and 
justified to some and inacceptable to others.
This split tells us something important about the meaning of transnation-
alism within the Polish movement: to some women it means solidarity with 
oppressed women everywhere, but to others it signifies belonging to the 
“advanced” liberal West, echoing the superiority implicit in some western 
feminist discourse, which postcolonial scholars have critiqued since the 
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femonationalist co- optation (Farris 2017). The debate itself testifies to the 
opening up of local feminist identities and struggles to broader transnational 
contexts and conflicts. With the Black Protests, feminist identity in Poland 
rapidly transcended the narrow bounds of national identity, as participants 
of the upheaval viewed themselves as partaking in a worldwide women’s 
revolution, a struggle against patriarchal forces that are global rather than 
local. We share this perspective as activists and participants of the feminist 
struggle, but also as scholars examining the broader pattern of mobilization 
around gender.
Explaining the success of Black Protests: why it happened and 
why it worked
The Black Protest phenomenon has by now been investigated by a number 
of scholars: sociologists, ethnographers, cultural studies scholars and pol-
itical scientists. How did so many women manage to become mobilized at 
such short notice? Why was so much anger triggered by the “Stop Abortion” 
law? After all, legal abortion had been almost impossible to obtain in Poland 
since the passage of the so- called “compromise law” of 1993. Depending 
on their theoretical toolkit, scholars have offered various answers to these 
questions, but all studies emphasize the protests’ egalitarianism, emotional 
intensity, spontaneity and reliance on social media. The proposed law was 
perceived as cruel and inhuman rather than just restrictive, and the fact 
that it received support from the Episcopate was an important trigger. 
The abortion ban became a symbol for a much broader set of issues and 
grievances.
Both the scale and the emotional intensity of what would later be called a 
women’s rebellion exceeded everyone’s expectations, including those of the 
organizers. What also took many by surprise was the mobilization’s imme-
diate effect: the Strike led to the withdrawal of the contested legislation and 
a massive rejuvenation of the women’s movement. Many scholars agree 
that this was, in fact, the birth of feminism as a grassroots movement in 
Poland: intersectional, inclusive and internally diverse (Korolczuk et al. 2019; 
Majewska 2016; Murawska and Włodarczyk 2017). For thousands of Polish 
women it was also a moment of personal transformation: as one participant 
from Szczecin said in an interview, even though she was not an activist before 
2016, she now felt empowered not just to join the protests but also to take 
the stage. She recalled “I just started to speak spontaneously during one of 
the first demonstrations, and people liked that, they could relate, so later 
the organizers called me and wanted me to speak” (interview 28 September 
2019, our translation). Prior to 2016, feminism had been a politically mar-
ginal phenomenon, centered mainly around NGOs, university gender studies 
programs and the largely middle- class Women’s Congress, with more radical 
leftist organizations and informal groups, such as local Manifas, struggling 
to gain recognition and influence both within the movement and in public 
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debates (Grabowska 2012, Regulska and Grabowska 2013). When the 
ultraconservative attacks on “gender ideology” began in 2012, women’s and 
left- wing circles employed a number of strategies to oppose this offensive. 
As early as 2013 efforts were made to debunk the claims of the anti- gender 
movement, to promote a gender equality agenda and defend gender studies 
as a legitimate scholarly pursuit (Duda 2016; Grzebalska and Soós 2016). 
Academics and non- governmental organizations published a number of 
books, articles and manuals for teachers targeting the general public as well 
as specific groups. In most cases authors approached the attacks on “gender 
ideology” as an unfortunate misunderstanding and tried to enter into a 
debate with opponents on the nuances and meanings of gender equality as 
a concept. Meetings, debates, conferences and workshops were organized, 
aiming to engage academics, teachers and the general public, while gender 
studies experts were trying to counteract the claims about the dangers of 
gender promulgated by the likes of Father Oko in mainstream media.
One strategy, prominent especially in social media, was to mock the 
excesses of anti- gender discourse through satirical memes, cartoons and 
cabaret songs, whereas some feminist and LGBT organizations engaged 
in strategic litigation. Yet another strategy was employed by the Women’s 
Congress which in 2013 sent a public letter to Pope Francis, alarming 
him about “unprecedented attacks against women’s rights waged by 
Polish Catholic clergy” (Kośmiński 2013). Additionally, reports were 
prepared demonstrating that many Catholic organizations had received 
UE funds dedicated to the implementation of gender equality standards. 
In 2013 Feminoteka Foundation held a much publicized press conference, 
demanding that the authorities review the allocation of EU funds so that 
organizations that do not fulfill the criteria would have to give back the 
money (Grzebalska and Soós 2016).
While some of these strategies gained public resonance, they were mostly 
reactive, oriented toward unmasking fraudulent claims of anti- gender 
groups. They relied on existing civil society structures and drew on support 
of the state, a strategy which proved to be largely ineffective after the Law 
and Justice party came to power in the end of 2015. In retrospect, these 
early efforts to resist the anti- gender movement appear weak and, in some 
cases, naïve or misguided, as in the case of the letter to the Pope, to which 
Vatican officials responded with a vague reassurance about the Holy See’s 
good intentions. What these initiatives did not take into consideration was 
the wider political dynamic: the scope of the transnational anti- gender 
movement and its interconnectedness with right- wing populism. In contrast, 
the Black Protests were a true mass movement with its own agenda and its 
own political culture. With the Strike, feminism emerged as a nationwide 
grassroots movement, marked by a radical political rhetoric and a penchant 
for hijacking patriotic symbols, capable of mobilizing tens of thousands of 
women at a few days’ notice (Graff 2019).
Feminist mobilizations in various countries had much in common. 
One such striking commonality is the role played by new communication 
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technologies: social engagement of people who did not previously per-
ceive themselves as activists resulted from their social media participation 
(Korolczuk 2016). The movements’ rapid growth can be accounted for by 
employing the concept of connective (as opposed to collective) action. The 
“scaling up” of protests was enabled by personalized engagement of internet 
users, in which communication became an important element of organiza-
tional structure (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). The role of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) seems to go beyond enabling commu-
nication and fostering the construction of collective identity: the medium 
changes the action logic. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, who 
analyzed a number of national and transnational mobilizations against glo-
balization, proposed to distinguish between groups and networks following 
the traditional logic of collective action and those that follow the logic of 
“connective action” (2012, 2013). While the former requires high levels of 
organizational resources and efforts to form and develop collective identities, 
the latter is based on “using resources to deploy social technologies enabling 
loose public networks to form around personalized action themes” (Bennett 
and Segerberg 2012: 757). This in turn changes the core dynamic of the 
action, making it more flexible and personalized, based on a rather eclectic 
and fluctuating sense of identity. In the Polish protests against the abortion 
ban this new logic was one of key factors facilitating mass engagement.
The protests’ quick growth shows how personal action frames or memes can 
effectively mobilize people who are uninvolved observers. Memes are packets 
of information (textual and/ or visual) that are easy to adapt and share, thus 
they travel fast across diverse populations (Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 745). 
Inclusiveness, clarity of message and emotional appeal, combined with high 
potential for personalization, are the aspects key for the popularity of memes 
in the Black Protests. The core idea was very simple: in order to join, one had 
to post a photo of her(him)self wearing black, with the hashtag #blackprotest. 
The uncomplicated and gender- inclusive formula was easy to personalize. As 
noted by philosopher and feminist activist Ewa Majewska (2016), the power 
of this strategy consisted not only in its inclusivity but also in its challenging 
of the traditional hierarchical relation between a powerful creator (of images, 
slogans or strategies) and weak participants, who can only accept or reject 
these creations. This formula allowed participants to be in control of what they 
share with others: most participants publicized carefully arranged selfies, many 
women choosing to post photos with friends, partners or children, and some 
opting for a group photo, which in turn helped to engage bystanders. There 
were also persons who preferred an anonymous version and posted pictures of 
favorite celebrities, media figures or even pets wearing black pieces of clothing 
or just in a black- and- white photograph. Most not only used hashtags but also 
added a personal message: the original concept invited alterations and per-
sonalization of the content, which allowed people to express their emotions, 
agency and control in creating their own meaning.
The choice of a strike as the main form of protest was of major import-
ance for the scale of mobilization. At the beginning, the initiators discussed 
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the possibility of organizing a typical strike, calling on women to abandon 
workplaces and take to the streets, but after an internal debate the for-
mula became much more open. The strike became an all- encompassing sym-
bolic packet, which covered a whole range of activities, such as striking, 
wearing black to work, having one’s kids wear black to school or kin-
dergarten, wearing badges, posting supportive messages on social media, 
blockading the entrance to Law and Justice party offices, holding collective 
readings of feminist books or debates on reproductive rights or even making 
sandwiches for fellow activists, as was the case of some Warsaw- based male 
participants. The open formula allowed people to join in and feel that they 
are part of a nationwide initiative, even if they could invest just a fraction 
of the time and energy that a regular strike requires. Arguably, this was of 
special importance for economically underprivileged women and to people 
in smaller towns and villages, where scarcity of jobs and conservative local 
milieu make it risky to publicly engage in potentially controversial issues, 
such as reproductive rights (Kubisa and Rakowska 2018).
As noted above, in the Polish context the very concept of a strike carries 
associations with the heroic tradition of the first Solidarity of 1980, the 
collective action of Polish workers, who – supported by intellectuals and 
activists – challenged the communist rule. As shown by Julia Kubisa and 
Katarzyna Rakowska (2018), it is no accident that both the Polish Women’s 
Strike and the 2018 Warsaw protest of parents of persons with disabilities 
named their mobilizations “strikes,” though neither initiative was literally a 
strike:
They rejected the division between production (wage labour) and repro-
duction (non- wage labour), which gave a deeper meaning to the “refusal 
of work,” showing how closely they are interconnected, both in terms of 
reproductive rights and of care work. The empowerment of this event 
was derived from taking over the concept of the strike and providing 
an inclusive space to connect different actions related to the struggle for 
reproductive rights.
(2018: 37)
So far, the hegemonic narrative has focused on the iconic male heroes, such 
as Lech Wałęsa (or Lech Kaczyński in the right- wing version of Polish his-
tory). This trend continued despite the fact that there is a long tradition of 
women’s strikes under communism, which were organized at big factories, 
e.g. in the city of Łódź, to protest against low pay, horrible working conditions 
and unequal treatment (Fidelis 2010; Mazurek 2010). As explained by Ewa 
Majewska (2016), the mainstream historiography downplays the import-
ance of collective effort and shared responsibility, stressing instead the role 
of individual qualities, such as (male) charisma, strong will and personal 
sacrifice. Accounts of the Solidarity strikes tend to focus on specific figures 
of heroes and the imperative of self- sacrifice. In contrast, the story of the 
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Polish Women Strike has coalesced around collective effort and solidarity 
among women who refused to be sacrificed for the greater good – be it God, 
the Nation or just higher fertility rates. Majewska (2017) has argued con-
vincingly that this new wave of women’s protests follows the paradigm of 
“weak resistance” based on collective effort rather than individual heroism 
and solidarity rather than charismatic leadership.
Other contextual factors and changes in political opportunity structures 
also contributed to the movement’s success. The “Stop Abortion” proposal 
was submitted to a parliament dominated by socially conservative parties, 
and the ruling Law and Justice party was supported by anti- choice groups 
during the elections – these two facts contributed to a sense of immediate 
danger. It was widely believed that this time there was a real chance that the 
parliament would accept a total ban on abortion. The heightened political 
climate and the mobilization of citizens opposing other reforms introduced 
by the new regime also played an important role. In some locations, such 
as Łódź, anti- PiS groups supported the women’s protests organizers with 
know- how and important resources, such as acoustic systems, security staff 
during rallies or help in printing leaflets and distributing informational 
materials. As one local activist explained in a personal communication:
Here in Łódź we have great communication with all citizens’ groups, 
with KOD, with old organizations, everyone chips in, there are no 
conflicts because we know we are in this together.
(communication during a meeting, 
December 2016, our translation)
Women’s protests against a total abortion ban can be interpreted as part of 
the transformation of the Polish civil society, which prior to 2016 was often 
depicted as NGOized and depoliticized (Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017). 
The socially conservative and populist Law and Justice party was swiftly 
introducing changes in virtually every sphere of social and political life, 
gradually dismantling the basic tenets of liberal democracy. In the process, 
Polish society became extremely polarized but also much more engaged and 
politically active, and street protests became normalized as a mean of com-
munication between the citizens and power holders. Ironically, the Law and 
Justice representatives, who appear to be deeply suspicious of any spontan-
eous grassroots organizing, proved to be extremely effective in mobilizing 
thousands of women and men in Poland and abroad.
Populist feminism – the extraordinary power of 
“ordinary women”
How does one situate feminist mobilization within the populist moment? 
Gunnarsson Payne (2020b) draws a link between the egalitarianism of 
Black Protests and Chantal Mouffe’s (2018) theory of left populism. Mouffe 
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defines populism as a particular articulation of conflict: one that defines 
“us” as the people and the opposing force as an arrogant and corrupt elite. 
If right- wing populism builds the collective identity of the “people” in exclu-
sionary terms (as a collectivity based on common ethnicity, race or nation), 
left populism does the opposite. It is a political strategy that
[…] aims at federating the democratic demands into a collective will 
to construct a “we”, a “people” confronting a common adversary: the 
oligarchy. This requires the establishment of a chain of equivalence 
among the demands of the workers, the immigrants and the precarious 
middle class, as well as other democratic demands, such as those of the 
LGBT- community. The objective of such a chain is the creation of a new 
hegemony that will permit the radicalization of democracy.
(Mouffe 2018: 24)
In opposing right- wing populists, the Black Protests persistently strove to 
reframe the ongoing political conflict by claiming the identity of the “people” 
for the women whose rights were in danger. Within the movement’s left- 
populist framing, the right- wing forces – well- funded, well- connected, cruel 
and manipulative – were positioned as a corrupt elite. A similar political 
identification has been employed by the women’s movements in other coun-
tries, e.g. many Latin American activists have explicitly positioned them-
selves as a voice of the oppressed who rise against political, social and 
economic elites (e.g. Biglieri 2020).
Arguably, the most remarkable finding about the mobilization concerns 
the activists’ own self- perception as “ordinary women.” A study conducted 
by Jennifer Ramme and Claudia Snochowska- Gonzalez (2019), based on 
interviews with 95 Women’s Strike coordinators from around the country, 
shows that they persistently used this phrase to describe themselves. The 
postulated “ordinariness” has several meanings. First, it signifies the diver-
sity of protesters in terms of age, education, class and region; second, it 
distinguishes them from seasoned activists or people involved in politics 
(Ramme and Snochowska- Gonzalez 2019: 95– 99). “Ordinary women,” it 
appears, are women from all walks of life who had been living their pri-
vate lives until the “Stop Abortion” initiative enraged them and provoked 
them to join the protests. Ramme and Snochowska- Gonzalez’s conclusion 
is similar to the one offered by Gunnarsson Payne: they interpret the per-
sistent use of the phrase “ordinary women” within a broader framework 
of competing populisms. Activists from the Polish Women’s Strike are not 
afraid to claim that they represent “womenfolk” or “the female sovereign,” 
proposing a different understanding of these collectivities – pluralist and 
inclusive.
Scholars emphasize the egalitarianism of the mobilization, its inclusiveness 
and spontaneous, uncontrolled growth. The leadership was collective, and ini-
tially there were no “stars” of the movement, though some women (notably 
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Marta Lempart) became well known throughout the country. Solidarity 
was felt and demonstrated with the most vulnerable and least privileged 
women: e.g. those who could not afford abortion abroad, rape victims, single 
mothers, mothers of children with disabilities. Majewska (2016) examined 
the movement in light of Václav Havels’ concept of “power of the powerless” 
and Antonio Negri’s “the common,” claiming that the protests were driven 
by participants’ confidence in their weakness and vulnerability.
Viewed as a mobilization of public emotions, the Black Protests were 
an expression of collective outrage, despair and righteous anger. It is these 
emotions, rather than a coherent set of political views, that were shared by 
thousands via the logic of “connective action” and during mass protests, 
which for many women became a revolutionary moment and a personal 
breakthrough. As one participant recalls:
We stood there surrounded by other women, surrounded by a black 
armor, as if we were one organism, one angry organism, an organism who 
said: we won’t give up without a fight. It was good. No one challenged 
us. We were a force, we sang songs. For the first time in my life, I was 
surrounded by people similar to me, thinking like me. We all agreed.
(Smętek 2017: 25, our translation)
Those who joined did not necessarily view themselves as feminists, but 
they shared a common threat and a common enemy: ultraconservative 
Catholics supported by the populist right- wing government. This clear us– 
them division helped to mobilize people who might otherwise have been 
reluctant to collaborate.
Mobilization of emotions, such as fear, anger, rage and solidarity among 
women played a pivotal role in the massive growth of the movement. Right 
after the Stop Abortion bill was publicized, feminist experts and activists 
“translated” its provisions for the general public, warning about the dire 
consequences that such a law would have for millions of Polish women and 
their families. They stressed that the law would open the road for prosecutors 
to imprison women and to investigate cases of patients who experienced 
miscarriages. The phrase “barbaric law” became widely associated with the 
bill. The possible effects of the law were compared to “torturing women,” 
to signal its unprecedented severity and to reference the physical and psy-
chological pain that female patients would be subjected to if the law were 
introduced. Many women openly expressed their fear of becoming victims 
by carrying banners stating: “We refuse to die so that you can keep a clear 
conscience!”, “I won’t give birth if I’m dead!”, “I refuse to be your martyr” 
and “We need doctors, not prosecutors!”. As one of our interviewees, an 
organizer of protests in Gdańsk, recalled:
Internet forums and Facebook groups were buzzing with emotions; 
women were talking about what is happening, they talked about their 
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past experiences and understood how many women had to go through 
similar situations.
(interview 29 September 2019, our translation)
The threat to women’s health, freedom and dignity was widely perceived as 
grave, because Polish women routinely experience humiliation and debase-
ment as patients, both in public hospitals and in private gynecological 
clinics. The report issued in 2018 by the Birth in a Dignified Way Foundation 
showed that 54% of women who gave birth the previous year experienced 
some form of violation of their rights while at the hospital: direct violence in 
the form of blackmail, threats, insults and the dehumanizing practice of tying 
the patient’s legs to the hospital bed (Adamska- Sala et al. 2018). In 2017, 
a pro- choice network called the Great Coalition for Equality and Choice 
organized a contest for women participating in the protests, inviting them to 
present a short essay about their motivations for engaging in activism. One 
author focused on her experience in a public birth clinic:
The public insurance (NFZ) package includes, at the very best, impa-
tience and indifference from your doctor, as well as a standard dose of 
condescension and bad jokes. But if you are a “difficult patient” – that 
is, if you ask questions – you may expect humiliation and intimidation.
(Zakrzewska 2017: 39)
Such experiences were also a common theme of talks among friends and on 
internet forums. Members of Facebook groups, such as Gals4Gals, often 
shared their horrible experiences, not only during birth, but also at routine 
checkups with gynecologists and general practitioners.
Focus on personal safety and dignity proved much more effective 
than abstract categories such as choice or reproductive rights, which had 
dominated feminist discourse in the preceding years. Highlighting concrete 
effects that the law might have on women’s lives affected not only their 
expectations for the future but also their perceptions of the social conditions 
in which they were living (Hemmings 2012). Much of the Black Protest 
rhetoric was aimed to expose the split between the mainstream discourse on 
women’s rights as being secure and the social reality in which their bodily 
integrity and a sense of security were under threat.
Thus, it is beyond doubt that the movement owed its success to its ability 
to mobilize powerful emotions. In this respect the Black Protests differed 
from earlier struggles for reproductive rights: they downplayed both human 
rights discourse and the liberal talk of individual choice, autonomy and 
the right to privacy. Instead, activists used language and imagery that were 
highly emotional and often dramatic. Slogans, chants, internet memes, signs 
and banners, made spontaneously by individual women, tended to take the 
expressive first- person form: e.g. “I am here because I am furious”; “I am 
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to describe the essence of the proposed law. Many of the signs were provoca-
tive and confrontational: “Take your rosaries off my ovaries,” or “We want 
doctors, not fanatics.” The words “dignity,” “suffering” and “cruelty” were 
used far more often than the emotionally neutral word “choice” (although 
the latter would also appear in slogans such as “My body – my choice”). 
Personal accounts, media interviews with activists and stories circulated in 
social media – all of these materials testify to a powerful emotional experi-
ence lived by individuals and immediately shared with the newly established 
activist community. These messages stirred strong collective affects. In the 
words of the local protest organizer:
There was this moment [during the demonstration] when everyone 
wanted to show how many of us there are and how angry we are, and 
it was not a bad feeling – we could transform our anger into collective 
action.
(in Murawska and Włodarczyk 2017: 
3, our translation)
Information about the possible effects of the ban invoked a moral shock 
(Jasper 1997), analogously to cases of femicide and rape in Argentina or 
Spain. It is through powerful identification with victims of violence and 
cruel treatment, rather than contemplation of abstract rights, that these 
movements achieve their wide appeal. As Diana Broggi writes, the struggles 
for bodily autonomy, economic safety and dignity are all interconnected:
[women] are the first to feel the effects of cuts to sexual and repro-
ductive health, escalating violence, femicides, and the murder of trans-
gender peoples – 2019 is already a record year for such crimes. Hence 
the slogan of today’s Argentinian feminists rings out: “We’re the ones 
with our bodies one the line.”
(2019)
Thus, in Argentina (Figure 6.2) and other countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, people joined the ranks of protesters with slogans such as “Not 
one less!” or “We want ourselves alive!”, whereas in Poland the banners 
declared: “Stop torturing women!” and “I am here for my daughter/ sister/ 
friend!”. A similar dynamic was visible in Spain in summer 2019, where 
mass protests were organized in 250 towns and cities across the country, 
declaring “a feminist emergency” following a series of rape and femicide 
cases. The protesters were united by a fear for women’s lives and the belief 
that they needed to fight together for a better future. As one of the organizers 
of the Spanish protests explained:
This has been a summer dominated by barbarity, murders, rapes, 
assault, pedophilia and gang attacks. […] We can’t let another school or 
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parliamentary term begin as if nothing has happened. To do so would 
be to tolerate the intolerable. […] This is an emergency!
(Jones 2019)
Such framing – the need to defend women against the immediate danger to 
their health and life – attracted not only women, but also men. As one of the 
participants of the Black Protests explained:
I remember this father who came to the protest with his young daughter 
and the daughter asked him why they were there, what for. And the 
father said: I’m fighting for your future. I was very moved by this.
(in Murawska and Włodarczyk 2017: 
2, our translation)
This language, marked by powerful emotional investments, stands in stark 
contrast to institutionalized gender expertise, which often proves eerily 
compatible with neoliberal governance. The women engaged in the new 
wave of feminist mobilizations still relied on medical and legal expertise but 
Figure 6.2  Demonstration on 8 March 2018. International Women’s Strike, the 
National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe and Free Abortion 
“Campaña Nacional por el Derecho al Aborto Legal, Seguro y Gratuito” 
Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Photo by Vale Dranovky
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saturated it with desires and emotions as premises for building arguments 
and truth claims. Thus, embodied and affective feminist knowledge emerged 
as an alternative to both the ultraconservative language of anti- gender 
actors and the alienating discourse of gender experts, who talk about gender 
mainstreaming, quotas and “leaning- in” (Korolczuk 2020).
The privileging of common women’s affects and knowledge is sometimes 
accompanied with ambivalence and distrust toward academic feminists 
and expert knowledge, echoing right- wing populism’s distrust of official 
institutions of knowledge. Following the debates on the roots and effects 
of the Women’s Strikes, some activists angrily rejected books and articles 
about the protests published by scholars. Academic studies were viewed 
as illegitimate appropriations and exploitation of ordinary women’s lived 
experiences and work. Whereas feminist scholars, many of whom are also 
engaged in the Polish women’s movement, viewed themselves as contributing 
to the struggle, offering useful knowledge and promoting the movement’s 
achievements abroad, such a view has not necessarily been shared by the 
grassroots. This tension is symptomatic of the shift occurring in global fem-
inism: a move toward what we call populist feminism, which situates itself 
in opposition to liberal elites, including established feminist circles.
Conclusions
We claim that the success of the Polish Women’s Strike relied on the 
movement’s capacity to capture the logic of populism for a progressive pol-
itical project. Similar claims have been made about the new wave of fem-
inist organizing worldwide. The movements grew by promoting the idea 
of commonness among participants (“ordinary women”), the disavowal of 
earlier engagements (one did not need to claim a “feminist” identity in order 
to join the revolution), and the employment of a powerful rhetorical and 
symbolic repertoire, one that mobilized collective affect (“dignity,” “torture” 
and “cruelty” rather than “choice”). Abandoning the established liberal dis-
cursive frames of human rights, these movements built their power based 
on emotions, both personal and collective. In effect, a new collective subject 
was constituted in the public sphere: angry women with a strong political 
identity.
Interpreting Poland’s Black Protests, Argentina’s Ni Una Menos or Italy’s 
Non Una di Meno as cases of “populist feminism” relies on a particular 
understanding of what populism is. If we were to follow Wodak’s (2015) 
conceptualization of populism as an ideology necessarily connected to xeno-
phobia and ethno- nationalism, such a description would make little sense. 
Feminist activists rejected both the ethno- nationalist definition of the people 
and the moralist frames of right- wing populism (i.e. the assumption that 
“ordinary people” are conservative and must be defended against “liberal 
elites”). However, if we move beyond such definitions, then three aspects 
 
162 Counteracting anti-gender movements
of the feminist movements in question may lead us to viewing them as 
examples of left populism.
First, feminist activists in various locations continue to reiterate the 
binarism of “people vs elites,” which is central to populist mobilizations, 
and which is common to otherwise disparate definitions of populism 
proposed by such thinkers as Cas Mudde and Chantal Mouffe. The Black 
Protests positioned angry women (and the men who supported them) as 
“the people” in a struggle against ultraconservative “elites.” Secondly, 
the wave of feminist activism that erupted around 2016 has effectively 
mobilized emotions such as anger, fear and solidarity, departing from the 
liberal feminist paradigm in which reasoned argumentation leads the way. 
Finally, the epistemic strategies employed by activists juxtapose common 
women’s embodied knowledge against both the disembodied expertise of 
ultraconservative actors and liberal framework employed by mainstream 
women’s movements (Korolczuk 2020). This type of knowledge production 
is characteristic of populist movements, which seek to challenge the estab-
lishment by undermining the authority of experts and academic institutions 
(Dean and Maiguashca 2020).
Clearly, the question of who are the people, who can represent them in 
the political arena and whose knowledge counts as legitimate knowledge are 
key issues in today’s struggles. Consequently, it should not surprise us that 
the current feminist mobilization has attempted “to occupy populism by 
turning some of its key tenets on their head” (Emejulu 2017: 65). In Poland, 
women’s struggle for reproductive freedom has been successfully enacted 
as a popular uprising, a struggle for democracy, and against the violence 
of right- wing populism. It has also turned out to be a left- wing movement, 
which readily supported protests of people with disabilities demanding state 
support and including among its goals a number of demands concerning 
care, social provisions for families and social justice. A similar tendency 
has been observed in other contexts: both Italy’s Non Una di Meno and 
Argentina’s Ni Una Menos emerged in response to gendered violence but 
soon expanded their agendas to include social justice demands (Arruzza and 
Bhattacharaya 2019).
As we put the final touches on this manuscript in October 2020, Polish 
women have yet again taken to the streets to protest against the ruling of 
the Constitutional Tribunal that deemed abortion illegal in cases of fetal 
abnormality. This wave of demonstrations was even more massive and more 
furious than the Women’s Strike of 2016. As noted by many commentators 
it had many features of a revolution aimed at abolishing the authority of 
the Church as well as the government (Gessen 2020, Pacewicz 2020). The 
revolutionary spirit was evident in uncompromising demands (including 
the stepping down of the Law and Justice government), radical language 
(including profanities and explicit sexual references on banners and in 
speeches) and willingness to engage in confrontations with the police. The 
tendency to frame the movement’s aims in populist terms is even more visible 
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than it was in 2016: stressing the opposition between the arrogant, hateful 
political elites and the masses whose righteous anger and desperation have 
brought them to the streets in the midst of the pandemic has become the 
staple of the movement’s discourse.
The mass women’s movements, which have emerged in recent years in 
countries such as Poland, Argentina and Italy, challenge not only gender 
conservative policies and discourses but also the political logic that drives 
right- wing populists and autocrats. As Margaret Canovan (2005) has 
argued, over the last two centuries the belief that people’s consent is the 
only legitimate basis of power has become commonplace, but the questions 
of who are the people and who can represent them have remained open. 
Today’s feminist actors propose a definition of the people radically different 
from that offered by right- wing populists. Instead of highlighting homogen-
eity, morality and the need for national sovereignty, women’s movements 
embrace plurality, intersectionality and global solidarity. Whether or not we 
believe in Chantal Mouffe’s claim that left populism is the only effective 
response to the current ultraconservative, illiberal trend, the analyses of con-
temporary struggles over gender show that they are, in fact, struggles over 




Gender in the populist moment
Gender is no distraction from real politics; it resides at the heart of politics 
today, both as a set of specific policy issues and as the nexus of a sym-
bolic struggle, a space where differences are negotiated and defined. Not 
a marginal controversy, no mere “cultural” issue, gender has become a site 
of powerful and often violent conflict. The anti- gender campaigns feed on 
religious sentiments and employ moralizing discourse, but their spread can 
only be properly understood in the context of the rise of right- wing political 
forces seeking ideological and affective means for gaining hegemony.
Anti- genderism is not just another wave of backlash, one that may be 
peculiar to the post- socialist context. Nor is it simply a tactic of the Vatican 
in its ongoing efforts to undermine gender equality. It is a new ideological 
and political configuration, a transnational phenomenon with outposts in 
both West and East. While the backlash of the 1980s and 1990s combined 
neoconservatism with market fundamentalism (which is to some extent still 
the case with neoconservative Christian fundamentalists in the United States 
and in other countries, such as Brazil), the new wave of right- wing popu-
lism in Europe skillfully links gender conservatism with a critique of neo-
liberalism and globalization. This combination has remarkable ideological 
coherence and great mobilizing power: right- wing populists have captured 
the hearts and imaginations of large portions of local populations more 
effectively than progressive movements have managed to do. The coherence 
of this worldview relies on three persistent equivalencies linking the cultural 
with the economic and the political: Western liberal elites are equated with 
the global political and economic elite; neoliberalism as a source of suffering 
and injustice is equated with individualism as a value system and ideological 
project; population and gender equality policies are interpreted as a new 
phase of global colonialism.
Throughout this book, our aim has been to understand the internal logic 
of anti- genderism as an ideology, the strategies of anti- gender campaigns 
and the different ways in which people relate to these socially conserva-
tive discourses and movements. Our principal ambition, however, was to 
theorize the complex relationship between anti- gender campaigns and 
the rise of right- wing populism. To this end we developed the concept of 
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opportunistic synergy to show that anti- genderism is neither an autonomous 
religious movement, which made its way into politics, nor an intrinsic fea-
ture of the right- wing populist worldview. While we acknowledge the role 
of the Vatican in initiating opposition against “gender ideology” and the sig-
nificance of gendered nationalism and social conservatism within populism, 
it is our view that anti- genderism owes its power to the way it combines 
religious, political and cultural dimensions.
We argue that the anti- gender mobilization has played an important role in 
the consolidation of the populist right as a transnational movement, one that 
successfully harnesses the anxiety, shame and anger caused by neoliberalism. 
In country after country, anti- gender actors have built alliances with right- 
wing populists: together they have attacked the rights of women, sexual 
and ethnic minorities, promoting what conservatives call “family values.” 
The various episodes which we observed in different contexts – campaigns 
against abortion and sex education, efforts to stop the ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention and attacks against the LGBT community – add up to 
a transnational phenomenon at the intersection of culture, religion and pol-
itics, which links different actors and often disparate ideological agendas.
Anti- genderism is politically effective not because of the persuasive 
power of the arguments it makes about “gender,” but due to its relation-
ship with right- wing populism. The opportunistic synergy plays out on two 
levels: ideological/ discursive and strategic/ organizational. Since populism 
is not a robust ideological project, but a thin- centered ideology (Mudde 
2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017), it readily feeds on narrative structures 
and arguments promoted by the anti- gender movement. Simultaneously, the 
actors behind anti- gender campaigns use the organizational and financial 
resources offered by political parties, especially in contexts such as Poland 
where populists are in power. What facilitates this collusion is not so much 
an intrinsic social conservatism of populist politicians, but the fact that the 
ultraconservative critiques of gender have been framed in populist terms and 
are thus readily adaptable to populist politics. The movement presents itself 
as a necessary and courageous defense of the people (often in their private 
roles as parents) against powerful and foreign liberal elites, with “gender 
ideology” emphatically identified as a modern version of (Western) coloni-
alism. The affective power of the anti- colonial frame has been a key factor in 
mobilizing the masses against sex education, gender equality policies or the 
LGBT community. This frame is remarkably flexible: in Western countries 
it is used to evoke shame and guilt in liberal elites (“you are the colonizers, 
shame on you!”), whereas in Eastern Europe it tends to merge with a sense of 
wounded pride and opposition against the patronizing attitudes of Western 
actors (“you are being colonized, it’s time to resist!”). The violence of sys-
temic transformation paved the way for contemporary right- wing populists 
who promise a corrective to the effects of the neoliberal revolution. The 
Polish case is both context- specific and paradigmatic for this global phe-
nomenon. While the choreography of local and transnational cooperation 
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varies over time and space, the ideological and organizational links between 
these forces are common. Key players include the Vatican, U.S. religious 
fundamentalists, Russian ultraconservative actors and right- wing politicians 
from around the world.
It is worth noting that not everyone who opposes “gender” as a con-
cept is an anti- genderist in the sense employed in this book. For example, 
the American alt- right is notorious for its anti- feminist stance (Nagle 2017; 
Strick 2020; Wendling 2018), but the alt- right framing of opposition to 
“gender” differs significantly from the views of the anti- gender movement. 
Breitbart news has occasionally reported on “gender ideology,” e.g. cri-
tiquing families that raise their children in non- gendered ways, but it did 
so in a mocking and irreverent tone. To the alt- right, the concept of gender 
as used in academia is an outrage to rational thinking, but it is viewed as 
ludicrous rather that truly dangerous. In contrast, anti- genderists gathered 
in networks such as Agenda Europe or TFP view “genderists” as a powerful 
force undermining the very foundations of Judeo- Christian civilization. 
Moreover, the alt- right’s stand on gender is primarily misogynistic and racist, 
it is the position of “angry white men” as Michael Kimmel (2013) put it in 
his influential book. In contrast, anti- genderism expresses the ethos of trad-
itional family in which open misogyny is replaced by a cult of fatherhood 
and what they call the natural order. One of the most recognizable leaders of 
the American alt- right, Steve Bannon, devoted several years to establishing 
an alliance with European right- wing populists and the radical right, such as 
AfD, Vox, the Brothers of Italy and Fidesz, apparently without much success 
(Serhan 2019). We have yet to see what role gender will play in this new 
initiative, if indeed it gains some influence in the future. It is clear, however, 
that the relationship between socially conservative right- wing groups that 
attack “gender ideology,” the alt- right milieu and the European radical right 
deserves further research.
As we have shown in this book, anti- gender coalitions sometimes include 
politicians and organizations with openly fascist leanings. Moreover, 
ultraconservatives occasionally employ rhetorical tropes whose roots can 
easily be traced to the fascist imaginaries from the interwar period, e.g. 
when attacking George Soros as leader of a clandestine Jewish elite ruling 
the world or when vilifying minority groups for spreading diseases, moral 
chaos and corruption. Some of the core images of the anti- gender narrative – 
such as malleable masses manipulated by devious elites, collective identities 
in danger of dissolution and the dark vision of the West as a dying civil-
ization – bear strong resemblance to fascist narratives circulated in 1930s 
France and Germany (Sanos 2012; Theweleit 1987). These ideological roots 
and identities are often effectively masked or sanitized by the seemingly 
apolitical discourse about family and children (Dietze and Roth 2020a). 
Anti- genderism appears to be not only a meta- discourse binding together 






These connections and mechanisms of concealment clearly deserve further 
analysis.
We claim that anti- gender rhetoric is best understood as a reactionary cri-
tique of neoliberalism as a socio- cultural formation. In contrast to left- wing 
critiques of the neoliberal regime, which focus on economic injustice, the anti- 
gender movement tends to moralize the phenomenon it opposes. Thus, what 
the left calls “neoliberalism” the right will call “rampant individualism” or 
“consumerism”; what to feminists is a “crisis of care” the right redefines as 
“crisis of the family”; the demographic trends framed by left feminism as a 
“reproductive strike” appear as a “culture of death” or “abortion as geno-
cide” in the ultraconservative vocabulary. Instead of naming the problem in 
socio- economic terms, as injustice and exploitation, anti- genderism presents 
the world of capitalism’s winners as degenerate and morally corrupt, an emo-
tional wasteland destroyed by greed and consumption. While we are far from 
claiming that these two frames have equal claims to truth, we do insist that the 
ultraconservative frame cannot be dismissed as a mere smokescreen for what 
is really a neoliberal agenda. In the United States, neoliberal policymakers 
identified the family as an alternative to the welfare state, thus legitimizing 
cuts to health, education and welfare budgets (Cooper 2017; Brown 2019). 
But despite its American connections, the global anti- gender movement is not 
an expanded version of U.S. neoconservatism. As we have demonstrated, the 
European anti- gender actors often implement “family values” through redis-
tributive state policies. Rather than accepting the function of promoters of 
family values in a neoliberal state, they position themselves as experts on social 
policy in what is to become an ultraconservative chauvinist- welfare state. 
They gain public resonance by introducing a host of social policies targeted at 
traditional families, and by critiquing the ethos of individualism which is cen-
tral to neoliberalism, identifying the latter with modern- era feminism.
Much of the material examined in this book belies the easy distinction 
between left and right, whereby “left” means culturally progressive and 
economically egalitarian, and “right” means socially conservative and pro- 
market. Our findings are consistent with scholarship showing the ongoing 
realignment of the political scene: a shift from the left- right continuum to a 
division between cosmopolitan liberals and conservative populists (Norris 
and Inglehart 2019; Piketty 2018). Given this new mapping, it is neces-
sary to examine not only the differences but also the possible convergences 
between left feminist and socially conservative critiques of neoliberalism. 
While it is tempting to deal with the similarities between the two worldviews 
by dismissing them as symptoms of a hostile takeover or appropriation of 
left- wing discourse by right- wing actors, this is a path we did not take in this 
book. As Wendy Brown eloquently puts it, there exists:
a left political moralizing impulse that wants everything the right stands 
for to be driven by nefariousness, smallness, or greed, and everything 
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we do to be generously minded and good, and impulse that casts Us and 
Them in seamless and opposing moral- political universes.
(2006: 690– 691)
Given the contemporary political and social landscape, the progressive 
strategy should be to go against such an impulse. Instead, we need to under-
stand the internal logic of right- wing populist critiques of neoliberalism, 
their uses and abuses of “gender” and the sources of their emotional appeal. 
The strategies employed by anti- genderists are heavily reliant on the use 
of emotions and sometimes involve the circulation of lies, misconceptions 
and false rumors, but they also reflect a coherent worldview and express 
deeply held convictions and attachments. While we disagree with the ideo-
logical claims and condemn the violence that sometimes results from them, 
we are often convinced of the sincerity of the people who are attracted by 
such arguments. The core narrative of anti- genderism is so effective because 
it responds to the tensions which accompany the populist moment. The 
anti- gender movement effectively harnesses the unmet demands for a voice, 
inclusion and agency, while pointing to liberal elites as those who should 
be held responsible for the current crisis. These elites, including feminists, 
gays and promoters of “gender ideology,” are portrayed as guilty of having 
shamed ordinary people who live ordinary lives. Anti- genderism presents 
itself as a response to this shaming, a way to regain collective dignity, a 
sense of pride and solidarity. It also offers a forum for collective action and 
a vague promise of a brighter future which this action will bring about: you 
can save the world by being a good parent, by loving your wife or husband 
and by opposing the forces of corruption.
Are progressive actors helpless vis- à- vis this framing? The logic of the 
populist moment as described by Mouffe (2018) offers an opportunity to 
reclaim the initiative. Feminism is for the elites and has nothing to do with 
the concerns of ordinary women – this old backlash myth has taken on a 
new life in the era of anti- gender campaigns, which have successfully equated 
feminism with capitalism. The recipe for success in countering this attack is 
to claim the role of “the people” for women and other minority groups, 
and to harness the emotional power of solidarity and hope. The problem is 
not merely that Western feminism has allied too closely to neoliberalism, as 
some socialist feminists have convincingly shown (Eisenstein 2012; Fraser 
2009). What is perhaps an even greater challenge is that the right has at the 
same time successfully framed feminism as a form of capitalism. As feminists 
we need to acknowledge that we have lost the monopoly on a gendered cri-
tique of neoliberalism. Not only has the right successfully appealed to many 
economically and culturally marginalized groups, but it has harnessed the 
grievances against late capitalism that are specific to women: the crisis of 
care, the devaluation of reproductive work and motherhood. If feminism is 
to respond to these developments effectively, it will have to do more than to 
denounce its alliance with neoliberalism and reclaim its socialist face. The 
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feminism of the future should be a feminism for the 99 percent (Arruzza et al. 
2019), but one that avoids economic reductionism and embraces affective 
solidarity as the basis for collective action. The struggle over values is real, 
and not a mere smokescreen for economic conflicts. Our analysis suggests 
that this new feminism, able to respond adequately to the challenge of the 
populist moment, has already emerged at the grassroots level in various 
locations.
With gender becoming a key battleground for the redefinition of the pol-
itical scene, feminism has stepped in as a major political actor. Contrary to 
liberal thinkers and commentators who want to blame feminism and so- 
called identity politics for the onslaught of right- wing populism (e.g. Lilla 
2017), we believe that it is the blindness of liberalism and liberal feminism to 
the problems of care and social politics that has facilitated their opponents’ 
successes in channeling opposition to neoliberalism. Right- wing populism 
presents itself as a legitimate alterative to the neoliberal paradigm, offering 
welfare chauvinism and re- traditionalization as the only feasible solution to 
the crisis of care. The women’s movements that have emerged in response 
to this movement are also a challenge to neoliberalism. What all the recent 
feminist mobilizations have in common is that they position women as “the 
people,” they tend to have a left orientation and are often developed in 
cooperation with other marginalized groups. Feminism allies include labor 
unions in Spain, leftist organizations working with migrants and refugees in 
Italy, movements for racial justice in the United States, whereas in Poland 
the new feminism has joined forces with people with disabilities, nurses and 
care workers. These movements position themselves as opponents of the 
neoliberal elite which sustains the patriarchy. Feminist activists denounce 
these elites employing a language that privileges emotion and affects over 
appeals to common sense and individual rights. They speak of dignity, truth 
and solidarity; they valorize ordinary women’s embodied knowledge and 
experience, using social media for sharing personal narratives and building 
affective communities. We claim that the new feminism shares many core 
features with populism, and thus it can be interpreted as a left populist force, 
poised to challenge right- wing hegemony in the populist moment. While 
this book did not examine broader left populist movements, such as, for 
example, the Spanish Podemos, our analysis clearly suggests that in order to 
be effective such movements must take the gender dimension of the current 
crisis more seriously than they have done in the past. It is not enough to 
“add” a feminist perspective to the left- wing agenda. It is about the realiza-
tion that, as Nancy Fraser puts it: “today struggles over social reproduction 
are at the cutting edge of left- wing, anti- systemic, anticapitalist struggle, and 
women are at the forefront” (Martinez 2019b).
This book is an invitation to reconsider the ongoing democratic back-
sliding – the crisis of liberalism and the rise of the populist right – as a 
process deeply intertwined with global struggles over gender, the family 
and reproduction. Conversely, we suggest that anti- feminist mobilizations 
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cannot be viewed in isolation from broader political dynamics but rather 
as a key part of the resurgence of right- wing populism. The anti- gender 
campaigns examined in this book are symptomatic of a major realignment 
in global politics in which post- material conflicts of values displace the left- 
right division formulated around economic issues and the role of the state. 
It is only by taking struggles over “gender” into account that we can under-
stand the affective and epistemological dimensions of the current rise of the 
populist right.
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